The US and the 'perilous crossroads'
The incoming Bush administration identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles to 'rogue states' as the most urgent security threat facing the US and advocated missile defence as the centrepiece of its response. In reaction to critics who argued that the more likely threat came from terrorists armed with 'suitcase bombs', rather than rogue states armed with missiles, the administration responded that it was necessary to defend against both. Like its predecessors, the Bush administration saw terrorism and proliferation as separate and distinct threats, requiring essentially different responses.
The 11 September terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax scare fundamentally changed this perception and led Washington to conflate the terrorism and proliferation threats. Following the collapse of the Taliban regime in November, President George W. Bush first revealed this new approach during a key speech on 11 December. According to Bush, the 'next priority' in the war against terrorism was stopping terrorists from obtaining and using WMD. This was directly connected to the proliferation of WMD to 'rogue' states because '[a]lmost every state that actively sponsors terror is known to be seeking weapons of mass destruction, and the missiles to deliver them at longer and longer ranges', and because '[r]ogue states are clearly the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists'.
Elaborating on this concept in his now famous 'axis of evil' speech on 29 January, 2002, Bush identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as regimes that could provide WMD to terrorists and vowed, '[t]he United States will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons'. Although the White House subsequently downplayed the 'axis of evil' imagery, Bush has continued to stress this new threat, particularly with regard to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Accordingly, the administration has increasingly emphasised the need to take pre-emptive action to disrupt and prevent threats before they emerge. As Bush explained in his key 1 June graduation speech at West Point:
'[d]eterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nations or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies'.
Reportedly, the administration is drafting a National Security Strategy (NSS) document for release this summer that will formalise a larger role for pre-emption to stop terrorist groups and 'rogue' states from acquiring WMD. According to press reports, the administration sees 'pre-emption' as covering a broad range of options. Beyond military strikes against suspect WMD facilities, preemption could include covert operations and even political measures intended to prevent a country or group from acquiring WMD. While no country or group will be mentioned by name in the NSS, the document is intended to establish the conceptual basis and rationale for preemptive actions to remove Saddam Hussein, in order to prevent Iraq from acquiring WMD which it might provide to terrorists groups.
Critics at the crossroads
Critics of the administration's 'axis of evil' concept and doctrine of pre-emption have attacked it on three grounds. Firstly, although most governments agree that al-Qaeda represents a real threat (including a possible use of WMD) and must be eliminated, they privately doubt that the prospect of rogue states – even Saddam Hussein – providing WMD assistance to terrorists is a very real one. Why, these sceptics argue, would Saddam take the chance of arming terrorists with WMD, knowing that the risk of discovery would spell his doom through retaliatory action by the US and others? In response, the administration argues that it cannot rely on Saddam's self-restraint, and that the potential for Saddam to assist terrorists with WMD is a sufficient threat to warrant his removal. Nonetheless, the US has begun to put more emphasis on concrete issues – Saddam's brutal dictatorship; his refusal to relinquish WMD and accept international inspections; and his threat to the region and oil supplies – rather than the speculative possibility that he might provide WMD assistance to al-Qaeda. After the initial reaction to the 'axis of evil' speech, meanwhile, US allies have also muted criticisms of Washington's concept in a bid to maintain solidarity in the campaign against terrorism.
A second point of criticism is that a policy of pre-emption cannot be equally applied to terrorists and rogue states. Pre-emption against terrorists – assuming that the necessary intelligence is obtained – is widely viewed as legitimate and necessary, both internationally and in the US. Yet, pre-emption against states developing WMD raises more difficult issues. Most observers accept that pre-emption, such as attacks against suspected WMD facilities in Iraq, is a valid policy option, but they question whether pre-emption can or should be the centrepiece of US non-proliferation policy to the neglect of other approaches.
Finally, many observers argued that lumping Iraq, Iran, and North Korea together in an 'axis of evil' was misleading and counterproductive – primarily because it undermined the real focus on Iraq, which constitutes the only case where the US has a plausible option to use military force to change the regime. In this view, for example, inclusion of Iran in the 'axis' damaged prospects for enlisting Iranian cooperation to remove Saddam because Tehran feared that it would be 'next on the list'. Instead, these critics argued, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea each represent different challenges that need to be dealt with in different ways.
In fact, following the 'axis of evil' speech, senior administration officials were quick to clarify that the policy of regime change was directed only against Iraq. They stressed that the US was still ready for dialogue with Pyongyang, and hoped that moderates in Tehran would open the door to engagement with Washington. Although he has been highly critical of the regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang, Bush has not explicitly called for the overthrow of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il or President Mohammed Khatami. Privately, administration officials argue that Saddam's removal would serve as a powerful warning to Tehran and Pyongyang that would pressure them to end support for terrorism and their pursuit of WMD.
Distractions, disputes and delays
Perhaps the greatest danger for Washington, however, is the appearance of a growing discrepancy between words and actions. Washington has continued to issue strong statements and develop its doctrine of pre-emption, but effective action – whether military or political – against Iraq, Iran, or North Korea has lagged behind.
Though much criticised, the 'axis of evil' speech initially appeared to have some positive effect on the intended targets. Saddam, apparently fearing a US attack, initiated discussions with the UN in early March on the resumption of weapons inspections. In Tehran, the speech reportedly sparked an intensified debate among various factions over the direction of foreign policy and whether to open an official dialogue with Washington. North Korea, which had previously refused to re-engage with the Bush administration, decided in April to resume diplomatic discussions.
Since then, however, US policy towards the 'rogue states' has appeared to lose focus and momentum – in part because other international issues have required attention, and in part because of serious policy differences within the administration. Most importantly, plans for the overthrow of Saddam have run into several complications. To facilitate the cooperation of key Arab states in regime change, the administration has been forced to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But, unfortunately, the vicious cycle of violence on the ground and policy disagreements within the administration have hampered timely and effective decisions. Bush's 25 June proposals for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute do not seem likely to prevent a further escalation of violence in the short term, and it will be extremely difficult for Arab front-line states, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to allow the use of their territory for a US military campaign while this bloodletting continues.
In addition, the war against al-Qaeda has not yet been won. A small contingent of US forces are tied down in Afghanistan for the time being, Osama Bin Laden and most of the al-Qaeda leadership remain on the loose, and there are mounting signs that they may launch a new round of terrorist attacks. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for Washington to turn its full attention towards Saddam, especially since the US military does not appear enthusiastic about a large-scale military operation against Iraq. Washington is also divided on the issue of UN inspections, between those who want to give Iraq one last chance to cooperate and those who fear that the resumption of inspections may give Saddam an escape route. Because of this disagreement, Washington has been unable to decide on next steps at the UN, such as whether to seek a Security Council ultimatum demanding that Iraq allow inspections and comply with disarmament requirements.
While none of these complications are insurmountable, they have delayed US military actions to remove Saddam. During his trip to Europe in May, Bush told US allies that no decision to attack Iraq has reached his desk. To correct any appearance of indecision, the administration has made it known that Bush has authorised covert actions to overthrow Saddam. All strands of opinion in Washington (and most governments) would welcome a coup against Saddam, but, based on past attempts, the prospects for success are not especially good. At some point, the administration will need to decide whether to step up the pressure (whether through an Afghan-style military campaign or full scale invasion) or run the risk of failing to remove a threat it has gone to pains to highlight.
And the other two?
Although the splits are less visible and urgent, Washington also seems divided and unsure over how to deal with the other members of the 'axis'. Disagreements on Iran remain relatively latent because Tehran (much more fractious and divided than Washington) cannot decide whether to engage the US.
Washington is therefore not under pressure to devise a coherent negotiating strategy. As the threat of a US invasion of Iraq has faded, Iran is also under less pressure to come to terms with Washington. US policy is stuck, as it was during the Clinton administration, without either effective engagement or effective pressure. In the meantime, Iran's support for terrorism and pursuit of WMD and missiles continues unabated.
Unlike Iran, North Korea has agreed to resume bilateral talks with the US. After an intense (and entirely normal) internal debate, Washington is finally prepared to re-engage too – albeit with a maximal position that demands a host of concessions from Pyongyang and offers little in return. If this opening position offers no returns, Washington will need to decide whether to offer more reasonable terms. This, in turn, would highlight a debate within the administration between those who want to build on the existing agreements between Washington and Pyongyang that deal with nuclear and other issues and those who prefer to scrap them and adopt a more confrontational approach. In the meantime, however, the Bush administration's decision not to pursue a nearly finalised deal on restricting North Korea's missile programme – negotiated in the closing months of the Clinton administration – and to adopt a tougher line towards Pyongyang has failed to produce concrete results, especially in terms of limiting missile exports.
Following through
The 11 September attacks led the Bush administration to add its new top threat (terrorists possessing WMD) to its old top threat ('rogue' states with WMD) to produce the 'axis of evil'. To defeat this new threat, Washington has begun to develop a doctrine that emphasises defence (both missile defence and homeland security), pre-emptive actions and effecting regime change. The application of this doctrine against terrorists is relatively uncontroversial, but its use against 'rogue' states is more problematic. The greater danger for the administration is that its new approach has yet to produce concrete results in terms of preventing 'rogue' regimes from continuing to pursue WMD. The challenge will be to counteract the lack of focus that has crept into the administration's approach and define a clear strategy for moving forward.
