Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 4, August–September 2009, pp. 21–27
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At its 60th anniversary summit in April 2009, NATO’s heads of state and government agreed to draft a new, contemporary strategy for the Atlantic Alliance. The current document, the so-called Strategic Concept, was approved in 1999 and does not reflect the dramatic political developments of the last decade, including the 11 September 2001 attacks, the war in Afghanistan, transatlantic disputes over the war in Iraq (which led to what then US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns called a ‘near-death experience’ for the Alliance) or the admission of nine new member states. Intermediate papers, such as the Comprehensive Political Guidance (approved in 2006) or the Declaration on Alliance Security (2009), have been prepared to provide the Alliance with at least some political guidance, but their general, lowest-common-denominator content could never provide serious strategic direction for NATO’s future evolution.
Thus, a new strategy is long overdue. The new Strategic Concept will be drafted in the coming months by a group of external experts – referred to as the ‘Eminent Persons’ – and is scheduled to be presented for the approval of NATO’s heads of state and government at their next summit in late 2010.
Strategic requirements
Given the changes in the international political landscape, the new Strategic Concept has to meet at least five requirements. First and foremost, it has to clearly define NATO’s roles and missions. This has been attempted many times in recent years, but the result has been a cluttered list of functions intended to account for all foreseeable contingencies.
Hence, the second requirement will be to set priorities so that demands may be brought in line with resources. Establishing a hierarchy of functions will mean that elements at the bottom of the list may be omitted, even if some NATO members might have different preferences. On the other hand, clear priorities can function as a benchmark for members’ performance.
Thirdly, by defining a common vision for NATO, the new Strategic Concept should become a tool for re-engaging and re-committing all NATO member states to the core principles of the Alliance. This should include the recognition that undivided security can only be based on undivided solidarity. A new consensus on these basics is necessary to counter a trend of re-nationalisation in foreign, security and defence policy, as can be seen in Afghanistan, where the ‘we’ in NATO operations is crucially missing.
Fourthly, the new Strategy, while necessarily grounded in the previous one, must be forward oriented. Merely re-confirming already-agreed wording would be insufficient. Moreover, the new strategy should not be an intellectual ‘Maginot Line’ that only codifies NATO’s acquis communautaire. Instead, it must fully reflect the broadest possible range of political–military contingencies to avoid strategic surprises.
Finally, NATO’s new strategy must contribute to winning the battle of narratives. It must serve as a public rallying point to gather support, particularly for the military dimension of security, and be seen as a strategic communications tool vis-à-vis an increasingly critical public. This will be all the more important as many NATO governments…
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Karl-Heinz Kamp is the Research Director of the NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome. This article is derived from the most recent NDC study, ‘The Way to NATO’s New Strategic Concept’. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone.
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