Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 2, April–May 2009, pp. 25–40
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The rise of China generates excitement in some quarters but anxiety in others. A possible mitigating factor against the worst-case scenario of a belligerent, outlaw superpower is the prospect of democratisation in China. For many liberal theorists, China’s apparently permanent commitment to free-market economics raises the expectation that a loosening of the Chinese political system cannot be far behind. It has become a truism that an authoritarian state is likely to undergo political liberalisation when its average per capita gross domestic product reaches between $5,000 and $6,000. A Chinese economist at a government-affiliated think tank recently projected that, based on current trends, China’s per capita GDP will reach $3,000 by 2010 and $6,000 by 2020. There are of course many uncertainties lying ahead. Especially in light of the global financial and economic crisis, China could see an economic downturn and a political retrenchment before realising its anticipated potential. China might also prove to be an exception to the $5,000 rule. Nevertheless, an optimist could hope that about the time Chinese power and influence begin to rival those of the United States, China will have some form of democratic political system.
The potential impact of democratisation on Chinese foreign policy is enormous if one accepts the assertions of what is commonly called ‘democratic peace theory’. Unfortunately, democratisation of China’s political system will probably not bring about a dramatic pacification of Chinese foreign policy, as important aspects of Chinese foreign policy are already ‘democratic’ in the sense that most of the Chinese people support, if not demand, them.
Democratic peace theory
Immanuel Kant argued in his essay ‘Perpetual Peace’ that democracies are disinclined to go to war because they give the general public, which is inherently peace-loving, veto power over a country’s foreign policy through the ballot box. Wars have been frequent in history, Kant argued, because the ruling class made the decision to fight while the mass public bore the costs of the fighting. But if the common man actually had a voice in foreign-policymaking, war would become infrequent. In a democracy, a decision for war must account for public opinion. National leaders who contemplate subjecting their people to an unpopular war risk being voted out of office.
Recent scholarship has suggested additional reasons why democracies might be disinclined to fight wars against one another. One argument is that democracies tend to develop rich networks of institutional and cooperative linkages, which act as restraints and disincentives against violent conflict. Another rationale is that the political culture of negotiation, compromise and peaceful resolution of differences that develops within democratic systems carries over into bilateral relations between democracies. Finally, democracies might see one another as sharing similar values, engendering a mutual respect that steers them toward managing their disputes peacefully.
Observers of recent US foreign policy will recognise the influence of democractic peace theory. President Bill Clinton proclaimed in 1994 that...
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Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East–West Center, Honolulu.
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