Iran's nuclear ambitions - Volume 9, Issue 2 - March 2003

 

Iran seems close to crossing the nuclear threshold: it is just a few years away from completing a recently disclosed facility that could be configured to produce enough highly-enriched uranium for several nuclear weapons a year. Tehran claims the plant, which is permitted under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is vital to its civilian nuclear power ambitions. However, the weight of evidence and analysis points in the opposite direction.

 

Following the 1973–74 oil crisis, Iran embarked on an ambitious nuclear power programme, which included an interest in developing fuel cycle facilities to produce enriched uranium and plutonium – the two essential ingredients for nuclear weapons. While competing with Germany and France to sell nuclear power plants to Iran, the Carter administration persuaded European governments not to supply fuel cycle facilities because of associated proliferation risks.

 

The 1979 Islamic revolution dramatically disrupted Iran's nuclear power programme. It led to an outflow of scientists and the suspension of nuclear contracts with Germany (which was building a nuclear power plant at Bushehr) and France (which was building a nuclear research complex at Isfahan). During the 1980s, Tehran sought to revive its nuclear power and research programme, but the US convinced European governments to impose a nuclear embargo, arguing that Iran was pursuing a weapons programme under the cover of civilian activities. Iran instead turned to Russia and China: in 1992, Russia agreed to complete the Bushehr plant and China agreed to provide two nuclear power reactors. Moscow and Beijing also began negotiations to supply research and fuel cycle facilities.

 

In 1995, the Clinton administration pressured Moscow to cancel a contract to supply a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment plant to Iran and limit its other cooperation to completion of the Bushehr facility. However, continuing Russian assistance to Iran became a perennial sore point in relations between Moscow and Washington. In 2000, Moscow renounced the 1995 limitations, promising to sell Iran additional power reactors. More successfully, Washington in 1997 reached agreement with Beijing to terminate nuclear cooperation with Iran, including cancellation of a uranium conversion facility then under construction at Isfahan. Despite US efforts, Iran was gradually able to make progress – often through unauthorised assistance from Russian entities and scientists. In 1998, Washington imposed sanctions on two Russian nuclear research organisations for assisting Iran in the production of heavy water, which is used in the type of natural uranium-fuelled reactors that are ideal for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. In 2000, it intervened with Moscow to block the sale to Iran of a laser facility to enrich uranium. The Bush administration continued efforts to convince Moscow to halt nuclear cooperation with Iran and prevent unauthorised transfers of technology and material.

 

The extent of Iran's nuclear development was publicly disclosed in August 2002, when an opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, revealed the existence of two undeclared facilities and details about front companies established to procure materials and equipment. One facility, located near Arak, was identified as a plant for the production of heavy water. The second, near the town of Natanz, was identified as an underground facility, still under construction, to produce nuclear fuel. In December 2002, the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security provided further details and commercial satellite pictures of the two facilities, identifying Natanz as a probable gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility.

 

Following these revelations, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami on 9 February announced that Iran was developing facilities at Isfahan and Kashan (i.e., the Natanz facility) for processing natural uranium to produce fuel for Iran's civilian nuclear power programme 'and nothing else'. To reinforce the point, Iran invited Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to visit the Natanz facility on 21–22 February. During ElBaradei's visit, Khatami pledged to submit the facility to inspections, and agreed to provide the IAEA with early design information on any new nuclear plants. He also agreed to consider enhanced safeguards measures giving the IAEA greater inspection capabilities.

 

According to press accounts of the IAEA visit, Iran's ability to produce enriched uranium through the gas centrifuge process is well advanced. Natural uranium extracted from mines at Saghand is processed at Isfahan and converted into uranium hexaflouride (UF6), the gaseous feed material for gas centrifuges, which spin the UF6 at high speeds to separate lighter and heavier uranium isotopes. At the Natanz gas centrifuge plant, Iran has already assembled a pilot scale 'cascade' of 160 centrifuge machines of a relatively advanced design, reportedly based on technology from Pakistan. Iran has sufficient parts for an additional 1,000 centrifuge machines and plans to install about 5,000 by 2005.

 

Depending on the configuration and operation of the facility, Natanz could produce either low-enriched uranium for light water nuclear power fuel or highly-enriched uranium for several nuclear weapons a year. Iran claims its efforts are designed to provide low-enriched uranium for power reactor fuel required by its 20-year plan to generate 6,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity from nuclear power (this is equal to the capacity of about six light water nuclear power plants). It argues that an independent means of producing nuclear power reactor fuel is needed to circumvent US efforts to cut off Iran's access to foreign nuclear power assistance. Under the NPT, Iran is legally allowed to develop fuel cycle facilities, such as the Natanz enrichment plant, provided that these facilities and the nuclear material involved are subject to IAEA inspections to verify civilian uses.

 

In Iran's case, however, this civilian justification makes little sense. Russia has already contracted to provide lifetime fuel for the 1,000 MW Bushehr nuclear power station, which is Iran's only nuclear power plant under construction. Even if Iran eventually acquires additional nuclear power plants, it is more economical to obtain fuel commercially from foreign suppliers – as do other countries with extensive nuclear power programmes, such as South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, Iran has no plausible need for the heavy water production facility at Arak: the Bushehr plant does not require heavy water and Iran's existing research reactors do not use heavy water, or use too little of it, to justify a production facility. Despite its assurances, Iran appears to be pursuing a nuclear weapons capability under cover of its civilian programme.

 

In one scenario, Iran could secretly try to produce highly-enriched uranium at Natanz or divert low-enriched uranium from there to a clandestine facility for further enrichment to weapons grade. IAEA inspections of the Natanz plant would significantly reduce these risks. Under its current safeguards agreement, Iran is not technically required to allow IAEA inspections at Natanz until 180 days before uranium is introduced into the plant. But public exposure of the plant has forced Iran to allow IAEA access to the facility when it is still several years from completion. Iran may thus also be forced to agree to a configuration of the plant and integrated monitoring devices that would make it very difficult to secretly produce highly-enriched uranium or to divert low-enriched uranium from the facility without detection. In addition, if Iran signs an enhanced safeguards protocol, it would be required to declare new nuclear facilities to the IAEA 180 days before construction begins and to allow environmental sampling that would help detect undeclared plants.

 

Nonetheless, even if IAEA safeguards are effective, Iran could still develop a nuclear weapons capability once the Natanz enrichment facility is operational. Under the NPT's terms, Iran can legally withdraw from the treaty with 90 days notice, citing 'extraordinary circumstances'. From Tehran's standpoint, it could justify a withdrawal by pointing to the perceived threat posed by Israel's nuclear weapons programme or by the United States. Having withdrawn from the NPT, Iran would no longer be subject to IAEA inspections, and could convert the Natanz facility to produce highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons within a relatively short period – perhaps a few months. If Iran exercised this option, it would increase pressure on other countries in the Middle East to follow suit, perhaps imitating Iran's precedent of developing fuel cycle facilities under the auspices of a civilian nuclear research or power programme.

 

To secure minimal Iranian cooperation in the impending war against Iraq, Washington has deliberately avoided a confrontation with Tehran over its enrichment programme. However, once Iraq's disarmament is achieved – whether through inspections or, more likely, an invasion to remove Saddam Hussein – the US will turn its attention to halting Iran's nuclear programme. Unlike North Korea – which is suspected of possessing nuclear weapons and is expected to expand its arsenal while the US deals with Iraq – Iran still seems to be a few years away from achieving a nuclear weapons capability. There is time to act.

 

A successful invasion of Iraq might significantly strengthen Washington's ability to pressure Tehran. With the US in control of Baghdad, and fearing they might be next on Washington's agenda, Iranian leaders may become more cautious about pursuing nuclear activities that could attract US hostility and even risk military attack. In addition, the elimination of Iraq's potential nuclear weapons programme could neutralise one strategic rationale for an Iranian nuclear arsenal. At the same time, Tehran is not likely to abandon its long-standing nuclear efforts easily. And even if the Iraqi threat is removed, many in Tehran are likely to see the development of nuclear weapons as even more essential in deterring the perceived US threat and associated efforts to engineer regime change in Iran.

 

From Tehran's standpoint, the optimal strategy will be to offer assurances of peaceful intent, while developing its nuclear weapons capability as quickly as possible. This explains Iran's decision to allow IAEA access to the Natanz facility while it is still under construction, and to promise IAEA inspections once the plant is operational. At some point, Tehran is likely to offer to accept additional IAEA safeguards measures to provide further confidence against the risk of diversion and the existence of undeclared facilities. To alleviate pressure to halt its nuclear programme, Tehran may also seek to satisfy Washington on other issues, such as terminating military assistance to Hizbullah terrorists or helping to establish a stable government in a post-Saddam Iraq.

 

However, Washington is unlikely to be satisfied by such moves, or tolerate the emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. Some US officials will emphasise the primacy of threats and pressure to intimidate Tehran into abandoning its enrichment programme, as well as efforts to encourage the emergence of moderate political leaders in Iran who may be more willing to limit Iran's nuclear activities to deflect American hostility. Others will argue that pressure should be accompanied by incentives, such as accepting Iranian access to nuclear power assistance and secure fuel supplies if Tehran agrees to halt development of an indigenous enrichment capability. If Iran carries on regardless in pursuing an enrichment capability, there is a risk that Washington may consider military options to destroy the Natanz facility – much as Israel destroyed the safeguarded Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981.

 

To avoid the need for military action, and the regional instability that would result from a strike, Washington will need the help of key powers with influence in Tehran, including the UK, France, Germany, Japan and Russia. As a first step, these key countries would need to agree that Iran's pursuit of a safeguarded enrichment programme, while technically legal, represents an unacceptable proliferation risk. Although disagreement over Iraq is likely to obstruct development of a common policy towards Iran, the need to deal with Iran's nuclear programme could equally provide a basis on which to restore cooperation among the leading powers.