Stuck in the Lebanese 'mud'

 

 

A unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops from south Lebanon seems likely following the failure of the Geneva summit peace negotiations between US President Bill Clinton and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on 26 March. The presence of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) in what Israelis disdainfully call the Lebanese `mud' is increasingly unpopular domestically, due to a constant toll of casualties inflicted by resistance groups spearheaded by Hizbullah. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak came to power in May 1999 on a pledge to withdraw troops within a year, with or without an agreement with Syria.

 

Attacks such as Hizbullah's cross-border shelling of northern Israel on 9 April have shown that the 'security zone' imposed by Israel to protect its northern population is no longer effective. But withdrawal in the absence of a wider deal will increase the risk of Hizbullah assaults, especially if Israel retains pockets of border territory as IDF commanders recommend. The movement has pledged to drive out the 'last Zionist soldier' from Lebanon. Such attacks could trigger a large-scale counter-offensive by Israel, which in turn could heighten regional tensions. The fate of Israel's proxy militia in the territory, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) has also become increasingly uncertain. Beirut views its members – and local residents who have become economically dependent on their southern neighbour – as traitors.

 

Intense domestic pressure, and the likelihood that Washington's involvement will falter as the US presidential elections in November draw near, could bring forward to May the IDF withdrawal upon which Barak has staked his reputation. This could further complicate the Syrian–Israeli track of negotiations. Damascus must be feeling the pressure of the imminent withdrawal, but it is unlikely to concede to Barak over territory. Although Iran sponsors Hizbullah, control of its supply-lines constitutes Assad's key weapon in negotiating the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Reining in Hizbullah in response to Israeli demands is therefore unlikely to appeal to Damascus, and at any rate would be difficult in view of continued Iranian support. Assad may even encourage Hizbullah to step up attacks as a means of pressure in the coming months.

 

Shi'i clerics formed Hizbullah in 1982. Its military wing, the Islamic Resistance, has roughly 300 permanent fighters and 3,000 part-time local recruits. The guerrillas lead the armed opposition to Israel's occupation with another Shi'i militia, Amal, and several smaller Lebanese and Palestinian groups. Its low-level war of attrition has honed the group into a motivated and disciplined force.

 

Weapons supplied from Iran have become increasingly sophisticated. The force now uses tube-launched, optically wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank missiles and remote-controlled bombs to devastating effect. The Islamic Resistance also benefits from considerable support and information from south Lebanese villagers. Small autonomous cells and a flexible chain of command make infiltration and exposure by Israeli intelligence near impossible. As a resistance force against an occupation condemned by UN resolutions, Hizbullah has developed a degree of international sympathy since the end of the Lebanese civil war of 1975_90, during which it targeted international military personnel in bomb attacks.

 

Hizbullah has changed its tactics from terrorism towards more conventional guerrilla resistance. Following a spate of IDF casualties and the assassination of the SLA second-in-command, Colonel Akel Hashim, the Israel Air Force attacked three Lebanese civilian power plants in February. Damage inflicted was estimated at $40 million by the Lebanese authorities. Hizbullah refrained from sending rockets into northern Israel in retaliation as it was widely expected to do, limiting itself to military targets. Israel's actions, meanwhile, contravened an April 1996 agreement brokered by France and the US aimed at protecting civilians from attack.

 

Hizbullah is still opposed to Israel's existence. But it says its post-withdrawal strategy would concentrate on peaceful resistance to the normalisation of Lebanese ties with Israel. Although ideologically committed to the foundation of an Islamic republic, Hizbullah's increasingly mature political wing, which has eight members of parliament, has also focused on championing the rights of the impoverished Shi'a, and advocating reform of Lebanon's political system by introducing proportional representation. It perceives the current religious weighting of parliamentary seats to be biased towards the Maronite Christian élite.

 

The SLA will struggle to adapt to, and survive in, a post-withdrawal south Lebanon unless Syria, which has 35,000 troops stationed in Lebanon and controls the country's security, guarantees its safety as part of an agreement. Since 1985, the militia force has been under the total control of Israel, which trains and equips its soldiers. SLA fighters were once predominantly Christian, but increasingly have been recruited among south Lebanese Shi'a and Druze, usually through forced conscription or financial inducements. Israel pays the soldiers salaries of $500_600 per month.

 

The SLA's proxy role has enabled Israel to retain only 1,100 IDF soldiers in South Lebanon. These mainly guard heavily fortified outposts. The roughly 2,500-strong SLA is more visible on the ground. The perception that it carries out Israel's dirty work has earned its soldiers the nickname 'sandbags' among the Lebanese. Indeed, while between 1985 and November 1999 Israel lost 244 men, the SLA toll was 410. The SLA also runs the notorious al-Khiam prison in the occupied zone. Human-rights violations inside the jail are well documented.

 

Hizbullah has stepped up operations against the demoralised force and encourages the increasingly frequent defections. The Lebanese courts have sentenced the SLA's commander, General Antoine Lahad, to death in absentia on charges of treason. Beirut insists that SLA fighters and civilian 'collaborators' will be prosecuted following the resumption of Lebanese control over the south. Although senior officers certainly risk harsh sentences, Beirut would gain little from large-scale prosecutions of civilians and the rank-and-file. Years of war have caused the migration – and sometimes expulsion – northwards of much of south Lebanon's population, which has shrunk from 250,000 in 1985 to an estimated 75,000–100,000 people. A large number of inhabitants are either related to, or associated with, SLA soldiers, or have 'collaborated' by benefiting economically from the occupation.

 

Large-scale Israeli attacks on civilians during the invasions of 1978 and 1982, and more recently in 1993 and 1996, have aimed to punish and discourage local cooperation with resistance groups. Israel has also used economic incentives to strengthen its position. Between 1995 and 1999, it spent $39.2m in assistance to the civilian population of the occupied zone, including investment in infrastructure and welfare. Families of SLA soldiers have been granted permits to work in Israel.

 

South Lebanon's economic dependence on Israel is compounded by a Lebanese ban on imports from the occupied zone – aimed at preventing Israeli access to the Lebanese market – and SLA controls on imports south into Israel. If the local economy is not carefully managed following the withdrawal of Israeli assistance, the area risks further depopulation.

 

In March 2000, Lahad announced that he would stay and defend south Lebanon after Israel withdraws. But his bravado was met with local scepticism. Lahad has moved his family to Paris and reportedly spends much of his time there. Trepidation about the future is giving rise to defiance, and some residents have started to set up civil-guard units with SLA cooperation. SLA soldiers say that Israel has reneged on a promise guaranteeing their safety in their homes in Lebanon, and many will flee if Israel leaves without an agreement.

 

In Israel, the withdrawal's imminence has fuelled public debate and a sense of obligation to the SLA. A small number will be granted asylum. But the Israeli defence ministry is reportedly having difficulty finding sufficient accommodation, and the resettlement plan is opposed by many right-wing Jewish groups. Israeli Deputy Defence Minister Ephraim Sneh has suggested that Israel may continue to back the SLA. The country risks being dragged back into south Lebanon if peace with Syria remains elusive.

 

A continued SLA presence could heighten tensions in the area. Beirut and Damascus are in no mood to make evacuation easy for Israel, and there are no guarantees that the 60,000-strong Lebanese Army would keep the border quiet in the absence of an agreement. SLA chiefs noted with trepidation that Lebanese troops did not deploy in the Jezzine area in July 1999 following SLA withdrawal from the enclave, which it had held since 1985.

 

The risk of violence will be mitigated if Israel withdraws to the international border, which would undermine the legitimacy of Hizbullah attacks. In April Barak rejected the Operation Morning Twilight plan proposed by IDF commanders, under which Israel would retain several outposts well within Lebanese territory. Israeli appeals for more international peacekeepers to guard their retreat are only likely be heeded if the IDF evacuates completely in line with Security Council resolution 475 of 1978.

 

In any event, Israel's interpretation of the international border is likely to be disputed. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the 4,500-strong force deployed since 1978 to oversee Israel's withdrawal and protect civilians, has reported the gradual shifting northwards of the border by Israel, at points by several hundred metres. These deviations from the international boundary could provide a pretext for continued hostilities with Hizbullah. Ireland and Finland have already suggested that they would withdraw their UNIFIL contingents if violence breaks out, and it is unlikely that other countries will put their troops in Hizbullah's line of fire if it disputes the withdrawal.

 

Lebanon's 360,000 registered Palestinian refugees, concentrated in the south, constitute a further potential source of instability. Lebanese President Emile Lahoud has warned of the possibility of cross-border violence if they are not included in a peace deal. Beirut has consistently refused to allow the refugees' integration into Lebanon, fearing a threat to the country's precarious religious balance. The Palestinians risk being left stranded. Diplomats also fear that Damascus could manipulate the largely inactive Palestinian militias, many of which are pro-Syrian, to cause unrest along the Israeli border.

 

Amid predictions ranging from a power vacuum in the south to renewed civil war, there are clear indications of Israel's future strategy if a peace accord is not reached. Large-scale IDF deployment along the Israeli side of the border is planned. Sneh has warned of harsh retaliation if cross-border attacks continue. A unilateral withdrawal in the absence of a wider peace is unlikely to end Israel's involvement in south Lebanon – much less to stabilise the region.