Patterns of power
On 6 December in Bonn, Afghan factions agreed to form an Interim Administration (IA) to govern the country in its initial post-Taliban phase. The Bonn Agreement – reached under UN auspices – specifies three stages in re-establishing a unified and, it is hoped, peaceful state. Firstly, that the IA should assume authority in Kabul on 22 December 2001, simultaneously taking over the country's seat at the UN – a position currently held in a caretaker capacity by the former government of Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-96). Secondly, that a Special Commission be established to prepare a loya jirga, or gathering of tribal elders and leading politicians, to be held in six months' time. This gathering will select a transitional head of state and seek to establish a broad-based Interim Government (IG) for a period not exceeding two years, during which preparations will be made for nation-wide elections. It is expected that Muhammad Zahir Shah, the former king of Afghanistan now in exile in Rome, will preside. Thirdly, that no longer than 18 months after the IG assumes power, a second loya jirga will be held to draw up a new constitution. The IG will also seek to establish a central bank, supreme court and other essential institutions.
The Bonn Agreement named Hamid Karzai, a prominent Pashtun leader, as chairman of the IA. The 30-strong cabinet, carefully selected to reflect the country's ethnic diversity, includes eleven Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five Hazara, three Uzbeks and three members of other minorities. Of the groups represented at Bonn, the Northern Alliance has emerged as the dominant force with 17 seats. These include three key portfolios: defence (Mohammed Fahim, Tajik); foreign affairs (Abdullah Abdullah, Tajik); and interior (Younis Qanooni, Tajik). The most powerful faction after the Northern Alliance is the Rome Group, which holds 8 seats, including the key portfolios of IA chairman (Karzai) and finance (Hedayat Amin Arsala, Pashtun). Supporters of the former king, this group enjoys widespread support amongst the powerful ethnic Pashtun community. Two smaller factions, the Cyprus Group (backed by Iran) and the Peshawar Group (backed by Pakistan) are also represented in the IA with the minor portfolios for irrigation and transport respectively.
Ethnic rivalries
A major effort has clearly been made to bring together as many feuding ethnic and religious factions as possible. The complexities of these relationships have only recently come to be appreciated. The Pashtuns live to the south and east of the Hindu Kush, dominating the capital Kabul and major cities like Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar. This group numbers about 6.5m within Afghanistan, while a similar number live across the frontier in Pakistan. Almost exclusively Sunni Muslims, they speak various Pashto dialects. Pashtuns form around 50-55% of the population, and have long been its traditional rulers. Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of modern Afghanistan in the mid-eighteenth century, was a Pashtun; so are Mohammed Zahir Shah and virtually all the Taliban. Under the IA, it seems clear that most Pashtuns will remain suspicious of Northern Alliance ministers and put their trust in Karzai and the Rome Group, as well as the former king.
Most powerful within the Northern Alliance are the Tajiks, numbering around 3.5m and dominating the mountainous northeast, particularly Badakshan province. Mostly speakers of Dari, a language related to Persian, they are nearly all Sunni Muslims (there are a small number of 'Mountain Tajiks' in the remote Pamir region who are Ismaili Shia). Under the IA, the Tajiks are well represented by Fahim, Abdullah and Qanooni. All three belong to the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e Islami party of Burhanuddin Rabbani. In addition, it has also been suggested that Rabbani may be appointed head of a future Supreme Court.
Immediately to the west of the Tajik heartland, centring on the plains around Mazar-e Sharif, live the Northern Alliance's second-largest contingent, the Uzbeks. This Turkic people, numbering around 1m, are uniformly Sunni Muslims with strong links to neighbouring Uzbekistan. The warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum heads the Uzbek-dominated Jombesh-e Melli Islami (National Islamic Party), and has a reputation both for brutality and as a political chameleon. To date, he has shown little enthusiasm for the consensus reached in Bonn, going so far as to warn that he may boycott the IA, in which he has not been given – or perhaps has not yet accepted – a post.
The third constituent of the Northern Alliance are the Hazara, a predominantly Mongol people numbering around 900,000 who inhabit the central Hindu Kush, especially the area known as Hazarajat centred on the remote town of Chakcharan. Amongst the poorest people in Afghanistan, the Hazara speak a dialect of Dari and are nearly all Shia Muslims. This brought them into bitter conflict with the Sunni ideologues of the Taliban. Some of the hardest fighting of recent years was around the largely Hazara town of Bamiyan. The Hazara warlord, and head of the Hazara-dominated Hezb-e Wahdat (Unity Party), is Karim Khalili. He draws much backing from his fellow Shia in Iran, and mistrusts his Tajik and Uzbek allies almost as much as he does the Pashtuns. Like Dostum, he has not been given a post in the IA. There are numerous other ethnic groups in Afghanistan – notably the Turkmen and Kyrgyz of the north, the Baluch of the southwest, and the Nuristanis of the east. None have any serious military or political influence, however.
Both the IA and the government designated to succeed it are likely to be dominated by Pashtuns and Tajiks, together with a number of largely symbolic lesser posts given to smaller but still significant minorities such as the Uzbeks and the Hazara. Outside observers have taken some comfort from the fact that, following the Bonn Conference, power amongst both the dominant Pashtun and Tajik communities has passed to younger, more sophisticated leaders.
The Tajiks
Younis Qanooni
The leader of the Northern Alliance delegation at the Bonn Conference, Qanooni was deputy defence minister in Rabbani's government. Born in 1957, he was a close friend of the Northern Alliance military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud – the so-called 'Lion of the Panjshir' assassinated by suspected Al-Qaeda suicide bombers two days before the 11 September attacks. A moderate known both for his willingness to compromise and his intelligence, he impressed diplomats at Bonn.
Abdullah Abdullah
A close ally of Qanooni and a good friend of Massoud, Abdullah emerged as the chief Northern Alliance spokesman and is likely to play a similar role in the IA. A consummate and articulate politician, he speaks several languages including fluent English.
Mohammed Fahim
The third of the triumvirate of younger Tajik leaders, Fahim is close to both Qanooni and Abdullah. A military man, he replaced Massoud when the latter was assassinated, and is now commander of what is certainly the strongest militia in the Northern Alliance, and probably the whole country.
All three of these younger 'reformist' Tajiks seem less rigid than their elderly mentor, Rabbani, who has effectively been sidelined. They are more aware of international opinion, and more cognisant of the need for compromise with the numerically dominant Pashtun. All of this may bode well for emergence of a government of national unity.
Hazara
Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq
A Hazara member of the Northern Alliance, Mohaqqeq has the Planning portfolio in the IA. He is a senior member of the Hezb-e Wahdat Party who was in charge of the fight against the Taliban in the Bamiyan area. Mohaqqeq heads the 'Akbari Faction' of the Hezb and can be seen as a rival to Karim Khalili who heads the 'Khalili Faction'. The Hazara-dominated Hezb-e Wahdat is split into as many as nine factions, but tend to cooperate against non-Hazaras, especially Pashtun in the Taliban.
The Pashtuns
Hamid Karzai
Head of Afghanistan's influential Popolzai tribe, Karzai is a distant relative of the former king. Respected by most Pashtun elders, he is well-educated and westernised. At Bonn, he demonstrated flexibility in dealings with other groups, notably the Northern Alliance. Although initially a supporter of the Taliban, he quickly turned against the movement because of its severe interpretation of Islam and the growing influence of Arab mujahiddin, and the Al-Qaeda group, on his country. A moderate, he is currently the Pashtun's best hope for building a new power base.
Mohammad Zahir Shah
The former king still retains widespread affection amongst the Pashtuns and other peoples. He is expected to return to facilitate the establishment of a loya jirga in June or July 2002, at which the future status of the monarchy may also be decided.
'Wild cards'
Ismail Khan
A Tajik warlord, Khan liberated the western Afghan city of Herat from the communists and became its governor before being overthrown and imprisoned by the Taliban. He has returned to Herat at the head of a predominantly Tajik militia, enjoying considerable support from neighbouring Iran. Nominally allied with the Northern Alliance, he is fiercely independent and will require a position within the IA or the IG if he is to remain onside.
Karim Khalili
A Hazara chieftain and head of the Hezb-e Wahdat, Khalili is based in the central Hindu Kush but enjoys a considerable following in both Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul. The Hazara, long excluded from power and treated with disdain by both Pashtuns and Tajiks, are strong enough to make trouble if they are ignored by the new authorities. As Shia Muslims they enjoy considerable backing from Iran, a factor the IA will ignore at its peril.
Abdul Rashid Dostum
Although still affiliated with the Northern Alliance, Dostum is chiefly interested in maintaining power in Mazar-e Sharif and the surrounding Uzbek and Turkmen provinces of the north. Apparently enjoying some support from Turkey, his position may be at least temporarily secured if Ankara contributes substantially to an international peace-keeping force. He has the potential to be a serious threat both to national unity and to the IA.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
The Pashtun equivalent of Dostum, Hekmatyar is in exile in Iran, where he had been valued for his opposition to allied coalition intervention against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He is regarded by his enemies as a religious zealot responsible for the shelling of Kabul during the Rabbani administration, which resulted in thousands of deaths. His re-entry into Afghan affairs would do little to boost stability.
Immediate agendas
All of the factions will now look to the task of defining Afghanistan's future political arrangements. Neither the Pashtun or Tajik groups favour allowing significant local autonomy for minorities within this system. The younger leaderships of Karzai and the Tajik triumvirate seem genuinely to want to establish a broad-based government.
Others, especially Dostum but also Khalili, are much more interested in protecting fiefdoms – a stance that the main parties to the IA/IG are likely to view as the path to continuing instability. Dostum can be expected to try to maintain his fiefdom of six provinces and up to 4 million people, possibly leading to fighting. If Dostum were to break with the Northern Alliance, there might emerge a politico-military alliance between Karzai and the Tajik triumvirate that could provide for stability.
Ultimately, whoever enjoys the support of the US will receive sufficient military and financial largesse to ensure they retain and strengthen their hold on power. Provided the anti-terrorist alliance holds to its promise to supply wide-ranging support to the IA/IG, all cards will be in the hands of Karzai and the Tajik triumvirate.
