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10 Sep 02 - Iraq bioweapons are 'threat to neighbours'

Iraq WMD Dossier thumbnail cover
Financial Times
 
Iraq could kill thousands of civilians in neighbouring countries by firing missiles armed with biological weapons, according to an assessment of its weapons of mass destruction capability published on Monday.
 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think-tank, says Iraq's ability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is "severely diminished" by comparison with the period just before the 1991 Gulf war.
 
But the report, likely to be closely studied by both advocates and opponents of western military action against Iraq, says: "Given Baghdad's behaviour over the last 25 years, there is every reason to believe that it remains committed to retaining and developing its WMD and missile capabilities as a core objective."
 
If unchecked President Saddam Hussein can slowly continue to rebuild them, the IISS says, and "it seems likely that the current Iraqi regime will eventually achieve its objectives."
 
It says Iraq has probably been preparing to use its remaining arsenal in the event of an attack by the US, and that if war breaks out "it seems unlikely that all use of chemical and biological weapons can be avoided."
 
Though the effectiveness of these against opposing military forces would be limited because of their ability to defend themselves, Iraq could deliver warheads containing biological agents to cities in Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. "Casualties in an unprotected population could run in the hundreds or even thousands."
 
However, in contrast to weekend statements by US and British officials, the IISS found that of the three types of WMD - nuclear, biological and chemical - "nuclear weapons seem the furthest from Iraq's grasp".
 
This is principally because of Iraq's lack of access to nuclear materials - either highly-enriched uranium or plutonium.
 
"Even worst-case assessments judge that Iraq will require several more years before it can develop [nuclear weapons] capability, assuming it can obtain access to substantial foreign materials and equipment."
 
However, the IISS cautions against a "nuclear wildcard": "If, somehow, Iraq were able to acquire sufficient nuclear material from foreign sources, it could probably produce nuclear weapons on short order, perhaps in a matter of months."
 
The IISS sees the greatest uncertainty in assessing Iraq's biological weapons capability. At the time United Nations inspectors left Iraq in 1998, it says, "Iraq possessed sufficient civilian facilities, equipment and materials to produce bulk biological weapons agent within weeks following a political decision to resume production."
 
It seems a "safe bet", the institute says, that Iraq either has resumed production, or will do so in the face of an impending attack.
 
"Amounts and types of biological weapons agent that Iraq may have at its disposal can only be guessed at, but presumably includes botulinum toxin, anthrax, and perhaps other agents in the range of thousands of litres."
 
However, its ability to deliver biological weapons is limited. At the time of the 1991 Gulf war - when Iraq did arm missiles with biological and chemical warheads - its delivery capability was "rudimentary and inefficient."
 
It probably only has a dozen or so al-Hussein missiles which it could fire at neighbouring countries.
Unless this capability has somehow improved, the "threat against well-equipped and well-defended forces would not be decisive," especially if opposing troops were vaccinated.
 
Iraq could have developed airborne spray or dissemination devices, but these could be shot down. "Most difficult to assess," the IISS says, "is the possibility of delivery of biological weapons by individuals or small groups acting as commandos or terrorists or even unwitting carriers."
 
By contrast, Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal is "better known and less threatening."
 
It probably has hundreds of tonnes of agents such as mustard, sarin, cyclosarin and possibly VX, and perhaps a few thousands of tonnes of munitions - much less than before 1991.
 
This arsenal is unlikely to be able to inflict significant casualties on well-protected opposing forces, and is also unlikely to be able to cause large casualties in surrounding countries with missile warheads unless Iraq has improved fusing and warhead design.
 
Overall, the IISS says Iraq's capability poses a strategic dilemma for other countries. The potential effectiveness of UN weapons inspections "depends first and foremost on the extent ot Iraq's willingness to co-operate . . . Even the most robust and comprehensive monitoring system will fail if Iraq expels the inspectors or feels free to restrict their access."
 
A war against Iraq could install a new government and eliminate the WMD threat, but at the risk of use of biological chemical weapons and civilian casualties.
 
"Either course of action carries risks," the IISS says. "Wait and the threat will grow. Strike and the threat may be used."