The future of Montenegro

 

 

If President Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro has his way there will soon be two new states in Europe: Montenegro and Serbia. At present they remain linked within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was founded in 1992, following the bloody collapse of the old six-republic federation. Open opposition from European Union countries and the United States to Montenegro's independence drive is unlikely to prevent its success.

 

The coming weeks and months are bound to be turbulent in the tiny coastal republic. With the recent collapse of its ruling coalition, early elections are scheduled for 22 April and a referendum on independence should be held soon after that. Before the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, the former Yugoslav leader, on 5 October 2000, it was feared that any moves towards independence could provoke a civil war abetted by Belgrade.

 

For most of Milosevic's rule, which began in 1989, the Montenegrin authorities were either enthusiastic supporters of his policies or little more than puppets. In winter 1991-92, for example, it was Montenegrin soldiers who laid siege to the Croatian port of Dubrovnik. Djukanovic was then Montenegro's prime minister and the president was his close friend, Momir Bulatovic.

 

In 1997, however, Montenegrin politics underwent upheaval. In the wake of mass protests against the Milosevic regime in Belgrade during winter 1996-97, Djukanovic came out against the Serbian leader while Bulatovic stuck with Milosevic. Montenegro's ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) split in two. In October 1997, Djukanovic challenged Bulatovic for Montenegro's presidency and was narrowly elected. Bulatovic, now leader of the rival Socialist People's Party (SNP), went on to become prime minister of Yugoslavia, a post he held until the fall of Milosevic.

 

During this period, Djukanovic opened Montenegro to the West and claimed that he was not anti-Yugoslav but only anti-Milosevic. On this basis, the DPS won the 1998 elections in a coalition with two smaller parties whose views differed over independence. Their 'For a Better Life' coalition secured 42 out of 78 parliamentary seats. Often subjected to economic pressure and embargoes from Serbia, the Djukanovic government survived, in part thanks to income from lucrative smuggling channels.

 

Montenegro increasingly came to rely upon its own resources. It took control of its borders and customs posts and began running its foreign and economic policies. It abolished visas for foreigners (Serbia still has them) and in 1999 dropped the Yugoslav dinar and adopted the German mark as its official currency. Fearing a coup or civil war, the government built its police into a formidable 15,000-strong paramilitary force.

 

 

As a vocal opponent of Milosevic, Djukanovic and his government gained both political and financial support from the West. Little was said about cigarette smuggling from Montenegro to the EU, which brought large amounts of money to Montenegro but defrauded EU governments of considerable amounts of tax. In July 2000, Milosevic changed the Yugoslav constitution to permit his direct popular election without consulting Montenegro, which by now was independent in all but name.

 

Once Milosevic fell, Western governments were irritated to discover that, far from wanting to cooperate with Serbia's democrats in rebuilding Yugoslavia, Djukanovic came out in favour of full independence. Despite a range of opinions within the DPS, agreement was reached with its pro-independence coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), that Serbia should be offered a deal. After the international recognition of both states, a loose 'union' or 'alliance' of the two should be formed, with a customs union and cooperation in defence and foreign affairs. Because it objected to full independence, the DPS's second small coalition partner, the People's Party (NS) decided to leave the government, thus provoking early elections.

 

Reactions in Serbia to developments in Montenegro have been mixed. Opinion polls show that most Serbs would like to retain a joint state, especially since many trace their origins to Montenegro, the two peoples share the same language and Orthodox faith and have always been close.

 

But many Serbian politicians, while saying they too would like to retain a union, have serious doubts. Serbia has a population of 8-9 million while Montenegro has barely 680,000 citizens. They find it hard to see how the two republics can share power equally in any newly negotiated federation. They suspect that the Montenegrin government's proposal for a post-independence 'union' is a ruse for getting Serbia to subsidise its expenses, especially in security and foreign affairs. Since Montenegro will never be a hostile neighbour, they are increasingly inclined, if the Montenegrins vote for independence, to go for a clean break.

 

Another reason Serbian politicians will be tempted to reject the Montenegrin proposal is that they are already burdened with trying to run one country, Serbia, with two governments – the Serbian one andthe Yugoslav one, whose writ in practice does not run in Montenegro. Cynics also believe that Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian premier, may go along with Montenegrin demands for independence because, once it secedes, the federation would no longer exist and therefore his personal rival, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, would lose his job – unless he switches to the post of Serbian president.

 

A curious anomaly is that the Yugoslav government is headed by Zoran Zizic, a Montenegrin from the SNP. The SNP also holds several ministerial posts. The reason for this is that during the 24 September Yugoslav 2000 elections, which were to bring down Milosevic, the Montenegrin authorities appealed for a boycott. Only some 20% of Montenegrins voted for what was then still a pro-Milosevic party.

 

Since then, the SNP has been in crisis. In early February, Momir Bulatovic resigned as leader, pushed out by a modernising faction that hopes to portray the party as strongly pro-Yugoslav but distant from Milosevic. A new leader, Predrag Bulatovic (no relation to Momir), one of its vice-presidents, was chosen at a special party congress held on 24 February.

 

 

According to an opinion poll conducted in January by Montenegro's independent Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (CEDEM), the pro-independence DPS, SDP and Liberal Alliance would together gain 44.3% of the general election vote with the SNP and NS together picking up 31.6%. However 21.3% did not know how they would vote or said they would not vote.

 

Asked about the future status of the republic, 36% wanted an independent state, while 15.2% favoured a 'union' of two independent states. By contrast, 7% wanted a united Yugoslavia, 16.1% wanted to retain a federal Yugoslavia, while 18.5% wanted a confederal state. On the independence of Montenegro, 49% said they would vote for independence, 39.8% said they would vote against and 10.2% either did not know or said they would not vote.

 

CEDEM's analysis of these results was that, assuming a referendum turnout of 75-80%, the pro- and anti-independence ratio would shift to 56:44. This would translate as a 44.3% vote for the pro-independence parties in the April election, giving them 55% of the seats in parliament. CEDEM also believes that, once the campaign gets going, the proportion of those in favour of independence will rise. To secure stability in Montenegro it will need to. Some 21% of the Montenegrin population is either ethnic Albanian or Muslim Slav from the northern Sandzak region. Both groups are solidly in favour of independence. However, if independence is seen to be delivered thanks to their votes, and not those of Orthodox Montenegrins, this could lay the ground for future tension.

 

Perhaps because things are so finely balanced, Djukanovic and his team are pressing for a referendum as soon as possible. They believe the benefits of independence would include enhanced prestige for Djukanovic and a stronger position for Montenegro in its efforts to secure international financial assistance. From June onwards, several thousand Serbs and Montenegrins who fled Kosovo following the Serbian defeat there will be able to vote, because they will, by then, have completed the two-year residency requirement necessary to vote in the republic. They will vote against independence.

 

Another complicating factor is that the SNP and the NS are threatening a referendum boycott unless all Montenegrins living in Serbia are allowed to vote and it is agreed that any referendum decision can only be considered carried if supported by half the electorate plus one rather than just a majority of those who vote. While they may drop their first condition, they may well insist on the second.

 

 

No one any longer fears war in Montenegro if the republic does move towards independence. But there are several Western concerns. Italy, for example, believes that smuggling will only be stamped out if Montenegro is part of a strong Yugoslav state. It also fears that the republic could be used as a safe haven, as it has, in the past, by their own mafiosi. Italy believes that senior figures in the government of Montenegro either protect the smugglers or benefit directly from the traffic. Indeed, in December 1999, Branko Perovic, the republic's foreign minister, was forced to resign after being indicted by an Italian court for involvement in smuggling and association with the Mafia – although the charges did relate to crimes allegedly committed some seven years earlier.

 

The French believe that any further 'fragmentation' in Europe would only help the US, which they believe would dominate a weak and divided Europe. The French are also particularly close to President Kostunica who does not want Montenegro to secede.

 

Whatever France believes about the US, however, the evidence points to a different priority in Washington. In early February, Djukanovic was snubbed in the US capital by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who was unable to find time to meet him. The US, like the EU states, fears that if Montenegro becomes independent, then the diplomats will never be able to resolve the Kosovo problem and that fragmentation will continue in both Macedonia and Bosnia. They believe that the best way to deal with Kosovo would be to create a three-republic confederation of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. This would allow Western troops to leave the region. The problem with the Western vision is that Kosovo's Albanians would take up arms rather than have any link with Belgrade again.

 

If Montenegro opts for independence, then far from destabilising the region, as some fear, it could have the opposite effect. It could concentrate minds on the future of Kosovo, and above all, on the need to create regional institutions modelled on the EU. The irony of the final collapse of Yugoslavia, therefore, is that the people who live in the countries that have emerged from its ruins will find that the only way to rebuild their economies and futures is by working together again.