North Korea's Chemical and Weapons (CBW) Programmes

 

Deciphering the chemical and biological weapons capabilities of any country is a challenge. Chemical weapons (CW) programmes are difficult to trace because many of the facilities potentially involved in military activities are dual-use, with legitimate peaceful purposes, and are relatively easy to conceal. With biological weapons (BW), this is even more the case. With regard to North Korea, assessments are especially difficult due to the fact that – in comparison to other countries suspected of pursuing chemical and biological weapons – the country has remained less accessible in terms of economic and political contacts. Since North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), there have never been any official declarations and international inspections of its chemical infrastructure, much less suspect facilities that might be associated with a chemical weapons programme. Also, although North Korea is officially a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Convention lacks a strong verification and inspection mechanism. Another major hindrance to comprehensive insight on North Korea’s presumed chemical and biological weapons programmes is that its research and industrial facilities in these areas are relatively isolated from the outside world, so much so that even basic questions of science and infrastructure are uncertain.

 

In these circumstances, an analysis of North Korea’s possible chemical and biological weapons programmes has to rely on public information provided by governments, defectors, and secondary source publications. Such an analysis, made using sources that by their very nature are not comprehensive, will contain many gaps and uncertainties. There are very few details on these suspect programmes that can be specified with confidence. Nonetheless, an analysis based on a variety of sources, particularly official US, Russian and South Korean statements and reports, concludes that North Korea probably has developed chemical weapons to be part of its deployed military capabilities (although there is little authoritative information on the type and amount of agent or delivery means). It is also probable that North Korea has a biological weapons programme at least at the research and development stage. North Korea has dual-use facilities that could be used to produce biological agents as well as a munitions industry that could be used to weaponise such agents. However, there is not enough information to determine whether Pyongyang has progressed beyond the research and development stage for a biological weapons programme and actually possesses stocks of biological weapons.

 

Since the early 1990s, official US, Russian and South Korean government publications have all described North Korea as having an active chemical weapons (CW) programme that has gone beyond research and development and includes the actual production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.2 There is considerable uncertainty, however, over the composition of that stockpile. Given its large – though ageing – chemical industry, North Korea is generally thought to be capable of producing all of the traditional chemical warfare agents (nerve, blister, blood and choking), although it may require imports of some specific precursors to produce nerve agents which are relatively more difficult to fabricate than the first generation blister, blood and choking agents. However, the exact size of the North Korean chemical weapons stockpile remains unknown. Recent South Korean government reports estimate a range of between 2,500–5,000 tonnes, but it is unclear whether these estimates concern the weight of chemical agent or the overall munitions stockpile and even whether they include biological agents. In any event, these figures are highly speculative. There is little authoritative information on the types of chemical munitions that have been stockpiled, but North Korea is capable of using a variety of delivery systems to disseminate chemical agents, including artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, aerial bombs, and missiles, as well as Special Forces. The role of chemical weapons in North Korea’s military planning is unknown, but it may be based partially on old Soviet doctrine. US and South Korean forces operate on the assumption that North Korea would use chemical weapons against both military and civilian targets as part of either offensive operations or in retaliation for an attack on North Korea.

 

In 1954, the North Korean army reportedly established regular chemical and biological defence units, which were most likely modelled on Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) units. According to some press accounts, North Korea’s offensive chemical weapons programme also began at this time, relying primarily on assistance from the Soviet Union, but the reliability of these reports cannot be determined. In any event, in the late 1950s, North Korea began to develop an extensive chemical industry. The First Five Year Plan (1957–61) placed great emphasis on developing a robust organic and inorganic chemical industry, building on facilities constructed during the Japanese occupation. At the end of 1961, Kim Il Sung issued a ‘Declaration of Chemicalisation’. This called for greater efforts to develop various chemical production facilities to support different sectors of the North Korean economy. According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, the 1961 declaration reflected North Korean recognition of the importance of chemical warfare. As a result of its large chemical infrastructure, North Korea can produce a number of dual-use chemicals, such as compounds of phosphate, ammonium, fluoride, chloride and sulphur, that could be diverted from civilian chemical uses to support a chemical weapons programme.

 

By the late 1960s, according to the US Department of Defense, North Korea was believed to have begun experiments with the production of offensive chemical agents. In May 1979, the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported that North Korea possessed only a defensive chemical weapons capability, although it noted that development of offensive chemical weapons would be the next logical step. Several press reports from the 1980s continued this speculation. The first publicly available official report, to the effect that North Korea had produced chemical weapons agents, was published in January 1987. This publication, by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, reported that North Korea possessed up to 250 tonnes of chemical weapons – including mustard and nerve agents – designed for delivery by artillery shells.

 

According to official and secondary reporting, North Korea’s chemical weapons arsenal expanded in the early 1990s. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which such statements reflected actual developments on the ground, or whether they resulted from outside factors affecting public reports of North Korea’s programme. Political factors have had an impact. For instance, in 1992, as negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) were drawing to a close, Seoul sought to publicise the extent of North Korea’s chemical weapons programme in a bid to pressure Pyongyang to sign the CWC. In October 1992,

for example, Seoul reported that North Korea had 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent held in six storage facilities, a four-fold increase over the 1987 assessment of 250 tonnes of agent.10 Pyongyang denied these claims, and countered that the US was storing chemical weapons in South Korea. On 14 January 1993, South Korea signed the CWC when it was opened for signature, and later declared a small stock of chemical weapons, which are being destroyed in accordance with the Convention. North Korea, on the other hand, issued a formal statement on 13 January 1993 denying that it possessed a chemical weapons programme, but it refused to join the CWC.

 

A second factor, in the mid-1990s, that influenced the public reporting of North Korea’s chemical weapons capabilities was the appearance of several prominent defectors, who publicised purported details about North Korea’s chemical weapons arsenal, along with related research, production and storage facilities. The most influential of these was Sergeant Yi Chung Kuk, who worked in the Nuclear-Chemical Defence Bureau of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and defected in March 1994. He did so, he said, in order to warn South Korea about the dangers posed by North Korea’s chemical weapons programme. Sergeant Yi provided first-hand information on the organisation and equipment of North Korea’s chemical defence units, which he was directly involved in, but he also reported secondhand information on offensive chemical weapons activities and facilities. Another key defector was Colonel Choi Ju Hwal, who also worked in the KPA and defected in 1995. Colonel Choi said that he did not have direct knowledge of North Korea’s chemical weapons programme, though he claimed to have obtained information from other officials in the Ministry of Defence. Much of Colonel Choi’s testimony is identical to information from other defectors, press accounts, and official South Korean government documents, and it is difficult to determine how much is original and how much is derivative. Finally, Hwang Chang Yop, the Secretary of North Korea’s Workers Party, defected in August 1996 and said that he had heard from other senior North Korean officials that North Korea had an arsenal of high-grade chemical weapons capable of ‘scorching’ South Korea and Japan. Mr Hwang did not claim any direct knowledge of chemical weapons production or deployment. Most of the information provided by these North Korean defectors cannot be independently verified, and the usual caveats about information from defectors applies. Nonetheless, their accounts were widely reported in the South Korean media and may have influenced official assessments by Seoul.

 

Arguably, Pyongyang had a strong incentive to enhance its chemical weapons programme in the mid­1990s, to compensate for the limits on its nuclear capabilities imposed by the October 1994 Agreed Framework. In addition, the financial limits on modernising its conventional forces may have given Pyongyang more reason to build up its CW capabilities. This speculation cannot be confirmed by direct evidence, but Seoul began to report a greater North Korean chemical weapons capability in the mid-1990s. In 1995, for example, the South Korean Foreign Ministry, the National Unification Board and South Korean military sources reported that North Korea had a stockpile of 1,000–5,000 tonnes of chemical and biological agents, including blister agents, nerve agents, choking agent, blood agent, and tear gas, which could be delivered by artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROG rockets, and Scud missiles. The most recent South Korean Ministry of National Defense report on North Korea’s CBW capabilities, from 2001, lists but does not identify by name four research, eight production, and seven storage sites for chemical weapons, and estimates the size of the Pyongyang’s stockpile at between 2,500–5,000 tonnes. There is some uncertainty as to whether the various South Korean estimates are for agent or munitions tonnes, and whether they include biological as well as chemical agents.

 

Official US sources agree on the existence of a North Korean chemical weapons programme, including the stockpiling of agents that could be delivered by a variety of weapons, but Washington has tended to report fewer details than Seoul. In general, US analysts tend to be cautious about the reliability of human information on North Korea’s CW programme, and it is extremely difficult to quantify issues concerning potential production rates and possible stockpiles because North Korean chemical facilities are not subject to international inspections, and satellite intelligence has little value in distinguishing between chemical production for military or civilian purposes. A 2001 US Department of Defense report identifies nerve, blister, blood, choking and tear gases as among the agents the North Koreans can produce and assesses that North Korea possesses a ‘sizeable stockpile’ of these agents, without estimating a specific quantity of agent. According to the US, there may be limits on the North’s production capacity. For example, the senior US military official in Seoul, General Schwartz, has testified that the North is capable of independently producing components only for first generation (i.e. World War I­-type) chemical agents (e.g. phosgene and mustard). Imports of some precursors may be necessary for the production of more advanced nerve agents. Official US sources agree with South Korean reports that North Korea has weaponised chemical weapons agents for deliver by artillery, missiles, and aircraft, as well as unconventional means, but US public reports generally do not discuss suspect or possible research, production, and storage sites associated with chemical weapons.

 

North Korean defectors and various secondary sources have provided detailed information about facilities purportedly involved in research, production, and storage of chemical precursors, agents and munitions.22 According to these sources, North Korea’s chemical weapons stockpile includes first generation blister agents (lewisite and mustard), various nerve agents (sarin, soman, tabun, and V-agents), and blood agents (hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride). Chemical weapons research is said to take place at various universities and at a number of institutes under the aegis of the Second Natural Science Academy. Chemical weapons production facilities are reported to include the Kanggye Chemical Factory and Factory No. 108 in Chagang Province, the Sakchu Chemical Factory in North Pyongan Province, the Ilyong Branch of the Sunchon Vinalon Factory in South Pyongan Province and Factory No. 297 in Pyongwon, South Pyongan Province.

 

In addition, a number of civilian chemical facilities have been implicated in chemical weapons production, such as the Manpo Chemical Factory and Aoji-ri Chemical Complex. Defectors and press stories also report that chemical agent storage sites are located in the cities of Masan-dong, Samsan-dong, and Sariwon, and in the greater Pyongyang area. These facilities are reportedly comprised of storage tanks housed in warehouses and buildings above ground, partially buried structures, and underground tunnels. It is alleged that chemical weapons agents are transferred to facilities at Sakchu or Kanggye for loading into munitions, which include 80mm artillery shells, 240mm rockets, aerial bombs, and aerial spray tanks. Following final assembly and filling, chemical munitions are reportedly stored at the Maram Materials Corporation and the Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation, located in Masan-dong, Pyongyang, and Anbyon, Kangwon Province, respectively. Most of this information cannot be independently confirmed.

Assuming that North Korea maintains a stockpile, chemical weapons agents and munitions could play a role in complementing Pyongyang’s conventional military power in offensive or defensive operations. In theory, North Korean forces could use chemical weapons against US and South Korean forces to reduce these forces’ combat effectiveness, deny the use of mobilisation centres, storage areas, and military bases, and hinder the arrival of reinforcements from overseas. Non-persistent chemical agents could be used to help break through defensive lines or to hinder an allied counterattack. Persistent chemical agents could be used against fixed targets, including command and control centres, logistics hubs, and airbases. North Korean forces appear to be prepared for operations in a contaminated environment. Chemical defence battalions are reportedly integrated into larger ground force units, and many troops are reportedly equipped with chemical protection equipment, including masks, suits, detectors and decontamination systems. North Korean troops are also said to participate in chemical exercises in an attempt to develop mission capability under chemical warfare conditions.

 

Of course, these defensive measures could reflect North Korean expectations that their forces may be subjected to a chemical attacks. Nonetheless, US and South Korean military commanders assume that North Korean offensive military plans include the use of chemical agents delivered by a variety of traditional means, such as ballistic missiles, artillery rockets and shells, mortars, and aerial bombs and sprays, against both military and civilian targets. Delivery by Special Forces is also a possibility. Aside from their potential role in offensive operations, chemical weapons presumably contribute to North Korea’s deterrent posture, especially since North Korea’s conventional capabilities have eroded relative to US and South Korean forces. Although Pyongyang officially denies that it possesses chemical weapons, the widespread belief that North Korea has a substantial chemical weapons arsenal – noted in official US and South Korean government reports – only serves to reinforce the view in the US, South Korea and Japan that a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would result in the use of chemical weapons against civilian and military targets.

 

There is less public information on North Korea’s biological weapons programme than on its chemical weapons programme. Official US, Russian and South Korean reports agree that North Korea has conducted biological weapons research, but there is considerable uncertainty as to whether Pyongyang possesses biological weapons and, if so, the types of agents involved. While official South Korean sources claim that North Korea has weaponised one or two biological agents, official US and Russian sources characterise North Korea as ‘capable’ of producing a variety of agents, including anthrax, cholera and plague without judging that North Korea has actually produced biological weapons. Given the dearth of information, it is impossible to make a firm judgement either way. Various defectors and press reports give details of biological weapons research, testing and production, but such information cannot be confirmed. There is no authoritative information on the potential role of biological weapons in North Korean military strategy, beyond speculation that biological weapons may be relatively less significant than chemical weapons, which have more utility as a battlefield weapon, and nuclear weapons, which are a more capable mass destruction weapon.

 

Virtually nothing is known about the history of North Korea’s biological weapons programme. Official US sources state that North Korea has pursued a biological warfare capability since the 1960s. During this time, according to press reports, a laboratory was established under the authority of the Academy of National Defence and 10–13 different pathogens were investigated, including anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague, smallpox and yellow fever, some of which reportedly were imported from culture collections in Japan. According to another secondary source, construction of an underground biological weapons research and development facility was completed in the 1970s. This facility was located in Onjong-ri, South Pyongan Province and conducted research, development, and testing of biological weapons agents on small laboratory animals.

 

A 1998 White Paper released by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, reported that, ‘by 1980, [North Korea] had succeeded in its experiments in bacteria and virus cultivation to produce biological weapons, and by the late 1980s had completed live experiments with such weapons.’ This is generally consistent with a 1993 report by the Russian intelligence service on proliferation, which stated that North Korea was performing ‘applied military-biological research’ with anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague and smallpox at a number of institutes and universities and testing biological weapons on North Korean islands. South Korean press and other unofficial sources go even further, claiming that, in the early 1980s, North Korea began actual production of biological agents and obtained a turnkey plant for agar (growth media) from East Germany in 1984 to further the biological weapons programme. In contrast, a 1997 US Department of Defense report judged that North Korea’s biological weapons programme was probably still at the level of research and development.

 

Whatever the status of its biological weapons efforts, North Korea has developed a number of dual­use biotechnology facilities that could be used to research biological weapons agents and produce militarily significant quantities of biological agents. But this infrastructure is not highly developed and there is no definitive evidence that it is being used for this purpose. North Korea joined the BWC on 13 March 1987 (followed by South Korea on 25 June 1987), but the convention has no provisions for mandatory declarations or inspections of civilian or suspect military biological facilities.

 

The most recent official US and South Korean reports agree that North Korea has a biological weapons programme, although only Seoul reports that it has advanced beyond the research and development stage. In 2001, for example, a South Korean defence White Paper described the North Korean threat as including ‘chemical and biological weapons such as anthrax of which North Korea is believed to hold a stockpile of 2,500–5,000 tons.’ The report does not address the issue of delivery systems, other than to note that North Korean Special Forces could launch attacks with biological weapons. Another South Korean Ministry of National Defense report from 2001 claims that North Korea possesses three research and six production facilities to support its biological weapons programme and has weaponised one or two types of biological agents. In contrast, the most recent public US government report, from 2001, says that ‘North Korea is believed to possess a munitions-production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize biological warfare agents, and may have biological weapons available for use’. According to press accounts, the US intelligence community has assessed with ‘medium’ confidence that North Korea possesses stocks of smallpox virus, but the evidence is not definitive.

 

Most of the detailed information about North Korea’s biological weapons programme has come from defectors and other secondary sources of unknown reliability. According to Choi Ju Hwal, the Germ Research Institute in the General Logistic Bureau of the Armed Forces Ministry is responsible for developing biological weapons. Yi Chung Kuk, meanwhile, claims that biological weapons research and development is carried out at the Microbiological Institute and that there are other facilities in North Korea for producing and storing biological weapons. Yi Sun Ok, who was an inmate at a North Korean prison camp, claims she witnessed biological weapons experiments in mid-1980s, which resulted in the deaths of some 50 inmates. However, none of these reports can be confirmed.

 

A number of secondary sources provide additional details on facilities and suspected agents said to be involved in North Korea’s biological weapons programme. According to one report, research on anthrax, bubonic plague, smallpox, yellow fever, cholera and other pathogens is carried out at the National Defence Research Institute and Medical Academy (NDRIMA). Another report says that North Korea’s inventory of biological agents includes anthrax, botulism, cholera, haemorrhagic fever (Korean strain), bubonic plague, smallpox, tuberculosis, typhoid, typhus, and yellow fever. Another claims that 13 types of biological weapons agents are produced at the Workers Party’s Central Biology Research Institute, the Preventive Military Medical Unit, and the February 25th Plant in Chongju, North Pyongan Province. But these reports also cannot be confirmed. To date there is no reliable information available to confirm whether North Korea has engaged in the development of genetically modified biological agents.

 

In conclusion, there is not enough information to reach a firm judgement on the progress of, or possible effectiveness of, North Korea’s biological weapons programme. This is understandable, given North Korean secrecy and the inherent difficulties of detecting and assessing biological weapons programmes, compared to nuclear or even chemical weapons activities. US, South Korean, and Russian official sources agree that North Korea has conducted research on a variety of biological agents, but only Seoul reports that North Korea has actually produced stocks of one or two types of biological weapons. The basis for this assessment is unspecified. Given its biotechnical infrastructure, North Korea is capable of producing significant amounts of common biological agents, such as anthrax, and delivering these agents through a variety of conventional and unconventional means, but it is not known how important Pyongyang views the development and deployment of a biological weapons capability. In any event, the possibility that North Korea may have biological weapons contributes to deterrence.