Which tactics and what force?
Washington has made clear its desire for 'regime change' in Iraq, seeing Saddam Hussein's removal as the way to reduce Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats from Iraq. US efforts to garner support for military action have achieved little success to date, with key Middle Eastern and European states urging Washington to focus on the more immediate problem of the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. The diplomatic complexities surrounding US plans for action are deepening. Yet, in assessing tactics and levels of force that the US would need to unseat Saddam, relatively straightforward conclusions arise.
The US would have to plan an invasion resembling Operation Desert Storm. While 500,000 troops might not be needed again, half that number could be. US casualties might be several times higher than the 400 sustained in 1990–91. Other options, such as using limited force in conjunction with aid to the Iraqi opposition, have appeal because they aim to repeat the tactics used in unseating Afghanistan's Taliban. In Iraq, however, such tactics would be unlikely to work. Saddam's removal would have to involve decisive force. The need for stability while a new Iraqi government became established would mean deploying up to 200,000 US ground troops, backed by 700–1,000 aircraft, and maintaining them in-theatre for some time.
Unsuitable Afghan model
The tactics used in Afghanistan would not work in Iraq. First, the disparity in power between government and opposition forces is much greater than that between the Taliban and Northern Alliance. Second, the terrain and tactics in Afghanistan favoured US airpower working with the local opposition, whereas in Iraq the US would have to plan for tactical environments ranging from large-scale open manoeuvre warfare to irregular urban warfare. Third, Iraqi forces have in the last ten years learned to deploy and operate in a manner that could mitigate the effects of bombardment.
In Afghanistan, Taliban forces and al-Qaeda fighters numbered perhaps 50,000. They faced a Northern Alliance about 15,000 strong, later assisted by southern Pashtun militias that made overall opposition forces at least half the strength of the Taliban. In Iraq, the armed forces include 425,000 active-duty troops. Of that number, roughly 30,000 are Special Republican Guard personnel and about 70,000 make up the Republican Guard – these are better fighters than is generally appreciated. The other 325,000 are estimated at 50% combat effectiveness. There are also 650,000 reservists of suspect capability and devotion, but these should not be dismissed entirely as a matter of prudence. Iraqi forces retain large quantities of equipment, although armoured combat capabilities are estimated at less than half those in 1990.
Iraq's opposition includes 15,000 Kurdish Democratic Party troops, 10,000 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan troops and 6,000 Shi'ite troops. Kurds claim their strength could double in time of conflict. This would make for a total of 30–100,000 opposition personnel. However, most Iraqi opposition forces lack mobility, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. This could be rectified by the US, which could also provide the technical means to operate in conjunction with US aircraft. Yet, the question of how the mostly Kurdish opposition would infiltrate in strength into central Iraq would remain. If a few thousand Kurds straggled into Saddam's strongholds and then faced tens of thousands of elite forces, the fate of those Kurds (and any accompanying US forces) would be bloody. Even if all the Kurds and other opposition fighters took up position, the resulting force ratio would be at least 4:1 in Saddam's favour.
The tactics of Iraq's army must also be considered. Facing a challenge from the Kurdish-based opposition and US airpower, its wisest course would be to hunker down in cities, distribute and hide its forces, and fight from those places. It cannot be assumed that the Iraqi army would deploy armour in the open desert (as in 1990–91), firing from static positions and presenting an immobile target for airpower (as the Taliban did). Many Iraqi weapons and command and control (C2) centres will be placed near apartments, hospitals, schools, and mosques.
Proponents of fighting Saddam, emboldened by the success of Operation Enduring Freedom, argue that US capabilities have improved enormously since Desert Storm, and are confident of rapid success, regardless of where the US fights Iraqi forces. They note that over 50% of ordnance dropped in Afghanistan has been precision-guided, whereas the proportion was less than 10% in Desert Storm. This is correct, but not particularly persuasive. Desert Storm hardly lacked for precision-strike weaponry: nearly 20,000 'smart' bombs were used, in contrast to about 12,000 in Enduring Freedom to date. Yet, several attempts to kill Saddam failed. In ensuing years, moreover, precision weapons were relatively ineffectual in depriving Iraq of WMD, much of which was hidden from intelligence analysts. Airpower proponents often forget the experience of Kosovo, where more than one-third of NATO's ordnance was 'smart', yet confirmed kills on Serbian forces in the forests and towns of Kosovo were very few. The US is largely still fighting with the weapons and tactics used in Kosovo.
Meanwhile, weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), so effective against entrenched Taliban forces, would generally be ineffective against Iraqi armour inside Iraqi cities, as they typically miss their targets by 10–15 metres. In urban settings, such inaccuracy would cause unacceptable collateral damage. Armoured targets would also often survive strikes. Laser-guided bombs could be more effective in good weather and against exposed armour, but require forward target-designators. If US aircraft tried to spot targets on their own, they would have to fly low over Iraqi cities, risking losses from Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). When coalition aircraft flew low in the first three days of Desert Storm, 27 aircraft were damaged or destroyed (one-third of losses).
The invasion option
The presence of sizeable US ground forces would make a decisive contribution to military success. Iraqi units might move against Saddam if they saw a massive army advancing towards them – many commanders are loyal to Saddam only out of fear for their lives. However, mass Iraqi defections cannot be assumed, and other factors warrant consideration. First, despite degradation, Iraqi forces have an urban warfare capability and it can be assumed that if US forces assembled over a period of months, cities would be 'prepared' for urban combat. Much heavy equipment is in poor repair, but the weapons needed for urban combat – shoulder-launched SAMs, anti-tank weapons, automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, explosives and mines – are in ample supply. Second, the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard are more loyal to Saddam than conscripts. It would be extremely imprudent to assume that 100,000 hard-core fighters would not oppose US-led coalition forces inside Iraq's cities. Washington would have to at least attain parity. More than 100,000 US troops would thus be required, while an invasion and occupation force of 200,000 would be ideal. Third, recent experience in urban combat points to the likelihood of one US loss for every 5–20 opposition losses. If Iraq were prepared to endure 20,000 casualties, the US could also suffer thousands (with roughly 20% fatalities). The risks in assuming easy victory only to be proved wrong would be quite high.
The Iraqi targets of greatest interest to US forces would include C2 and leadership targets, what remains of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme and other WMD capabilities. If these could be neutralised, the war could potentially be won quickly, since toppling Saddam and depriving Iraq of WMD is of more importance to the US than completely destroying Iraq's military. However, it has to be assumed that C2 targets could survive attacks; that the US would not quickly learn the whereabouts of WMD targets; and that Saddam could evade capture or remain within a protective cordon formed by elite troops. Under these circumstances, one has to assume that the US would have to destroy or force the surrender of the bulk of Iraq's armed forces, and particularly the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard.
In choosing forces, the US would have to use several hundred combat aircraft to attack strategic targets and provide close air support for US and any other coalition ground troops. In terms of ground forces, some heavy armour would be needed, but a mix of armour and infantry would be critical. Since there is no dedicated division or corps of urban combat troops in the US military, the US ground force might include: two heavy armoured or mechanised infantry divisions; the 101st Air Assault Division (possibly also earmarked for seizing forward operating bases); the 10th Mountain Division; several thousand Rangers and special operations forces; and one or two Marine divisions.
A ground invasion would be difficult to prepare. Deploying 200,000 troops to the Gulf would take time, especially since Saudi bases and facilities might not be available. If only Kuwait allowed access to its facilities for staging, building up 200,000 US troops would take 2–3 months and forces would be more limited in terms of their breakout manoeuvre warfare. More airfields would also have to be built and a number of carrier air groups would have to be deployed. A total preparation period of 4–6 months might be needed.
WMD wildcard
Despite these caveats, it is possible to be confident that a US-led invasion force would achieve victory. Yet, US planners will have to keep in mind possible use of whatever WMD capability Saddam has retained or developed since UN weapons inspectors were ejected in 1998. Based on past experiences with chemical weapons, current US casualty estimates would have to be increased by at least 50%. Also of concern would be possible WMD-use against Israel, Kuwait, the Kurds or Western targets. Iraq may possess 30 SCUDs and shorter-range missiles, while aircraft and human agents might also deliver weaponry. SCUDs carrying conventional warheads would not be major threat, with average casualties of 1–5 per missile expected. Those carrying biological weapons would probably fail to dispense agent properly, given the crudeness of the delivery mechanism but SCUDs carrying chemicals would be expected to kill dozens per warhead, depending on levels of protection, wind conditions and advance warning. Aircraft carrying chemical or biological weapons would, however, be much more dangerous. Fortunately, neighbouring states are unlikely to be vulnerable given the cover afforded by the US air force, but Iraqi Kurds and Shi'ites might be at risk. These dangers are real but probably not excessive.
Calibrating the conflict
Overthrowing Saddam would require preparations for a ground invasion followed by an occupation of Iraq. It is difficult to imagine any US administration which contains Secretary of State Colin Powell not planning for the use of overwhelming force. Simple prudence also argues for such an approach. If such plans are made, and deployments initiated, there is a possibility that the Iraqi army might crumble before it had to be fought. But this cannot be relied on. Hoping for an easier victory, or experimenting with an Afghan model of warfare first, would probably result in large causalities among the Iraqi opposition and a stalemate that would damage US relations with the Middle East, without shaking Saddam's hold on power.
