Russia's armed forces

 

 

In Russia's April presidential elections, more than 80% of active service personnel voted for Vladimir Putin, compared with the 25% who voted for Boris Yeltsin in the first round of the 1996 presidential polls. Military personnel hoped that Putin – himself a former security-service officer – would address the acute social and economic problems facing the military after ten years of ill-implemented reforms. But Putin risks eroding this crucial pillar of support if he does not pay proper attention to the social and economic impact of his proposed reforms. In the wake of the loss of the Kursk submarine and its crew, the President can ill-afford further to alienate the military rank and file and their families.

 

Putin believes that personnel reductions and the creation of a smaller, fully professional army will tackle declining living standards and low morale in the armed forces. On 11 August, Russia's Security Council proposed a gradual reduction of the defence budget allocation for personnel from 80% at present to 50% by 2016. The Russian armed forces would therefore have to be reduced by 400,000 to a total of about 800,000 or fewer, just to maintain current salaries and benefits. The defence budget increases announced on 24 August will boost levels of pay, on average by 20%, but personnel cuts will still be necessary. The increases will not help Russia's thousands of retiring military personnel.

 

The past decade, however, has shown that major force reductions, if unaccompanied by measures to help servicemen re-enter civilian life, can provoke social tensions, aggravate regional financial difficulties and encourage criminal activities both inside Russia and beyond its borders. More than 800,000 service personnel have left the armed forces since 1992 in the absence of such measures.

 

 

According to the Russian Institute of Labour, over 70% of retired service personnel have difficulties finding civilian jobs. The majority of officers  – commissioned and non-commissioned – remain unemployed for more than a year after leaving and many for more than three years. Captains and majors (or those of equivalent rank) aged between 35 and 44 experience the gravest problems. This age group is most actively targeted by criminal groups seeking recruits for private-security firms and illegal arms and drug-smuggling operations as well as for private military contracts in Africa, the Balkans and other conflict areas.

 

Greater force reductions could exacerbate these problems. Those who leave the armed forces are now targeted by well-organised criminal networks, rather than the small local gangs or individual criminals of a few years ago. Such opportunities may particularly appeal to the thousands of contract soldiers and conscripts returning from the conflict in Chechnya.

 

On returning from Chechnya, soldiers no longer receive the 800–950 roubles ($35) per day salary that they earned during the conflict; the average major's salary is about a third of that rate. Contracts are usually signed for three or five years, but officers may quit before they expire. Declining public support for the war could increase the number of early resignations as the conflict winds down.

 

Putin therefore must tackle three main tasks if his military reforms are to succeed:

 

• Improving living and economic conditions for younger military personnel. Many current contracts expire in the next two years and more than 30% of service personnel under 35 years old have stated that they do not intend to extend them;

• Radically reforming the system for helping service personnel to re-enter civilian life. This should include providing information about options after leaving the services, providing retraining during the final year of service, financially and logistically assisting relocation from remote military towns and regions with high unemployment and creating tax and other incentives for successful civilian employment; and

• Cracking down more effectively on criminal groups that try to recruit former service personnel.

 

 

Poor and irregular pay is the main reason young and middle-aged military personnel leave the services early. Some 50% of contract officers cannot afford to live or keep their families on military pay alone and many have second jobs. This undermines military efficiency and morale and contributes to crime and negligence within the armed forces. Acute housing shortages further undermine morale.

 

More than 71,000 families of active personnel have to live in dormitories. In 1998, the state pledged to pay 80% of a house price for Russians leaving the armed forces. Funding for this plan was limited, however, and the Ministry of Finance could process only 15,000 certificates in three years; around 42,000 applications a year were received.

 

Russian law entitles military personnel with more than 15 years' service to receive free housing and up to 20 months of salary on retirement. But many remain without housing, while outstanding salary has been devalued by inflation and not fully paid. Many have therefore been left with diminutive pensions that cannot support their families. Younger members of the armed forces often are required to leave before they are eligible for pensions and cannot find stable employment for years.

 

Poor working conditions in the armed forces also encourage early retirement. Because of funding shortages, officers cannot conduct regular training, even if old equipment is used. Many talented and ambitious young officers have little chance of promotion, particularly in the navy, where the reduction in the number of operational ships has severely restricted opportunities. Those under 40 years of age often leave hoping to exploit their technical and managerial skills in the better-paid private sector. In large cities such as Moscow and St Petersburg they might be hired, but in smaller towns they have little chance of legitimate employment.

 

There was strong opposition within the military and among former military personnel to Putin's new tax code, ratified in July, which removed the exemption from income tax enjoyed by former members of the armed forces. Financial worries, pressure from criminal groups and lack of entrepreneurial skills prevent many ex-service personnel from setting up businesses. When remote military encampments close down, many of those serving in them cannot afford to relocate their families and often remain, without jobs, in what become virtual ghost towns. There are 1,200 such settlements in Russia, most with a few hundred inhabitants. More than 300 of them are in the Far Eastern Military District.

 

 

Crime within the armed forces has soared in recent years. In 1999, it increased by 10% compared with the year before, with the number of corruption cases surging by 50%. Between 1993 and 1998, the number of bribery cases involving military personnel investigated by the authorities increased by 82% compared with 23% in Russia as a whole. Whereas crime committed by service personnel (mostly conscripts) once usually involved stealing from one other, it now consists of organised groups, often including officers, stealing from civilian-run shops or selling military equipment.

 

Drug offences are also rising sharply. Official figures show that 1,100 soldiers and officers have been treated for drug addiction, but the number is certainly much higher. In 1999, over 1,200 cases of bullying were reported in the armed forces, in addition to 900 among Interior Troops and 400 among the Border Guards. Last year, 40 conscript sailors escaped from their ship in Vladivostok complaining of physical abuse.

 

 

Given the low morale and criminal behaviour in the Russian military, it is unsurprising that, according to the Institute of Labour, more than a quarter of service personnel receive employment offers from criminal organisations before they leave the forces. This is particularly true of former Special Forces personnel, or veterans of Afghanistan and Chechnya. Some war veterans form their own criminal clans, which are involved in racketeering, drug trafficking and the illegal sale of weapons. The Organisation of Veterans of the Special Forces says that more than half of ex-Special Forces personnel join criminal organisations where they can exploit their expertise to carry out contract killings and bombings whilst covering their tracks.

 

Many ex-military personnel form 'security companies', which provide protection for businesses and former servicemen. In 1991, the government granted special tax exemptions and licences for disabled war veterans giving them the right to import alcohol and tobacco tax-free and export crude oil and metals. Such trade has generated millions of dollars for criminal groups.

 

Many criminal gangs formed by ex-service personnel have links with corrupt officials, from civil servants in the Ministry of Defence to commanders of remote units. The first major corruption scandal occurred in connection with the withdrawal of Russian forces from Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and the head of his budget department were accused of embezzling millions of dollars, prompting Grachev's dismissal in 1996. There have since been several allegations of high-level corruption within the military and defence bureaucracy, usually relating to the illegal sale of military equipment to Europe, Africa or Central Asia. The Russian armed forces are estimated to be the world's largest supplier of stolen military equipment. Between 1990 and 1998, the number of registered crimes associated with firearms theft from Russian military units rose from 788 to 1,352. On 29 August, Putin responded to international criticism by banning the sale of Russian arms and equipment to Ethiopia and Eritrea in line with a May 2000 UN ban on arms sales to the two countries. While this will not eliminate private military activities involving Russian citizens in those two countries, it could curtail them.

 

Groups offering mercenaries from countries of the former Soviet Union to warring parties around the world have also hired Russian ex-service personnel. Russian and Ukrainian pilots are flying and maintaining fighter jets and transport aircraft in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Russian mercenaries fought alongside Serb forces in the Bosnian war and in last year's conflict in Kosovo. Former Russian military personnel are also running drug-trafficking or arms-for-drugs operations in Tajikistan and Colombia.

 

 

According to a 1998 law, the state is required to help with 'social adaptation' – training military personnel for civilian jobs during their last year of service. But no federal funding has yet been allocated for this purpose. Foreign donors, including Germany, the UK, Norway, the European Union and the US-based Soros Foundation, have met most of the cost of running social-adaptation centres. The Japanese Foreign Ministry runs two such retraining courses in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk and is planning to expand its programme.

 

It is crucial that the Russian government also shows commitment to these efforts. More than 60 social-adaptation centres that have been established by ex-military personnel are functioning across Russia without any foreign or state support. Some charge for education, while others are funded by businesses or foundations run by former service personnel. Regional administrations provide many such centres with free office space and facilities. The centres reduce social tension and help to create new jobs. If Putin's new government were to make integrating ex-service personnel into the civilian sector a policy priority, it could thereby help to revive the economies of the regions. Failing to do so could dash the expectations of the military and undermine political and social stability.