Colombia's war on drugs

 

 

Concerns are mounting in Colombia and neighbouring countries that regional violence could escalate as US-trained troops push into the southern province of Putumayo to curb narcotics production. Within the incoming US administration of George W. Bush there is strong support for the $7.5 billion Plan Colombia aimed at eradicating the drug business and boosting Colombia's economic and social development. But the international community is divided over its likely effectiveness. Colombia's hopes to persuade the European Union to match the US contribution of $1.3bn towards the programme are unlikely to be fulfilled.

 

This year will be crucial for the plan. Controversy in potential donor countries about the programme's military aspects will be fuelled by the deployment in Putumayo, where 50% of Colombia's coca crop is grown. Many EU countries fear that the military campaign will exacerbate rather than eliminate the root causes of Colombia's instability. Further escalating tensions is the end-of-January deadline for Colombian President Andrés Pastrana to decide whether to extend the control of the main rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), over another large southern area.

 

Barely a year after it was announced in 1999, Plan Colombia's efficacy is doubted. Even if no one questions Pastrana's good intentions, the package has lost its initial momentum and its ability to contribute to normalising Colombia.

 

 

Colombia is the source country or transit zone for about 80% of the cocaine used in the United States. Coca-producing areas have almost doubled in acreage over the last five years. The narcotics trade yields billions of dollars annually, which mainly fund armed groups involved in drug production and trafficking. These factions have been fighting for more than 30 years, leaving thousands dead and millions displaced. The conflict mainly pits the FARC and a smaller anti-government force, the National Liberation Army (ELN), against the Colombian Army, the National Police and illegal right-wing paramilitary groups.

 

Pastrana announced Plan Colombia early in his administration. The aim was to halve drug production within six years and revive the country's economy - which is suffering its first recession for 25 years. The three-year programme is to be financed mainly by the Colombian government, which has pledged $4bn of the overall cost. This money will come from Colombia's own budget, bond issues and loans from international financial institutions. The main users of Colombia's drugs – the United States and Europe – were expected to donate the remaining $3.5bn.

 

Plan Colombia originated during Pastrana's electoral campaign in 1998. Pastrana pledged to combine tough measures against drug traffic with an economic strategy for generating employment, attracting foreign investment and boosting international trade. His strategy would also involve:

 

 

Pastrana's popularity in Washington helped win support for his plan within President Bill Clinton's administration. Although debate on the package was initially postponed, Clinton took up the issue citing a 'compelling national interest to reduce the flow of cocaine and heroin to our shores' and promote peace in Colombia. He requested $1.6bn from Congress over two years to assist anti-drug efforts in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, including $1.3bn of new funding. The lion's share of this was destined for Colombia.

 

 

Colombia receives more US police and military assistance than the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean combined. With nearly $300 million-worth of new weapons, equipment, training and services, Colombia in 1999 became the world's third-largest recipient of US grant security assistance after Israel and Egypt. The new aid proposal was unveiled by Clinton on 11 January 2000 and approved by Congress in July.

 

The package comprised five main categories: support for human rights and judicial reform; expansion of counter-narcotics operations into southern Colombia; assistance for farmers who grow coca and opium poppies to help them adjust to legal economic activity; narcotics interdiction efforts and assistance for the National Police. Military aspects of this aid have received the most attention.

 

US support for Colombia's 'Push to the South' against the main drug-producing areas has included creating, equipping and training counter-narcotics troops within the Colombian Army. A 950-man battalion, based at Tres Esquinas on the Putumayo border, became operational in December 1999. A second US-trained battalion completed training in December 2000 and a third is expected to become operational in April. Other measures implemented include:

 

 

From a regional perspective, one of the package's most controversial aspects was the supply of some 60 UH-60 Black Hawk and 42 UH-1 Huey utility helicopters. Ecuador and Venezuela feared that supplying large quantities of sophisticated weaponry to the Colombian armed forces could spark a regional arms race.

 

As the scale of military assistance became known, criticism of the aid programme intensified in Washington. Opponents argued that the country would be embroiled in another unwinnable jungle conflict. Former US Ambassador to El Salvador Robert E. White said the US efforts would amount to intervening in another country's civil war.

 

 

While indicating that they understood Pastrana's initiative, most South American governments have so far distanced themselves from the scheme. Latin Americans have traditionally disapproved of US intervention in the region, particularly the stationing of troops.

 

Especially critical of the plan has been Brazil, South America's largest country, which shares a long border with Colombia. In August 2000, during a South American summit convened by the country's president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian government warned against a large-scale US military presence in Colombia. Washington says its military assistance will be limited to training Colombian units and US military personnel will be barred from accompanying Colombian police and army units on missions.

 

At the fourth Meeting of Ministers of Defence of the Americas – organised by Brazil in October 2000 – discussions focused on Plan Colombia. No consensus emerged on endorsing the programme. Despite Colombian efforts to highlight drug interdiction as a priority for Latin American militaries, the meeting's final declaration barely mentioned the issue.

 

After the meeting, Pastrana toured several South American countries to rally support for the deal. Chilean President Ricardo Lagos and President Fernando De la Rúa of Argentina reiterated their backing for peace negotiations in Colombia in general terms, but pointedly refused to back the plan's military aspects.

 

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has warned about the possible destabilising effect of introducing sophisticated combat helicopters such as the Black hawks into the region. Ecuador fears heightened tensions on its border with Colombia if refugees flow in seeking shelter from right-wing paramilitary groups and guerrillas during major Colombian army offensives. Brazil is worried that Colombian drug traffickers will be pushed over the border into the Amazon jungle. This is now the Brazilian Army's main security concern.

 

 

European Union members clearly disapproved of the strong accent on military measures in the original Plan Colombia agreed by the US government. The European Commission, in particular, has argued that a comprehensive solution will require national dialogue with the guerrillas. It has not been willing to support, let alone co-finance, a strategy involving special military units and sophisticated equipment.

 

Europe was also disturbed that no European official was invited to the discussions between Bogotá and Washington that resulted in the plan. The projected EU contribution was publicised without consulting Brussels. Pastrana was hoping for roughly equal donations from the US and the EU. At two meetings of the multinational Support Group of the Peace Process in Colombia held in London and Madrid in June and July 2000, the European Commission indicated that it would not take part in any initiative with a military dimension. Instead, it reiterated its intention to help Colombia to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, protect the environment and develop alternative crops.

 

Of the member states, only Spain made a concrete pledge, offering over $100m. Other EU member states and the European Commission promised rapid contributions, but did not specify how much. At a follow-up meeting of the Support Group in Bogotá in October, EU members pledged approximately $180m in new grant aid. The Commission expressed willingness to provide about $94m, but emphasised that these funds would not be for Plan Colombia itself. This enormous gap between Colombia's expectations and the pledges made prompted Bogotá to present a revised version of the plan late last year, placing greater stress on social programmes and peace efforts. Brussels is currently considering the scheme.

 

A common European position remains elusive. Spain and the United Kingdom favour integrating European and US aid. Other member states are more concerned about being perceived as followers of a US-inspired scheme. Whatever the outcome, EU assistance will probably be significantly less than Colombia hopes for and loaded with conditions, such as human-rights improvements and continued dialogue with the rebels.

Muddling through?

 

Pastrana knows he can count on American support, as the problem has undisputed priority for any US administration. But US officials say the plan – at least its social and economic aspects – cannot succeed without broader international support. Apart from the Colombian and US and Spanish contributions, there are other relatively small grants that might be allocated to the programme. These include the $94m from the EU, $131m from the United Nations, $20m from Norway and an estimated $120m from EU members. Colombia may also receive repayable loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and other international financial institutions. An EU Technical Experts Group will meet soon to discuss issues raised at the October meeting in Bogotá, but even though the EU is the second-largest consumer of Colombian narcotics, the issue is not considered pressing in Brussels.

 

Pastrana seems resolved to promote his idea despite growing criticism at home – from rebels and Pastrana's political opponents – and decreasing foreign support. Latin American neighbours are primarily concerned about containing the crisis within Colombia's borders. EU countries appear to have decided that the problem is primarily an American one.

 

Washington and Brussels could still coordinate their efforts to save the plan and accommodate each others' concerns. Europeans need to understand that it will be hard to contribute to resolving the crisis if they continue to reject any military-related options. But support within the European Parliament for Colombia's rebels – despite their involvement in narcotics production – could make it difficult for the EU to change policy.