The US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, undertaken without the most explicit Security Council authorisation for the use of force, generated a spate of gloomy predictions about the lasting damage that the war was likely to inflict on the United Nations (UN). Some five months after US President George W. Bush announced a formal end to major combat operations, the UN is again at the centre of discussions about Iraq's future. As the heads of government met for the annual opening of the General Assembly in New York in late September, Bush used the occasion to make another direct appeal to member states. He told the assembled delegates that the US would welcome a greater UN role, additional troops and money to assist in the stabilisation and rebuilding of Iraq. This, he stressed, was in everyone's interest now that Iraq had become 'the central front in the war on terror'. It was the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, however, who grabbed the main headlines with a call for a 'hard look at fundamental policy issues', adding that the organisation had reached a 'fork in the road'.
Five months of occupation have revealed just how formidable are the challenges involved in rebuilding a religiously divided, politically fragmented and economically weak country emerging from decades of oppressive and despotic rule. With US casualties now exceeding 300, no sign of an early reduction of US troop levels and the financial costs of occupation mounting by the day (Bush recently requested an additional $87bn from Congress), members of the Security Council are all in agreement on one central issue: the Iraqis themselves need to be given a much greater role in restoring stability and in running the country. Agreement on this fundamental point means that the dynamic within the Council is sharply different from that of March 2003. This is bound to ease ongoing efforts to reach a consensus on the future of the UN's role in Iraq. Nevertheless, several obstacles and sensitivities need to be addressed along the way.
What kind of force…
In his speech to the General Assembly, Bush suggested that the UN was in a position to 'contribute greatly to the cause of Iraqi self-government'. To this end, he called on the UN to assist in developing a constitution for Iraq, train its civil servants and help organise multiparty elections – all areas where the UN has a proven track record. He further commended the 'vital and effective work' carried out by the UN's specialised agencies, specifically that of UNICEF and the World Food Programme. These ideas and sentiments were all spelled out in greater detail in the draft resolution presented by the US to the Council on 4 September. The proposed resolution was also, however, designed to serve other purposes.
In particular, the US has been anxious to increase substantially the number of non-US troops on the ground in Iraq. At present, the US provides 127,000 out of 152,000 troops. In an effort to alter the overall balance of contributions, the draft resolution – which the administration had hoped to pass before the opening of the General Assembly – urges member states to provide troops for a 'multinational force, under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability'. By 'unified command' Washington meant US command and control, and for 'member states' the administration had, in the first instance, four countries in mind: India, Pakistan, South Korea and Turkey. By reaffirming the UN's 'vital' role and generally raising the organisation's political profile in Iraq, the US has been hoping that each of these countries would be able to overcome powerful domestic opposition to despatching troops. For the time being, the prospect of this happening is still remote, especially as far as India and Pakistan are concerned. The decision last week to call up more US reserves suggests no early resolution of the issue. Yet other countries have not questioned the idea or importance of providing extra troops. Indeed, in a much-publicised interview with The New York Times on 21 September, French President Jacques Chirac, otherwise critical of the occupation, was careful not to rule the possibility of France providing troops. Member states also appear to accept that overall military command-and-control will continue to rest with the US.
…and when to transfer power?
The real obstacle to an early adoption of a new resolution has centred on another key question: how soon and in what way power should be transferred back to the Iraqis. US Secretary of State Colin Powell was quick to brand as 'totally unrealistic' the suggestion by French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin that the UN should oversee the creation of a provisional government in Iraq within a month, a constitution by the end of the year and elections in the spring. Instead, the US has called on the Council to 'endorse' the 25-member Governing Council as 'the principal body of the Iraq interim administration'. With the assistance of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Coalition Provisional Authority, this body would then draw up a 'timetable and program for the drafting of a new constitution […] and for the holding of democratic elections'. In his interview with the New York Times, Chirac appeared to tone down Villepin's initial call for a rapid transfer of authority. Still, he did call for a two-stage plan, involving first the 'symbolic transfer of sovereignty' from Paul L. Bremer, the US administrator in Baghdad, to the Governing Council, followed by the 'gradual ceding of real power over a period of about six to nine months'. For understandable reasons, given the adverse security situation throughout Iraq, the US remains reluctant to place a specific timescale on the process of handing over power. Nevertheless, the determination of all involved to transfer power as soon as practicable, and the common and overriding interest in ensuring that stability returns to the country and the region, should lead to a meeting of minds, possibly before the donors conference in Madrid next month.
However, over the past two months a further obstacle to a revamped UN role in Iraq has come to the fore. Within the UN – that is, the UN secretariat and organisations – reservations about assuming a more prominent role in Iraq have grown. Following the devastating terrorist attack on the UN compound in Baghdad on 19 August – an attack which saw the death of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, along with 21 people less than a week after the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq – questions have been raised within the Secretariat about the security of UN personnel in Iraq and, by implication, the risks involved in becoming too closely associated, without any real and corresponding influence, with the US-led occupation regime.
Ultimately, the UN secretariat will undertake whatever the Security Council demands of it, but some account must clearly be taken of the concerns that have been expressed. If not, the chances of persuading other troop contributors to come forward appear dim.
UN's expanding peace and security role
With the media's attention so firmly fixed on Iraq, other, arguably more significant, news about the UN's expanding role in the field of international peace and security have almost escaped attention. On 19 September, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1509, establishing a 15,000-strong stabilisation force for Liberia to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement signed following the departure of former president Charles Taylor in August. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) – which is nearly as large as the UN mission to Cambodia in 1992–93 – has been set up under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for an initial period of 12 months and will formally be replacing the existing ECOWAS force on 1 October 2003. UNMIL's mandate is not that of a straightforward peacekeeping operation. It is extraordinarily ambitious, involving detailed provisions for the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation of former combatants. It also envisages a role for the UN in monitoring and restructuring the Liberian police force, and it will assist the transitional government in re-establishing 'national authority throughout the country'.
When the Liberian deployment is complete, the number of troops and civilians deployed on UN missions around the world will be close to 50,000; an impressive figure by historical standards, surpassed only for a brief period in the early 1990s, when the UN was engaged in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. The figure may climb still further as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York is reportedly in the advanced stages of preparing for a possible mission to Sudan. When one recalls that the UN Security Council also authorised two new operations after the formal end of hostilities in Iraq – the UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI), authorised on 13 May, and, a few weeks later, the deployment of a French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force to eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo – the day-to-day reality of the UN's role in the field of peace and security is put in perspective. In some respects, the Secretariat has never been busier.
Balanced debate
All of this raises the question of whether the UN has indeed reached a 'fork in the road'. In his annual report on the work of the organisation, Annan argued that 'the war in Iraq [had] brought to the fore a host of questions of principle and practice that challenge the United Nations and the international community as whole'. He returned to this theme in his speech to General Assembly. Many, especially critics of US and UK action in Iraq, have seized on the references in Annan's remarks to the dangerous 'proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force'. Yet, the Secretary General was careful to add that denouncing unilateralism was not enough: one also had to 'face up squarely to the concerns that makes some States feel uniquely vulnerable'. As such it was a more balanced speech than much of the commentary about it appeared to suggest. In it, Annan also observed that 'members may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of threats'. Agreement will never be reached on such criteria. Still, the discussion itself may serve a useful purpose, especially if the debate is widened to look both at the reality of 'new threats' and the question of how best to meet them.
