Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 4, August–September 2009, pp. 127–148
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Scholars and policymakers often argue that armed groups must first lay down their weapons before peace and democracy can be achieved. The existence of armed groups is considered antithetical to sustained peace, and to democracy, where the legitimate use of force belongs solely to the state. In some cases, critics also find the ideological positions and policy preferences of armed groups anathema, claiming that groups such as Hamas, Hizbullah, the Sandinistas and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) must be weakened not only because their arms inhibit peace and democracy, but because their ideologies do as well.
Regardless of the underlying logic, this strategy is wrongheaded. Insisting on disarmament as a precondition to negotiations prolongs conflicts. Few opposition groups are willing to give up their arms before they have been provided a meaningful stake in the system, just as a gambler would never surrender his chips before sitting down at the table to play. Setting disarmament as a precondition stalemates negotiations from the outset and eliminates the possibility of moderating the political stances of conflict participants. Trying to remove today’s enemies from the democratic process only isolates them, and provokes their enmity tomorrow.
Dropping the precondition of disarmament not only increases the possibility of negotiation and moderation, but the inclusion of armed groups can actually play an important, positive role in negotiating settlements leading to the end of civil war, to democratisation and to long-term security. One must remember that the conditions fostering the establishment of democracy –democratisation – are not the same as the conditions of established peace and democracy. As Dankwart Rustow noted, democratic regimes often derive from hotly contested debates, ‘family feuds’ in which contending sides recognise that neither can win the dispute outright. These processes can be volatile, even ‘hot’, borne of factors often incompatible with democracy itself. Without this period of initial contestation and compromise, however, the conditions of stable democracy may never be met. In the midst of conflict, preserving a balance of power between forces deters violence and enables compromise, rather than derails it.
Lessons from the Cold War are instructive here. What allowed the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union to remain non-violent was precisely that the balance of power between the two states deterred direct confrontation. Indeed, in the realm of international politics, the benefits of the power balance as a deterrent to conflict are considered self-evident. This logic should also be applied to power dynamics within states. Regardless of how seemingly abhorrent the preferences of the actors may be, the existence of competing powers may actually deter future violence. It may also facilitate negotiations by creating conditions in which all parties prefer compromise over the possibility of escalated conflict.
Of course, arms are not always a good thing – the dangers of proliferation are real, and the promotion or dissemination of arms is to be resisted. The policy advice presented here applies onlyto situations in which arms are already present. Rather than categorically assuming that arms must be removed…
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Matthew Longo is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, Yale University. Ellen Lust is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University.
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