Volume 9 - Issue 9 - November 2003

Prior to the invasion of Iraq, all the states of the Persian Gulf had much to fear. Among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the prospect of a prolonged conflict carried the risks of diminished US credibility, a resurgence in the popularity of Saddam Hussein and social unrest. In fact, the smaller states of the northern and central Gulf have seen their strategic situations improve. They also stand to reap another important benefit - faster democratisation. Yet, despite the direct strategic advantages which the Iraq war has conferred on the Arab Gulf states, and the indirect benefits of political legitimisation and stability it has encouraged, there are still many dangers ahead.

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In early November 2003, Iran said that it was suspending development of the Shihab-4 - a missile that, unlike the more established Shihab-3, had not yet reached the production stage but was estimated to have sufficient design range to strike targets in Europe. The announcement, which came soon after Tehran said that it would suspend its uranium-enrichment activities, probably marked a response to mounting international concerns about  Iran's nuclear  and missile  programmes. If the gesture was intended as a tactical measure to placate Tehran's European and American critics, however, it does not form part of any overall slowdown in Iran's missile development efforts.

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A new dimension to Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry is fast emerging at sea. As India's negotiations with Russia for the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines near completion, flight tests of a new generation of Indian naval missiles are proceeding apace. On 23 November, India conducted a sea-based test of its new supersonic and potentially nuclear-capable cruise missile - BrahMos - for the third time in as many weeks. While Pakistan will be hard-pressed to match such capabilities, these developments will boost Islamabad's own aspiration for a sea-based nuclear capability, thereby further complicating South Asia's already complex security dynamic.

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The US Army has roughly 180,000 soldiers deployed abroad, with ongoing operations in Iraq accounting for nearly 130,000. Over 70% of the active army's manoeuvre brigades - 24 out of 33 - are engaged overseas. Nearly 40,000 reservists - drawn from both the US Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG) - now serve in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush administration officials see no cause in these numbers to increase the size of the army, although they have in the last two years quietly let its full-strength rise from the authorised level of 480,000 to just over 500,000. Yet many military analysts and members of Congress consider the army to be overstretched and potentially unable to cope with a long-term presence in Iraq - much less any war on the Korean Peninsula or additional campaigns and missions in the war on terrorism.

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EU leaders will adopt a formal 'Security Strategy' at the Brussels European Council in December 2003. It will be based on a draft document - entitled 'A secure Europe in a better world' - unveiled in June by Javier Solana. The draft was widely welcomed, both in Europe and the United States, as heralding a new assertiveness, robustness and clarity in EU foreign policy. Indeed, the main significance of this document is the fact that it exists at all; never before has the EU tried to set out how it sees the international security environment, what it considers Europe's security objectives to be, and how it intends to achieve them. The key question is whether the Security Strategy will amount merely to fine words, or whether it will make the EU the more effective actor it aspires to become.

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