Indonesia's leadership crisis

 

 

Since his election as Indonesia's president in October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid has faced huge challenges. He and his unstable coalition government have needed not only to revive the country's economy, but also to bring the armed forces under more effective civilian control while managing the centre-periphery tensions that have increasingly appeared to threaten national cohesion. Another important task has been to prosecute those who benefited from corruption or committed human rights abuses under former president Suharto's New Order regime (1966-98). While there has been limited progress on these fronts, Wahid's record has been disappointing. However, this does not imply that the most likely alternative president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, would perform more effectively.

 

While Wahid was well-known as the leader of the 40-million strong Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Muslim organisation, his election was unexpected and achieved only with the support of Muslim political parties. These wished to deny the presidency to Megawati, the leader of the secular Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), which gained the largest number of votes in the June 1999 parliamentary election. Despite his physical handicaps – notably near-blindness – and the fact that he had relatively little support outside his political stronghold in East Java (his National Awakening Party holds just 11% of parliamentary seats), the new president was widely seen as a credible reformist and potentially able to unite diverse political forces. Megawati became vice-president in the new administration.

 

However, by early 2000, Wahid faced criticism for his erratic political style, reputed cronyism, failure to repair the economy and inability to control escalating communal violence and separatism. Censured by parliament last August, he survived by apologising for his failures and promising to share power with Megawati. In reality, power remained with Wahid.

 

 

In February, having lost support from Megawati's PDI-P and the military's parliamentary faction, the president was again censured in a memorandum supported by 86% of legislators in the House of Representatives (DPR). Supposedly at issue was his implication in two financial scandals. However, this was essentially a justification for efforts by his opponents – led by the same Muslim parties that had supported him in 1999 and Golkar, the ruling party under Suharto – to oust him. The real issue was Wahid's poor leadership, particularly in the face of the deteriorating internal security situation and economic malaise.

 

Although Wahid questioned the legislature's authority, the February censure motion began a process potentially leading to his impeachment. Responding in late March to the critical parliamentary memorandum, Wahid apologised for `any inappropriate behaviour', but dismissed allegations of corruption against him. It now seems likely that the DPR will issue a second censure memorandum, which the president will be given a month to answer. In the event that he remains obdurate, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, which comprises the DPR, interest groups and representatives from the regions), will be convened – probably in August – to begin impeachment proceedings.

 

Several things might occur before such a process is set in train. Wahid might resign, or acquiesce in a new power-sharing deal in which he would be reduced to a figurehead role, with Megawati wielding effective power. However, this seems unlikely in view of the president's evident determination to hang on to power. Alternatively, opposition forces might with military support launch an unconstitutional takeover, along lines seen earlier this year in the Philippines. This is also unlikely: Megawati is aware of the danger for her own position of setting such a precedent, while the military's leaders, who are keen to reconstruct the army's image as a force for stability, have stressed their belief in the importance of constitutionality.

 

More credible is a scenario in which Wahid seeks to form a new cabinet including stronger representation from the PDI-P in order to retain power until fresh elections are held in 2004. This move could be accompanied by threatened coercion of opponents. Indeed, following February's parliamentary censure motion, the NU's Banser militia ran riot in Javanese cities. It attacked the headquarters of Golkar and other parties opposing Wahid, and began infiltrating large numbers of its members into Jakarta to `defend' the president. Wahid has also threatened to launch corruption indictments against opponents.

Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the impeachment process will proceed and that Megawati will become president in August, or that the MPR will force Wahid to concede all but ceremonial functions to her. Even if Wahid survives, future challenges are likely. The president's poor health could also cut short his tenure. These doubts over Wahid's future beg the question of the likely impact of a change of leader. Wahid has issued dire warnings that Indonesia will disintegrate if he ceases to be president. This is far-fetched, but an immediate violent backlash from Banser and other pro-Wahid groups cannot be ruled out in the event of Megawati supplanting him. Such disturbances could escalate to involve widespread clashes with rival political groups, but they could equally be short-lived and largely restricted to East and Central Java.

 

 

Megawati's style of leadership would probably be distinct from Wahid's, but she would be unlikely to achieve significantly greater success in dealing with the problems facing the country. Indeed, there is a danger that her leadership could contribute to reverses in key areas for Indonesia's future.

 

Initially, Megawati would probably benefit from the broad support of parties opposed to Wahid, including Golkar, the Muslim National Mandate Party and the United Development Party, as well as her own PDI-P. However, Megawati has displayed little political skill and has articulated few substantial or original political ideas while vice-president. She might ultimately prove no more able than Wahid to maintain political stability by establishing a modus vivendi with opposing political forces and the military.

 

Conflict between Megawati and the political parties which might help her gain the presidency would be likely after the initial flush of mutual congratulation over Wahid's ousting. Parliamentary opposition to Megawati would have an added edge because of her gender and lack of Muslim credentials – the factors which denied her the presidency in 1999. Indeed, depending on the composition of her administration, her presidency could precipitate a more radicalised opposition from Muslim forces excluded from power.

 

Such trends might reinforce Megawati's reliance on the armed forces as a power base. Although the anti-military outlook of many PDI-P supporters – who include student radicals and left-of-centre non-governmental organisations – might ultimately impose limits on this reliance, cooperation rather than conflict would characterise her relations with the armed forces. Senior military officers could assume a more prominent role in government. In consequence, Megawati would be less likely than Wahid to implement key reforms affecting the armed forces, such as providing an institutional basis for civilian political supremacy over the military, and dismantling the army's politically oppressive territorial structure. She might also be reluctant to pursue prosecution of military personnel for past abuses. A positive side-effect of this more relaxed relationship might be reduced military support for the agents provocateurs who have reputedly contributed to inter-ethnic violence in regions such as Maluku and East Kalimantan.

 

Megawati would probably be a more assertively nationalist leader. She would adopt a harder line, stressing the use of military force in dealing with restive provinces such as Aceh and Irian Jaya where there is widespread popular support for independence movements. This posture – which would contrast with Wahid's efforts to find political solutions – could suppress separatist forces in the short-to-medium term, while helping to reinforce links with the military. However, intensified military operations would not be helpful in finding long-term solutions in these provinces and would expose the government to even greater domestic and international criticism over the human rights abuses.

 

As president, Megawati would provide less support than Wahid for granting fiscal and political autonomy to Indonesia's regions. New laws on the devolution of administrative and fiscal authority – previously over-centralised in Jakarta – to townships and regencies began to take effect in January. However, they are unlikely to act as a panacea for centre-periphery problems. Decentralisation is currently being implemented in an extremely haphazard fashion. Little thought has been given to establishing a proper legal infrastructure for devolution, or to local empowerment and service provision.

 

Nonetheless, once teething problems are finally resolved, this move towards federalism by another name could represent the best available option for maintaining national cohesion in the face of substantial provincial grievances. While decentralisation is probably an inadequate instrument for dealing with the cases of Aceh and Irian Jaya – where long-standing ethnic and religious tensions loom large – it might help to keep provinces such as Riau and East Kalimantan inside Indonesia. Megawati's apparent centralist impulse could negate this opportunity, exacerbate separatist tendencies and lead to rely more heavily on coercion.

 

 

Western governments (notably the US and Australia), together with Indonesia's South-east Asian neighbours, hope for more effective governance from Jakarta and for Indonesia's restoration as a responsible interlocutor on regional matters. They might initially be relieved to see Wahid removed and an administration led by Megawati installed. However, under Megawati, Jakarta would remain preoccupied with domestic matters. Personnel changes – and particularly the removal of outspoken Defence Minister Mohammed Mahfud – could facilitate better relations with Washington and Canberra, but there would be little chance of Jakarta re-assuming the constructive leading role that it exercised within the Association of South East Asian Nations under Suharto.

 

Moreover, Megawati's nationalist posture might surface in dealings over economic issues with Western governments and international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank. Playing on widespread resentment of the West's influence and resisting pressure for faster economic reforms could bring considerable political benefit to Megawati. However, there would be dire consequences for Indonesia's economic revival if the already hesitant progress towards reforms were delayed further.

 

At least until the elections in 2004, and possibly beyond, Indonesian politics will be characterised by instability and relative ineffectiveness at the political centre. This means that violence will continue to plague the country's peripheral provinces, and that neighbouring states and interested governments further afield will continue to be concerned about the security implications of Indonesia's protracted transition to democracy.