|
Dealing with the 'axis of evil' |
|
The 11 September terrorist attacks led the Bush administration to add its new top threat (terrorists possessing WMD) to its old top threat (‘rogue’ states with WMD) to produce the ‘axis of evil’. To defeat this new threat, Washington has begun to develop a doctrine that emphasises defence (both missile defence and homeland security), pre-emptive actions and effecting regime change. The application of this doctrine against terrorists is relatively uncontroversial, but its use against ‘rogue’ states is more problematic. The greater danger for the administration, however, is that its new approach has yet to produce concrete results in terms of preventing ‘rogue’ regimes from continuing to pursue WMD.
Full text & PDF (free to all users) >>>
|
|
More turmoil for Turkey? |
|
The failing health of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has raised fears that Turkey will soon be plunged into another round of domestic turmoil at a time when it is struggling to emerge from a crippling economic recession and facing a string of critical challenges abroad - ranging from an impending confrontation with the European Union (EU) over Cyprus and the slow pace of EU-mandated domestic reforms, to peacekeeping in Afghanistan and the possible extension of the US-led campaign against terrorism to include an attack on neighbouring Iraq. The prospect of a weak, introspective government in Ankara at such a critical time is likely to result in the Turkish military acquiring a greater profile in domestic politics and assuming effective overall control over what it sees as key foreign policy issues. Still, over the next few months, the military will be distracted by its own internal changes.
Full text & PDF (subscribers only) >>>
Buy this article online >>>
|
|
US-China relations |
|
Prior to the advent of the ‘war’ on terrorism, it appeared probable that the task of defining and managing relations with China would absorb much of the Bush administration’s foreign policy energies. When it entered office in January 2001, the administration said that it would place US allies, rather than China, at the centre of its Asia policy. It cut back on military-to-military exchanges with China, to punish Beijing for its espionage activities in the US. President George W. Bush pledged to do ‘whatever it takes’ to help Taiwan defend itself, and announced the largest package of arms sales to Taipei since 1992. Washington relaxed some restrictions on visits by Taiwanese leaders to the US. Perhaps most importantly, Bush repudiated the Clinton administration’s policy of treating China as a prospective ‘strategic partner’, and instead declared Beijing to be a ‘strategic competitor’ of the US. Together, the EP-3 incident of 1 April 2001 and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 prompted a significant modification in the Bush administration’s approach to China and Taiwan. However, it has not produced a full return to the policies inherited from the Clinton administration. Moreover, persisting mutual mistrust will make it difficult to manage the welter of outstanding issues in US-China relations.
Full text & PDF (subscribers only) >>>
Buy this article online >>>
|
|
Serbia and Montenegro |
|
On 18 June 2002, the Constitutional Commission charged with setting out the terms of a new relationship between Serbia and Montenegro met for the first time. The commission was established under the 14 March Belgrade Agreement – brokered by the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy chief, Javier Solana – dealing with the ‘principles of relations between Serbia and Montenegro’. If the two republics approve the constitutional charter that is supposed to emerge from the commission’s deliberations, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) will cease to exist, being replaced by a ‘union of states’ to be known simply as Serbia & Montenegro. The new union might well prove temporary: at the core of the Belgrade Agreement is a provision that either or both republics can opt to leave the union after a period of three years. While genuine enthusiasm for the new union is hard to find in either of the constituent republics, the Belgrade Agreement is at least based on a loose convergence of interests.
Full text & PDF (subscribers only) >>>
Buy this article online >>>
|
|
Prospects for Pakistan |
The events of 11 September brought a dramatic reversal in Pakistan’s regional security role and held out the prospect of a transformation in its longer-term fortunes. Washington’s ultimatum, inviting nations to be ‘with us or with the terrorists’, presented Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf with both dangers and opportunities. He joined the anti-terrorist effort, and in the process jettisoned Islamabad’s decade-long effort to establish a client government in Afghanistan, because he hoped to obtain support for his reform agenda and acquire international respectability. Musharraf also hoped, with less foundation, to keep a ‘firewall’ between US-led anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s support for the insurgency in Kashmir. At issue is whether Islamabad’s policy changes will last, and whether Musharraf can keep his domestic support base together. To do so, he needs in the short term to keep control of the army, reduce the challenge from militants, and persuade India to create political space for a settlement effort.
Full text & PDF (subscribers only) >>>
Buy this article online >>> |
