The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula

 

The modern political history of the Korean Peninsula is shaped by the legacy of the 1950–53 Korean War. This bitter and costly conflict ended in military stalemate, with North and South Korea continuing to be divided by the 38th parallel. Subsequently, North Korea amassed large and formidable conventional military forces, which are mainly forward-deployed near the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), seemingly in position to launch an invasion of South Korea. Over the past two decades, due largely to economic decline and lack of financial resources, as well as force improvements in South Korea and the US, North Korea’s conventional forces have become relatively weaker, when compared with those of South Korea and the US. As a result, any North Korean option to invade South Korea has become less credible. While causing tremendous damage, a North Korean attack on South Korea would most likely be defeated by a US–South Korean counterattack. Nonetheless, the credibility of North Korea’s conventional military forces remains largely intact in terms of their potential to defend the state and to inflict damage on South Korea – especially Seoul – which remains hostage to North Korea’s artillery massed along the DMZ.

 

By the same token, options for US and allied forces to launch pre-emptive strikes against selected military targets in North Korea are fraught with steep risks, even more for any plan for an invasion to overthrow the North Korean regime. The US could probably destroy known nuclear and missile facilities in a pre-emptive strike, but not hidden facilities and weapons that would survive such a pre-emptive attack. In any event, Pyongyang would regard an attack on its strategic assets as a dire threat to its vital interests, and could retaliate in ways that could quickly escalate to a wider conflict. The US and South Korea would likely prevail in a fullscale war, but the human and material costs would be very high – even if unconventional weapons were not employed. In essence, the military standoff that marked the end of the Korean War prevails 50 years on.

 

Conceptually, US defence reviews conducted in the 1990s included the Korean Peninsula along with military contingencies in Southwest Asia. Geographically, however, the situation on the Peninsula bears more similarity to that surrounding the former border between East and West Germany, and to Bosnia-Herzegovina, than it does to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or southern Iraq. In particular, the dispositions of North Korean and allied (US and South Korean) armed forces deployed on the Peninsula are dictated by terrain. In geographical terms, the Korean Peninsula is compact, approximately 250km wide at its narrowest point and about 1,000km long. Moreover, the Peninsula is characterised by mountainous topography; much of the flat land that exists comprises either marshland or rice fields. Therefore, rapid movement by heavy armoured forces would be difficult.

 

The DMZ is approximately 4km wide and 250km long, stretching from the Yellow Sea (or West Sea) in the west to the Sea of Japan (or East Sea) in the east. Contrary to its name, this zone is located within one of the world’s most heavily militarised areas. More than one million troops and 20,000 armoured vehicles and artillery pieces – plus more than one million landmines and numerous fortified defensive positions – are packed into a small area surrounding the DMZ. Furthermore, there is little ‘strategic depth’ between the DMZ and the capital cities of Pyongyang (about 125km north of the DMZ) and Seoul (approximately 40km south of the DMZ). As a comparison, forces on either side of the DMZ are more densely concentrated than were those of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe during the Cold War.

 

The region’s topography offers heavy armoured forces three main avenues of approach for any potential land offensive. Two are in the relatively flat western part of the Peninsula, known as the Chorwon and Kaesong Munsan corridors, and provide the most direct approaches to Seoul and Pyongyang, although much of the flat terrain is marsh land and rice fields. The third route runs along the east coast through the Taedong Mountains and is the most amenable to vehicle passage. In some places, these corridors are about 15km wide and interconnected with other possible routes, which would utilise existing road networks and suitable terrain in the central and eastern parts of the Peninsula.

 

Although it is difficult to know North Korea’s precise intentions or aspirations, its forces are deployed along the DMZ in such a manner that they could support an invasion of South Korea. In particular, the percentage of North Korean forces deployed within 100km of the DMZ has significantly increased during the past two decades. Currently, North Korea deploys approximately 65% of its military units, and up to 80% of its estimated aggregate firepower, within 100km of the DMZ. This inventory includes approximately 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems and 2,000 tanks. Because of these forward deployments, North Korea could theoretically invade the South without recourse to further deployments and with relatively little warning time.

 

Thus, it has been argued that North Korea’s military strategy is designed around plans to launch an invasion of South Korea. At the same time, North Korea’s armed forces are also positioned in order to deter an attack, being deployed to deliver a pre-emptive strike against the South if Pyongyang believes that an attack is imminent or to retaliate with overwhelming force if the North is attacked. This posture is dictated by the doctrine that ‘attack is the best form of defence’, a formulation that defined Soviet forward deployments in East Germany during the Cold War. The mass forward deployment of North Korean forces also helps to strengthen domestic political support for Pyongyang’s ‘military first’ policy and heavy internal security apparatus.

 

North Korea, having adopted generic Soviet military doctrine, would probably begin any war with a massive artillery assault on South Korean and US positions south of the DMZ and on Seoul itself. Chemical weapons might also be employed against military and civilian targets. Infantry and mechanised forces would then try to take advantage of the ensuing chaos to penetrate South Korean–US defences with the aim of quickly capturing Seoul. These advancing forces could be preceded by Special Forces, pre-deployed in South Korea through tunnels or inserted by mini-­submarines or airdrops. Presumably, North Korea would try to catch US and South Korean forces off-­guard, attempting to seize Seoul before reinforcements could be deployed. Once Seoul was captured, North Korea might try to invade the rest of the Peninsula or try to use Seoul as a bargaining chip to negotiate favourable ceasefire terms. In any event, mass artillery and armoured forces, supported by Special Forces and airborne missions, would be the central components of any offensive operation.

 

North Korea’s armed forces are composed of nearly 1.1m active-duty personnel and some 4.7m reserves, making them the world’s fifth largest active military force. Although precise conversion rates for the North Korean Won to the US dollar are difficult to ascertain, North Korea officially maintains an annual defence budget of about $1.5bn to support these forces, but some estimates of actual expenditure are more than three times as high, at around $5bn, which would translate to about 25% of North Korea’s GDP, estimated to be currently $20bn.

 

Pyongyang’s order of battle is equivalent to approximately 150 active duty brigades. That includes 27 infantry divisions, as well as some 15 independent armoured brigades, 14 infantry brigades, and 21 artillery brigades. North Korean forces are heavily dug-in with more than 4,000 underground facilities and bunkers near the DMZ and an estimated 20 tunnels dug under the DMZ, of which four have been found. There are also more than 20 Special Forces brigades, totaling about 88,000 troops, which could be deployed by air, sea and land to disrupt US and South Korean combat operations and attack civilian targets.

 

North Korea’s armoured forces are estimated to include some 3,500 main battle tanks (MBTs), 3,000 armoured personnel carriers and light tanks, and more than 10,000 heavy-calibre artillery pieces, many of which are self-propelled. The MBT force primarily comprises older T-54/55/59 models, but includes some 800 indigenously produced T-62s. Of the estimated 10,000 or so artillery pieces in the North Korean inventory, a considerable number are pre-deployed, in range of Seoul; additional artillery could be moved forward to fortified firing positions at short notice. Of particular concern to Seoul are Pyongyang’s 240mm multiple rocket launchers (capable of simultaneously firing 16–18 rockets), its 152mm and 170mm towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, and its mobile FROG systems – all of which are capable of delivering chemical and biological agents as well as conventional high-explosives. In addition, the ground forces have about 7,500 mortars, several hundred surface-to-surface missiles, 11,000 air defence guns, 10,000 surface-to-air missiles, and numerous anti-tank guided weapons.

 

The North Korean air force possess some 605 combat aircraft and is organised into 33 regiments: 11 fighter/ ground attack; two bomber; seven helicopter; seven transport; and six training regiments. The air force mostly comprises older MiG aircraft (of the MiG-15/17/19/21 types), but includes small numbers of more modern MiG-23, MiG-29 and Su-25 aircraft. Like North Korea’s ground forces, a relatively large percentage of the air force is deployed near the DMZ – at military air bases only minutes flying time from Seoul. The North Korean navy can be divided into six main groups: 43 missile craft; about 100 torpedo craft; 158 patrol craft (of which 133 are inshore vessels); about 26 diesel submarines of Soviet design; 10 amphibious ships; and 23 mine countermeasures ships. There are also some 65 miniature submarines for the insertion and extraction of Special Forces. Around 60 percent of the North Korean navy is deployed in forward bases, and North Korea has strengthened its coastal defences in forward areas by deploying more modern anti-ship cruise missiles.

 

On paper, North Korea’s armed forces are formidable, but their actual capabilities are less than the raw data suggest, given the obsolescence of most North Korean equipment. Around one-half of North Korea’s major weapons were designed in the 1960s; the other half are even older. Also, it is certain that due to shortages of spare parts, fuel, and poor maintenance, some weaponry will not be functional. The US Army’s Cold War system for comparing hardware capabilities suggests that ground combat units equipped with modern Western weaponry are about 20–40% more combat effective than units of comparable size with out-of-date equipment. After the 1991 Gulf War, the US-based Analytic Sciences Corporation developed a more up-to-date and realistic model for comparing forces, known as the Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization (TASCFORM), which was utilised in the 1990s by the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. According to this model, modern Western weaponry is generally two-to-four times more capable than Soviet systems.

 

Using TASCFORM methodology, it is estimated that North Korea’s heavy armoured forces, possessing enough combat hardware to equip perhaps ten US divisions, have an actual capability equivalent to about 2.5 US armoured divisions. With equipment operated by the infantry added, the North Korean ground forces possess an overall firepower which is equivalent to nearly five modern US heavy divisions. By comparison, Iraq was assessed as having six modern division equivalents when the same TASCFORM scoring system was used in 1990. Using the same methodology, North Korean airpower, the equivalent to six US wing equivalents in size, corresponds to only two F-16 wing equivalents in estimated net capability.

 

North Korean doctrine, military readiness and morale are also key factors in determining actual military performance. Employing highly inflexible Soviet-style military doctrine, North Korea emphasises high-ranking decision-makers and scripted war plans – neither of which encourage operational flexibility nor initiative. It is doubtful, therefore, that North Korea possesses a strong mid-level officer corps. Pyongyang has attempted to raise training levels and readiness in recent years, but fuel and other shortages have significantly limited its ability to conduct large-scale combined-arms training exercises, such as those practised by US and South Korean forces. Fuel shortages have especially limited air force training: pilot training – according to anecdotal evidence – is limited to a handful of flying hours every year, because available aviation fuel needs to be conserved for actual military contingencies.

 

Nonetheless, despite shortages of spare parts, fuel and training time, North Korea’s conventional capabilities pose a significant threat to allied forces and South Korea’s population. For example, North Korea’s artillery capability does not require sophisticated tactics nor modes of operation to pose a threat to Seoul. In any conflict, North Korean artillery, firing from fortified positions near the DMZ, could initially deliver a heavy bombardment on the South Korean capital. Allied counter-battery fire and air strikes would eventually reduce North Korea’s artillery capability, but not before significant damage and high casualties had been inflicted on Seoul. Similarly, the North Korean air force could launch surprise attacks against military and civilian targets throughout South Korea before allied air superiority was established. The potential delivery of chemical or biological weapons by artillery, short-range missiles and aerial bombs is an additional threat – especially to unprotected civilians.

 

North Korean naval forces could complicate US efforts to reinforce its forces in South Korea during a conflict. Although the US Office of Naval Intelligence states that North Korea’s submarine force is obsolete and is ‘only modestly proficient in basic operations in its own coastal waters’, it points out that North Korean submarines could be effective in operations such as mining and insertion of Special Forces. Similarly, although North Korea’s missile and torpedo craft are old and their weapons systems obsolete, these vessels would need to be neutralised before US vessels could anchor and use ports to deliver reinforcements. Mines in the difficult waters around the Korean Peninsula would pose a threat to allied forces, as they did to the US 6th Fleet during the Korean War. However, the mine countermeasures capabilities of the US and South Korean Navies can now detect and clear mines at a much faster rate than previously.

 

United States Navy (USN)/United States Marine Corps (USMC) amphibious doctrine dictates that landings will be launched from relatively far out to sea, thereby keeping the large amphibious-capability vessels clear of shallow-water mines and coastal defence batteries. Moreover, although heavy equipment still relies on displacement landing vessels, a far greater proportion of amphibious troops and equipment are now transported by hovercraft and helicopter, which are less vulnerable to mines. Defence spending North Korea’s military capability is also affected by issues of manpower effectiveness, including morale and loyalty. The political loyalty of officers and troops to Pyongyang is extremely difficult to determine, but party control and indoctrination remains strong in the armed forces, and there is no basis to assume that the military would collapse or revolt in wartime. As they demonstrated during the Korean War, North Korean forces are likely to be physically tough and resilient. However, years of maltreatment of soldiers by officers, and malnutrition – North Korean units rear livestock and grow vegetables to boost food stocks – may have affected morale to an unknown extent.

 

South Korea’s armed forces comprise approximately 686,000 active-duty troops and 4.5m reservists. Its active ground forces are about half the size of North Korea’s in terms of personnel, major equipment holdings and force structure, but its equipment is superior. South Korea’s air and naval forces are comparable in size to North Korea’s, and they possess much more modern and sophisticated equipment. Overall, South Korea’s armed forces have become one of the world’s more capable militaries and present a formidable forward defence against any possible attack by North Korea.

 

South Korea’s army consists of 11 corps, with 52 divisions and 20 brigades. They can deploy some 2,300 main battle tanks, 2,500 armoured personnel carriers and light tanks, 4,500 heavy-calibre artillery pieces, 6,000 mortars, an estimated 600 air defence guns, over 1,000 surface-to-air missiles, and about a dozen short­range surface-to-surface missiles. Usually, 12 army divisions are deployed along the DMZ in heavily fortified positions. The South Korean air force has 538 combat aircraft and 117 attack helicopters. Meanwhile, the South Korean navy includes 39 principal surface combatants, 20 submarines, 84 patrol and coastal combatants, 15 mine warfare ships, 12 amphibious vessels, and 60 naval combat aircraft. South Korea’s defence expenditure is several times more than that of North Korea. In 2002, as at average annual exchange rates, South Korea’s defence budget amounted to $13.2bn. However, this figure needs to be balanced as manpower costs in the South are greater.

 

According to the TASCFORM scoring system, South Korea’s ground combat weapon capabilities are rated higher than those of North Korea because of South Korea’s qualitative edge. By the same measure, its air capabilities, when factoring in attack helicopters, are also superior – totalling about 2.5 F-16 wing equivalents. With the acquisition of the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1-A, due in service this year, South Korea’s armed forces will increase their capabilities significantly. The missile system has a range of 300km and can target command and communications facilities, intelligence assets, and missile launching sites.

 

As measured by static equipment indices, South Korea’s conventional forces would appear superior to North Korea’s. When morale, training, equipment maintenance, logistics, and reconnaissance and communications capabilities are factored in, this qualitative advantage increases. In addition, if North Korea invaded the country, South Korean forces would have the advantage of fighting from prepared defensive positions. Therefore, the Pentagon’s official current assessment of the Korean military balance suggests that, due to qualitative advantages, the South Korean–US combined force capabilities are superior to those of North Korea.

 

Still, there are spheres in which South Korea could improve. A number of modernisation programmes have been delayed or cancelled due to financial considerations. According to the US, South Korea’s principal shortcomings are in the areas of command, control and communications, chemical and biological defences, and precision munitions. In addition, replacement of South Korea’s ageing Nike-Hercules air defence system with Patriot missiles would significantly strengthen the country’s theatre missile defence capability.

 

A war in Korea would be extremely demanding on US forces. As envisaged in all post-Cold War defence plans (the ‘base force’ of President George H.W. Bush’s administration, the Clinton administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review of President George W. Bush’s administration) the US would have to deploy almost half of its combat forces in the event of a fullscale conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The required number of troops would be in the region of 500,000–600,000, comparable to the 550,000 who fought in Operation Desert Storm.

 

The US normally has about 300 fixed-wing combat aircraft based in the immediate vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. This figure includes US air forces in Japan, and some 75 fixed-wing aircraft on board a carrier, which is normally deployed nearby. In March 2003, a number of F-117 stealth fighters and F-15E Strike Eagle fighters boosted US air capabilities when they were dispatched to the theatre for the annual Foal Eagle military exercise, but remained in the region because of tensions concerning North Korea’s nuclear programme. A modest additional ground force element of perhaps 1,000 troops was also added at the same time, and 24 B­52 and B-1 bombers were deployed to Guam. These deployments demonstrate Washington’s ability to quickly reinforce its military: the US could double its available combat aircraft in the region within a week, and double them again in another couple of weeks. Moreover, US Army and Marine Corps forces in northeast Asia have 100 attack helicopters deployed with them. Airfields available for US combat aircraft would number at least half a dozen at the start of any hostilities, and could quickly be expanded to a dozen or more locations across Japan and South Korea.

 

The US usually stations two brigades of the Army’s Second Infantry Division in South Korea. These constitute 18,000 US troops, based in 17 camps approximately halfway between Seoul and the DMZ and astride the two main potential avenues of approach in the western half of the country. US forces conduct extensive training, both on their own and in conjunction with the South Korean military, to maintain capability and interoperability. By 2006, US forces will have redeployed 75km south of the Han River (which runs through Seoul) with the headquarters of US Forces Korea moving from Seoul to the Osan-Pyongtaek area. The redeployment will not result in any significant reduction in the numbers or readiness of US forces on the Peninsula; nor will it remove completely the ‘tripwire’ function of US forces against any North Korean attack. The redeployment, will, however, shorten US lines of communication in the initial phase of any confrontation and increase the survivability of US units by placing them out of range of initial North Korean artillery strikes. In this respect, the redeployment of US forces in South Korea will strengthen US military capabilities to defend South Korea and respond to any North Korean attack.

 

Politically, however, the redeployment plan has created nervousness in both Seoul and Pyongyang because of concerns that the US will be more inclined to launch a pre-emptive strike on North Korean nuclear and missile facilities if US troops are less vulnerable to North Korean retaliation. However, the risk that a pre­emptive strike would lead to a general conflict is very high, regardless of whether or not US forces are immediately exposed to North Korean retaliation. Nonetheless, Pyongyang may respond to the US redeployment by seeking to enhance its existing capabilities to attack targets beyond standard artillery range – by expanding its short-range ballistic missile force, for example.

 

In an emergency, US ground forces in Korea can be roughly tripled in size within ten days. Initial reinforcements would include the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii. In addition, a brigade’s worth of army equipment and a brigade’s worth of Marine Corps equipment stored in pre-positioned ships in the Indian Ocean would arrive shortly thereafter, to be manned by troops airlifted from the US. After several weeks, a number of ships could also arrive from the US. Eight SL-7 fast sealift ships carrying a US-based heavy armoured army division could reach Korea after some 20–30 days. In the same timeframe, many large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off vessels, as well as more ground forces and marines could also reach the Peninsula. More aircraft carriers and other ships, possibly serving in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, or off the west coast of the US could also be redeployed. Within 75 days, according to official plans, the entire transport operation could be complete. In practice, the operation might take 100 days given the inevitable complications concerning actual deployments and the potential need to clear North Korean mines, submarines, and missile boats from South Korean waters before unloading supply ships.

 

In all, using the TASCFORM system, these US forces would correspond to at least five modern heavy ground-division equivalents and more than 15 modern fighter wings – a combined capability exceeding that of North Korea’s forces, even without including South Korea in the balance. However, the complex logistics of moving large numbers of forces and equipment over great distances, potentially in the face of North Korean countermeasures, would create a difficult and demanding task. Moreover, in the time it takes for full reinforcements to arrive and be deployed in the region – at least 2–3 months – the military situation could have altered dramatically.

 

Finally, in extremis, US forces would also be capable of using nuclear weapons in any Korean conflict. Although President George H.W. Bush ordered the unilateral removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from Korea in 1991, the US retains the ability to deploy nuclear-armed submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) in response to any use of unconventional weapons by North Korea against US forces or allies. The US official negative security assurance concerning the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non­nuclear weapon states has not applied to North Korea since 1993, when it was found to be in violation of its nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards obligations. In any event, Pyongyang has subsequently withdrawn from the NPT and declared that it possesses a ‘nuclear deterrent force’. Moreover, longstanding US doctrine does not preclude the possible use of nuclear weapons against an adversary that uses chemical or biological weapons against the US or its allies, such as South Korea and Japan. North Korea is fully aware of US nuclear capabilities and has often cited the US nuclear threat as a justification for its own nuclear programme.

Throughout the 1990s, US military planners assumed that a North Korean surprise attack on South Korean and US forces might succeed, at least in terms of achieving its intermediate objective of seizing Seoul. In order to accomplish this goal, North Korea would employ its two main advantages: mass artillery – already deployed within range of Seoul – and heavy armoured forces, deployed immediately north of the DMZ. In theory, a massive artillery barrage would stun defences and open corridors for armoured forces to punch through and capture Seoul before allied forces could react. In the event that coalition forces lost Seoul, US military planners estimate that approximately six US ground combat divisions including marine and army units, ten air force wings, and four to five carrier battle groups, would be required to liberate the South Korean capital.

 

In recent years, with the steady degradation of North Korean forces and improvements in South Korean military capabilities, some experts believe that the prospect of a successful North Korean attack to capture Seoul and reunify the Peninsula through force has diminished. In this analysis, South Korea and US forces deployed along the DMZ and around Seoul would stand a good chance of halting or at least severely delaying a North Korean offensive. As a war progressed, North Korean forces would become increasingly vulnerable to US reinforcements, and to attack by precision munitions. Their supply lines would be disrupted by allied artillery and air attacks – which would interdict reinforcement and re-supply along predictable axes of advance.

In addition, South Korean defences are well­prepared, and the country’s armed forces are qualitatively superior (while having comparable firepower to those of North Korea). With most of the

 

South Korean army deployed across a 250km front (in a dense force-to-space ratio of about one division per 10km), invading forces operating in a hostile air environment would find it hard to penetrate such defences, particularly across terrain that is largely unsuitable for the movement of armour. The natural obstacles of rivers and marshes, combined with man­made barriers, mines, and bridge demolitions, would impede further movement and channel North Korean forces into killing zones.

 

Even assuming an attack in winter, which would allow forces to traverse frozen rice fields, North Korean military bridging units would need to cross the Han or Imjin Rivers in any attack on Seoul from the western half of the country. The combined effects of terrain, demolitions, and allied air and artillery in slowing North Korean armoured vehicles would greatly increase their vulnerability to direct fire from anti-tank systems and armour, as well as indirect fire and air­delivered precision munitions. To decrease the impact of allied strikes, North Korean forces might attempt to obstruct the visibility of US and South Korean forces by the use of artillery smoke rounds. Even if they lost some of their sensor and optic capability, allied forces would still have the advantage of being able to fire from protected positions.

 

Although South Korea’s K-1 tanks do not have the detection and targeting capability of the US M1 Abrams, the K-1 is superior to and better protected than North Korea’s outdated Soviet-type tanks and should prevail in tank versus tank engagements. The all-weather, day­night capability of the allied forces is another ‘force multiplier’, allowing troops to detect any massing of armoured vehicles with various platforms. This equipment includes reconnaissance satellites, RC-7B planes, and joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft, as well as ground radars and infrared intruder detection systems.

 

In the air, US and South Korean aircraft would quickly establish air superiority, with at least 500 planes and helicopters deployed to thwart a ground attack. Using 1991 Gulf War data as a guide, allied forces could expect to destroy roughly one armoured vehicle for every four shots fired, deploying Maverick, Hellfire, and tube-launched optically-tracked wire-guided (TOW) missiles as well as laser-guided bombs. Therefore, in theory, allied forces could destroy several hundred North Korean armoured vehicles per day, although this estimate could be affected by weather conditions and by the relative ease of concealment afforded by the Korean terrain, in comparison to the open desert of Kuwait and Iraq. Over time, North Korean targets would become fewer in number and more dispersed, but the rapid arrival of US air reinforcements would increase the density of airpower in the area of operations.

 

North Korean commando forces would only have a limited capability to disrupt South Korean defences. Firstly, an airborne assault generally requires air superiority and the suppression of the enemy’s artillery and air defences – North Korea would not be able to gain either of those advantages. Secondly, a tunnel assault could be more effective, although troops arriving via underground passageways would be unable to penetrate deep into South Korean defences, given the short length of the tunnels. Also, they would be highly vulnerable to counter-attacks on the tunnel entrances by artillery or munitions delivered by air, which could probably be initiated within a short time of the assault starting. Thirdly, it is likely that North Korean Special Forces would use submarines to infiltrate troops, although their numbers would be limited.

 

Nevertheless, Special Forces might be able to cause serious disruption – including through the possible delivery of chemical or biological agents – in cities and rearguard military areas.

Finally, North Korea’s economic decline continues to erode the relative effectiveness and readiness of its forces. Despite the regime’s ‘military first’ policy, North Korea cannot afford to significantly modernise its ageing conventional forces – or even afford the levels of maintenance, refurbishment, and training necessary to maintain high readiness. In conclusion, North Korea is capable of inflicting widespread damage on South Korea in the early days of any conflict, but there is considerable doubt about the ability of North Korea’s conventional forces to sustain offensive military operations and resist the counter-attacks of a technologically superior adversary with better trained forces. Therefore, according to the Commander of US Forces in Korea, General Schwartz, ‘an attack scenario appears unlikely at this time because North Korea clearly knows that its regime would ultimately be destroyed as a result of any attack.’

 

 

If North Korea cannot be confident of achieving a successful invasion of South Korea, do Washington and Seoul have a plausible offensive option to invade North Korea and capture Pyongyang? Despite the relative shift in the military balance of power in favour of the allies, such a pre-emptive use of force would appear very risky. Even though US and South Korean forces

enjoy qualitative superiority, and, via a US military build-up, could increase this superiority rapidly, they could not be confident of winning an offensive war against North Korea without sustaining heavy military and collateral casualties. An all-out invasion, along the lines of the March–April 2003 campaign in Iraq, is not an appealing option. Even with the US military’s prowess and ability to execute ‘effects-based operations’ (which aim to disrupt the decision-making ability of an adversary) an invasion of North Korea would likely prove much more costly than the 2003 Iraq War.

 

Firstly, with so many North Korean weapons deployed near Seoul, and many in protected locations, even a well-timed surprise attack could not prevent a heavy artillery bombardment of the South Korean capital. In their current positions, a large percentage of North Korea’s estimated 10,000 or so artillery pieces are deployed within range of Seoul, with the capability to fire several rounds a minute. The initial speed of a fired shell is generally around half a kilometre per second. Therefore, even if an allied counter-battery radar, some 10km away picked up a North Korean missile or artillery shell and established a track on it within seconds, a counter-strike would not be able to silence the North Korean gun or launcher for at least a minute. As a result, one artillery piece could probably fire 2–5 rounds before being neutralised or forced to retreat into its shelter. Theoretically, several thousand artillery rounds could land in Seoul no matter how hard the allies tried to prevent or stop the attack.

 

Secondly, many North Korean military and political leadership facilities are located deep underground, making them hard to identify and attack, and thus limiting the effectiveness of effects-based operations. North Korea has studied US campaigns in the Balkans and Middle East and has taken measures – such as hardening facilities, dispersing forces, and improving camouflage, concealment and deception – to counter US technological advantages. Compared with Iraq, North Korea has more numerous hardened underground facilities, and the US has even worse intelligence on the functions or even the locations of such facilities. It would be extremely difficult for US Special Forces to infiltrate North Korea, to locate command locations and to direct aerial attacks against such facilities.

 

Thirdly, there is no straightforward line of approach to Pyongyang, like the open desert traversed by coalition forces in their advance on Baghdad in March–April 2003. Just as the difficult terrain would complicate a North Korean attack on the South, it would also present difficulties for any allied attack against the North. As a result, the harassment of supply lines during an invasion of North Korea could be a much more pervasive problem than it was in Iraq. An amphibious landing to bypass the DMZ and attack Pyongyang directly would be a substantial and risky operation, especially since the North has made efforts to strengthen its coastal defences in recent years. Airborne troops would presumably play an important role in seizing key assets behind North Korean lines, but it could be difficult to reinforce these troops if advances over land were stalled.

 

Fourthly, North Korea’s armed forces, with a total active-duty strength of more than a million, are much larger than Iraq’s and more likely to resist. Iraq’s forces numbered around 400,000 (against coalition forces of more than 250,000) and most of Iraq’s forces melted away under the coalition’s overwhelming firepower. In contrast, the US military respects the toughness and determination of the individual Korean soldier. While difficult to measure, the North Korean regime probably commands more political legitimacy and loyalty than the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, and a collapse of North Korea’s armed forces cannot be assumed. Consequently, an offensive operation against North Korea would require a build-up of hundreds of thousands of US troops, in addition to a large number of South Korean soldiers. It would be impossible to conceal this build up from Pyongyang, which would have time to prepare its defences or even launch its own pre-emptive attack before allied forces could be fully deployed.

 

Fifthly, North Korea’s arsenal of unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles is estimated to be much more potent than Iraq’s. In the case of Iraq, US military planners assumed that Baghdad had a relatively small arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, which would not be effective on the battlefield against protected coalition forces and could not be delivered in large amounts against cities beyond Iraq’s borders. In contrast, North Korea is assumed to have thousands of tonnes of chemical and possibly biological weapons, which can be delivered against Seoul via numerous short-range weapons or against cities throughout South Korea and Japan via longer-range missiles. Iraq was thought to have a handful of ageing ballistic missiles, while North Korea is believed to have hundreds of ballistic missiles. Finally, Washington was confident that Iraq did not have any nuclear weapons, while North Korea is thought to possess a small nuclear capability. Though the use of its presumed nuclear arsenal would invite nuclear retaliation, Pyongyang has effectively tried to foster the impression that it would take suicidal actions as a last resort if faced with a military threat to extinguish its regime.

 

Due to these considerations, a fullscale pre-emptive attack to remove the North Korean regime is considered by Washington, Seoul and Tokyo to be an impractical option. More limited pre-emptive options include air strikes against known or suspected North Korean nuclear facilities, chemical weapons storage sites, missile launchers and firing bunkers, or North Korean artillery locations near the DMZ. But, these limited options suffer two basic disadvantages. Firstly, from a practical standpoint, it would be difficult to conduct a fully effective first strike, given the uncertainty and multiplicity of targets. For example, US forces could probably destroy the key nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre – thus destroying North Korea’s known plutonium production capacity – but such attacks cannot account for additional facilities and materials presumed to be hidden at other locations. Similarly, pre-emptive attacks could only account for a portion of mobile missile launchers and artillery rockets.

 

Secondly, a limited pre-emptive attack runs the risk of provoking North Korean retaliation. Pyongyang would view any attack against its strategic assets as the opening move in a broader campaign to destroy the regime. On the one hand, Pyongyang will presumably recognise that a massive response against South Korea and Japan to a limited US strike would guarantee the end of the regime. On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult for Pyongyang to suffer a loss of key assets without responding in some way to defend itself and deter additional allied attacks. Even if Pyongyang tried to limit its response to selected targets, such as targeting US military forces deployed in South Korea, the danger of escalation to a state of general conflict would be high. As a consequence, there is little enthusiasm in Washington, and much less in Seoul and Tokyo, for a surprise ‘surgical strike’ to knock out North Korea’s key military assets. However, if the allies believed that war was inevitable and that North Korea was preparing to attack, a pre-emptive strike would hold great advantages. Likewise, if Pyongyang feared an attack on its critical military assets, it would be under pressure to use its weaponry before these assets could be destroyed on the ground.