The quagmire of political reconstruction
Current speculation over possible US military intervention to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Hussein suggests that 'regime change' in Baghdad is more likely to be brought about in the near future by external intervention than by internal conspiracy. It is worth considering, therefore, what might follow from such action. Much that may occur in the wake of military action cannot be predicted. However, given the enormous problems associated with any attempt to 'refound' Iraqi politics, it is clear that the occupying power would have to work through the existing forces of Iraqi political society – some openly opposed to the current regime, some closely allied to it and others deeply ambivalent.
Conquest and coup d'état
The impression that the current regime in Baghdad can only be overthrown by a US-led military invasion is a testimony to the enduring weakness of those Iraqi forces opposed to Saddam's government. The failed popular uprisings of 1991, the botched assassination attempts and military conspiracies of the 1990s, and the parochial concerns of the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq have shown the limits of domestic opposition. The key question now is whether, in the event of a full-scale US invasion of Iraq, one could expect things to be much different.
There is some scope to believe that an invasion would act as a catalyst for disaffected officers in Iraq's security forces to turn on Saddam's regime. An organised coalition of senior officers is almost certainly the only effective internal method of ousting a regime so well entrenched. The conspirators must be able both to strike at the heart of power by killing Saddam himself and as much of the leadership as they can in a single blow. They must also be sure of being able to mobilise sufficient military force to discourage thoughts of resistance by units commanded by Saddam loyalists. For this reason, successful action is most likely to come from within the elite forces of the Republican Guard or the Special Republican Guard.
Recruited mainly from the tribal groupings of the Sunni Arab northwest and officered in large part by men drawn from the clans of the al-Bu Nasir (Saddam's tribe) from the Tikrit region, these formations are very much part of the regime they are expected to overthrow. Yet, they are riven by the factionalism, personal and clannish rivalries and jostling for advantage that has been so characteristic of the regime's patronage system. They are also aware that they are better placed than others to bring about change. It is thus possible to imagine that a US invasion, backed by the overwhelming power at Washington's command and promising an outcome as devastating for the Iraqi armed forces as that which they endured in Kuwait, would lead senior officers to act.
They might be acting to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as the regime would certainly be tempted to do if its survival were at stake. However, they would equally be acting to ensure that they and their kind – officers and the networks of the Sunni Arab elite – would continue to have a decisive role in Iraqi politics after Saddam's fall. Such action would, therefore, be pre-emptive. It would be designed to underline the coup leaders' utility to occupying US forces, while preventing the dominance of those Iraqi groupings that successive US administrations have courted for the past few years: the Kurds; some of the Shi'a; self-declared liberals, democrats and communists; and exiled military officers with their own agendas and networks.
Whether such a last-minute revolt does take place, or whether US forces occupy Baghdad unaided by any substantial section of the Iraqi state or society, Washington would face similar problems. In essence, these would boil down to the two related questions of how far the US could go in reshaping or refounding the Iraqi state and its politics; and on which existing Iraqi forces the US could rely in seeking to implement its project. Actual outcomes will depend upon any number of factors that cannot not sensibly be predicted at this point. However, it is worth considering the dilemmas that will face a US occupying force as it vacillates between two positions best characterised as 'micro-management' and 'laissez-faire' respectively.
'Micro-management'…
'Micro-management' would entail a sustained effort on the part of the US to refound Iraqi politics – not simply the public state institutions, but also the networks of power, patronage, and expectations that lie behind and operate through those institutions. It would entail introducing new values into Iraqi public life and backing these with power sufficient to ensure that they were seen to work by significant numbers of the population at all levels.
Two immediate problems become apparent in such a scenario. First, there is the absence of Iraqi allies with sufficient social clout and determination to carry such a project through. All of the present Iraqi opposition forces are ill-suited for this role. The Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan can command considerable numbers, but only in Kurdistan, where their rivalry and political methods stand in stark contrast to their declarations in support of open government and democratic accountability. The Shi'i Islamist al-Da'wa party and those grouped around Sayyid Bakr al-Hakim in the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq enjoy a certain following within Iraq, but their advocacy of political leadership by clerics has in fact alienated many among the majority Shi'a of Iraq. The other smaller parties associated with the opposition, both within the Iraqi National Congress and outside it – leftists, constitutional monarchists, liberals and others – have virtually no following and, if the behaviour of some of their leaders is anything to go by, maintain a weak attachment to the idea of accountability. Much of the declared opposition operates according to the rules of patronage, clientelism and, where necessary, intimidation.
Adherence to the rules of a distinctively Iraqi political game by virtually all players provides the second major challenge to the US. Abandonment of these rules could lead to formidable resistance. This would come not simply from the residual elites of the state over which Saddam has presided, but also from those who feared that a new order would turn their world upside down. For some, the fear would be domination by the majority Shi'a of Iraq. Ironically, for many of the most organised amongst the Shi'a – the Islamist parties – the danger would be the introduction of secular politics in which they would have little say. For others, transparency, accountability and the idea of truly public service would carry the threat that accumulated privileges would be stripped from them and their patrons.
Resistance would not necessarily be violent – at least not initially. It is more likely to take the form of subversion of the 'democratising project', if that is what the US would be seeking to create. This could happen in a number of ways. After decades of oppression, opening up the political sphere in Iraq will lead to the settling of old scores and a revival of sharply opposing views of Iraq's future. The risk of open conflict in such a heavily armed society will tend to privilege the role of the security forces.
… could backfire
The US will train and arm security forces to maintain social order, almost certainly building on the existing overdeveloped structures of the Iraqi state. This will tend to reinforce the informal networks that already bind many of these individuals to each other, making them representative of a certain sector of society – generally the Sunni Arab northwesterners – and a certain authoritarian mentality. It will underline, once again, the indispensable nature of the security forces in the governance of Iraq.
The corrosive effects of Iraq's political economy on forms of democratic accountability have also to be considered. Here, the role of Iraq's oil income will be decisive, as it constitutes the prize for those competing for power, under US protection or otherwise. It also reinforces the centralising, authoritarian aspects of the economy, as well as the development of forms of patronage, which grant to those disbursing the oil revenues enormous political power.
In the face of this reassertion of some of the characteristic features of Iraqi political society – clannishness, patron-clientelism and coercive intimidation – the US may find itself with allies in Baghdad that are no more than clients, dependent on continued support and transmitting US directives through the military and economic power bestowed conditionally upon them. Ironically, the US would have been manoeuvred into playing a role which was functionally not far removed from that of the present regime in Iraq: it would be the patron, armed with overwhelming coercive force and financial resources, which would be relying upon its subordinates to 'deliver' social order in Iraq.
This would invite two kinds of response. Domestically, there will be a temptation either to eliminate or intimidate the chief clients of the US occupying power. Competition for the centre's favour would be no less fierce and ruthless than it has always been, with rival factions – for the most part bearing little resemblance to the organisations formed in exile or within Iraq to combat Saddam during the past decades – jostling for position and for a chance to exercise power. Violence would be part of the game, directed both at the clients of the US and at US targets to make a point.
Regionally, such a situation would invite intervention by various neighbouring states. Some, such as Iran, would be concerned about the very presence of the US in Iraq. Others – such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Syria – would be concerned about the influence exercised by regional rivals or, in the case of Turkey in particular, by developments in Kurdistan. Proxy conflicts and the sponsorship of individuals and parties in the Iraqi political game would be one way of ensuring that their interests were protected and that the ambitions of their regional rivals, or indeed of the US, were checked. For Iraqis already weakly attached to the idea of national politics, the temptation to look for such sponsorship would be great, in part to counter the influence of the US and its clients. The 'spoiler' role played by such proxy conflicts could be harmful to any idea of reconstruction.
'Laissez-faire' the likely course
In such circumstances, it is more than likely that the US would find itself veering towards a 'laissez-faire' role in which it accepted de facto the power structures of Iraqi political society, many of which would be recognisable from Iraq's recent past. Thus, the armed forces and security services (which can guarantee order) would be recognised. With this would come recognition of much of the informal politics of Iraq – communal, tribal and ethnic – which has exercised such power over Iraqi society and which might be able to find more open expression under the relaxed rules of a broadly tolerant oligarchy. Here a number of the political organisations which have given expression to such politics – Kurdish, Turcoman, Assyrian and Shi'i – would play prominent roles, competing with each other for communal representation, rather than seeking to dominate the state.
As in previous eras, the state would become the arena for uneasy competition between newly founded coalitions combining both civilian interests and factions operating within the armed forces. Proclaiming the ideals of Arab and Iraqi nationalism, the struggle would be, as ever, for control of the state and its massive resources. How the competition develops will depend upon a number of unknowable factors. However, the advantage will tend to lie with those who can command the military. Apart from having the means of coercion in their hands, they could also plausibly claim to bring a certain order to Iraq out of the potentially fractious scrum of communal politics – a communal politics that could lend itself to regional interference by Iran and Turkey in particular. They would also have the advantage that they too might be able to rely on social networks of solidarity particular to the tribal identities so heavily represented within the Iraqi security forces. In sum, the prospect for fashioning a post-Saddam government that conforms behaviourally and in terms of its values with Washington's preferences is subject to enormous practical obstacles, many of which have their roots in a distinctive and entrenched Iraqi political culture. Remnants of Saddam's regime would probably live on after his fall.
