Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 4, August–September 2009, pp. 13–20
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North Korea’s October 2008 agreement to open all declared nuclear sites to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a quid pro quo for its removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism marked a high point for President George W. Bush’s foreign policy. But even before Pyongyang began to abandon verification, Kim Jong Il had outmanoeuvred Bush by building and testing a nuclear device. By April 2009, Pyongyang’s expulsion of nuclear monitors following the UN Security Council’s condemnation of its ballistic-missile test, and its insistence that only ‘mutual agreement’ permitted inspection of suspect atomic sites, suggested little nuclear disarmament beyond identified nuclear sites was in the offing. The May 2009 nuclear detonation should put an end to the disarmament illusion, at least as long as the Kim regime remains in power. The time has come for Washington to stop trying to force Pyongyang to disarm and to recognise that nuclear non-proliferation is not an end in itself. Rather, it is only one means to prevent the use of atomic weapons, the ultimate objective.
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said in April that while he did not like to accept any country as a nuclear-weapons state, the international community ‘had to face reality’. White House non-proliferation czar Gary Samore acknowledged that it was unlikely the current regime would give up its nuclear weapons. If North Korea’s bomb is here to stay, the international community must address three serious concerns. The first, the risk that Pyongyang will export nuclear material to other nations or terrorists, has dominated the public agenda and galvanised dozens of states to cooperate with Washington’s Proliferation Security Initiative, an effort to intercept nuclear contraband. The UN Security Council’s 14 October 2006 sanctions resolution gave the initiative an additional boost.
A premeditated North Korean nuclear strike is a second peril. But here too the United States and South Korea have constructed an effective deterrent and retaliatory response.
The third serious challenge, however, remains largely unaddressed. It is possible that North Korea could launch its nuclear arsenal not as the result of premeditation but due to intelligence failure, misperception, miscalculation or command-and-control deficiencies. Kim Jong Il’s fear of pre-emption magnifies the risk, and his successors, concerned about holding on to power, may suffer from greater apprehensions.
The peril will increase as Pyongyang weaponises its arsenal for placement on ballistic missiles, a scenario that appears plausible given its continuing rocket-testing programme. Considering the stakes, curbing the danger must be a priority in American strategic planning.
Given that the usual range of incentives and disincentives is unlikely to move the North toward nuclear disarmament, and that any use of force could potentially reignite the Korean War, the time is ripe to examine a set of options that Washington has so far eschewed, concerned that it would legitimate Pyongyang’s atomic arsenal. ‘Engagement’ – diplomatic recognition, military confidence-building measures and economic investment ‘without precondition’ – offers the best way not only to constrain North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons but, ultimately, to…
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Bennett Ramberg, a former US State Department analyst, is a Los Angeles-based proliferation expert, foreign-policy consultant and businessman. He is the author of Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy (University of California Press) and directs the Global Security Seminar.
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