Taiwan's presidential elections

 

Taiwan's presidential elections on 18 March 2000 will mark a crucial stage in the island's political development and its relations with China. The polls could pave the way for a further relaxation of Taipei's restrictions on economic and transport links with the mainland. However, they are also fuelling China's anxieties about Taiwan's aspirations to become an internationally recognised sovereign state. Whoever wins, there is little likelihood that Beijing will scale back preparations for a possible military assault on the island.

 

President Lee Teng-hui's departure after 12 years in office will be the first democratic change of the island's leadership since Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist forces retreated to Taiwan in 1949 after losing to the communists in the Chinese civil war. Since then, the KMT has ruled Taiwan while maintaining that the government of the 'Republic of China' on Taiwan was the legitimate government of all China. The increasing hollowness of this claim has encouraged demands in Taiwan that the island should dissolve its perceived 'oneness' with China and declare itself independent. Relations with China have been a key subject of debate during the Taiwanese election campaign.

 

China demonstrated its concerns by issuing a policy document on 21 February 2000. In it, Beijing threatened with unprecedented clarity to attack the island not only if it declared independence, but also if the Taiwanese authorities refused to engage in reunification talks – a clear warning to the leading candidates, none of whom has expressed enthusiasm for such dialogue. There are fears that even if Beijing does not desire war over Taiwan, a future Chinese government could be trapped by its predecessors' and its own rhetoric into taking action that could draw in the US and destabilise East Asia.

 

However, Beijing has so far refrained from staging war games in the Taiwan Strait as it did during the build-up to the Taiwanese presidential elections of 1996. China possibly doubts the effectiveness of such tactics in influencing Taiwan's voters. It may also want to avoid directly provoking the US while Congress is debating bills concerning China's membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Taiwan's security.

 

Lee provoked Beijing's fury in July 1999 when he declared that, in future, Taiwan and China should conduct relations on a 'special state-to-state basis' – a move away from the official formula that they constituted one temporarily divided country. However, Lee's departure from office is little comfort to Beijing. The current race is contested between three front-runners – Lee's favoured KMT candidate, incumbent Vice-President Lien Chan; the independent James Soong; and Chen Shui-bian of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Less than four weeks before the balloting, opinion polls gave Soong a slight lead over the other two.

 

The rivalry between Lien and Soong has dealt a blow to the fragile unity of the KMT. Soong was a leading figure in the party until he fell out with Lee and decided to run as an independent. With the KMT's image tarnished by corruption allegations, Soong's expulsion from the party added to the popularity he had gained while serving as Taiwan's governor from 1993 to 1998. He also won the support of conservative KMT nationalists who remain committed to union with the mainland, albeit not on communist terms. These had grown disillusioned with Lee's perceived lack of commitment to reunification.

 

Government moves to prosecute Soong for his alleged embezzlement of more than $10 million when he was the party's secretary-general have deepened KMT divisions. Many party members believe these charges to be part of Lien's campaign to defeat Soong. They could therefore bolster his image as a man battling against a morally wayward party.

 

The DPP's Chen enjoys similar public backing. As mayor of Taipei from 1994 to 1998, he reduced the city's traffic congestion and cracked down on prostitution. He has attempted to play down DPP support for formal independence, claiming that Taiwan already enjoys such a status and that there is no need to change the official Republic of China name. Chen is clearly aware that the party's pro-independence stance, whilst reflecting the feelings of a large minority of Taiwanese, has been one of its greatest handicaps in gaining majority backing. Many potential supporters are deterred by fears of a Chinese attack in the event of a DPP victory.

 

Beijing-controlled newspapers in Hong Kong have denounced the mainland policies of the leading candidates as variations on Lee's 'two-states' theory. Chen, particularly, is accused of trying to deceive voters with his shift away from supporting outright independence. Victory for Chen would almost certainly escalate tensions between Taiwan and the mainland.

 

As a result, US China policy could also be plunged into confusion. This policy is based on two contradictory principles: respecting the democratic will of the Taiwanese people; and opposing any move by Taiwan to assert its independence. The Clinton administration is anxious to avoid clashing with Beijing and has stressed its commitment to 'one China'. However, anti-Beijing feelings run high in the Republican-dominated US Congress. Clinton and his preferred successor, Vice-President Al Gore, cannot be seen to be 'soft on China' in a US election year.

 

Growing tension between Beijing and Taipei could be partially defused if a new Taiwanese administration sought closer economic ties – something supported by all three leading candidates. Even Lien has promised stronger economic relations with the mainland, knowing that members of the business community are frustrated with Lee's restrictions on direct investment in China. Lien has pledged to push for direct shipping and other links, in return for a sign of goodwill from the mainland.

 

However, political rapprochement will be more elusive. Taiwan's citizens have shown a strong preference for maintaining the status quo. Without major political changes on the mainland – and arguably even with them – it would be politically suicidal for any Taiwanese leader to accept Beijing's version of the 'one-China' principle, according to which Taiwan constitutes an integral part of the People's Republic.

 

The Taiwanese elections are unlikely to ignite hostilities immediately. Instead, they may be followed by a period during which Taipei and Beijing probe each other's intentions. The two countries may resume discussions of a possible visit to Taiwan by the mainland's chief negotiator, Wang Daohan, which were suspended last year amid the furore over Lee's 'two-states' theory.

 

The policy paper issued by China in February did not specifically demand that Taiwan renounce Lee's 'two-states' concept, previously posited as a condition for resuming talks. But at the same time, Beijing will continue to prepare its armed forces for a possible conflict with Taiwan and its chief backer, the US. Any Taiwanese administration, meanwhile, will continue current efforts to maintain an advantage over the mainland in terms of military technology.

 

The security environment in the Taiwan Strait has changed significantly since the elections four years ago. According to the Pentagon, China has increased the number of short-range ballistic missiles deployed on the coast facing Taiwan. It has acquired more advanced Su-27 fighter planes from Russia, enabling it to narrow the air-power gap between itself and Taiwan, which is equipped with American F-16s and French Mirage 2000s. In February 2000, China received from Russia the first of two Sovremmenyy-class destroyers equipped with sophisticated Sunburn anti-ship missiles.

 

China's security concerns have also shifted. America's positioning of two aircraft-carrier battle groups close to Taiwan during the 1996 crisis convinced Beijing that it had to be better prepared for US intervention in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing derived some reassurance from Clinton's public declaration in 1998 of Washington's 'three noes' policy towards Taiwan – no support for the island's independence; no support for two Chinas or one Taiwan, one China; and no support for Taiwan's membership of any organisation for which statehood is a requirement.

 

But Beijing's military planners are alarmed by America's continuing weapon sales to the island; its refusal to rule out the possibility of deploying a theatre missile-defence system to protect Taiwan; and the strengthening of its defence cooperation with Japan and the Philippines over the last two years. Clinton promised to veto legislation being debated in Congress that would boost US defence contacts with Taiwan. China, however, is worried that if there is enough support for the bill, the next American president might feel obliged to adopt at least some of its proposals.

 

Last year's NATO action against Yugoslavia heightened China's fears of American intervention in the Taiwan Strait. To Beijing, the NATO campaign set a dangerous precedent for Western military involvement in other countries' internal affairs. The conflict also demonstrated the huge technological advantages enjoyed by America and its allies.

 

In coming years, China will certainly redouble efforts to address its military deficiencies, particularly as they relate to possible war with Taiwan. China's financial and technological constraints mean that – even with Russian help – it will not be able to match US sea- or air-power for the foreseeable future. However, with weapons such as the Sunburn missiles, Beijing hopes that it could inflict heavy damage on any US naval force, and that this threat will deter US intervention.

 

Taiwan's new president, meanwhile, will have to deal with a leadership in Beijing that is more preoccupied with the reunification issue than it was for most of Lee's rule. Following the handover to China of Hong Kong in 1997, and of Macao by Portugal in December 1999, Chinese officials have made clear that Taiwan is their next objective. Chinese President Jiang Zemin is under considerable pressure from political and military leaders to set a timetable for reunification.

 

Should Taiwan's next president prove as reluctant as his predecessor to discuss reunification, Jiang might announce a deadline. Domestic political jockeying will intensify in the build-up to the Communist Party's Sixteenth Congress in 2002, and to the National People's Congress in 2003, at which Jiang's successor will be appointed. Chinese leaders might, therefore, adopt a tough stance on Taiwan in order to demonstrate their nationalist credentials. But Washington, as much as Beijing or Taipei, will determine the development of relations between Taiwan and mainland China after the March elections.

 

China's belligerence towards Taiwan may have been fuelled by Clinton's perceived weakness and uncertainty in his handling of Chinese affairs. Such uncertainty was evident when, under pressure from Congress, Clinton granted Lee a visa to visit America in 1995. Fears of a backlash in Congress also prevented him from securing agreement to China's accession to the WTO during a visit to Washington by Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in April 1999.

 

The next US president will have to demonstrate a clear and consistent policy towards China involving both engagement with Beijing, and commitment to Taiwan's defence – and to be more prepared than Clinton vigorously to defend this policy before Congress. If such leadership is not forthcoming, Beijing could issue a military ultimatum to Taiwan from which it could not subsequently retreat. The results could be disastrous for the entire region.