Serbia goes to the polls - Volume 6 - Issue 10 - December 2000

 

 

Serbia's parliamentary elections on 23 December will mark the definitive end of the Slobodan Milosevic era, as Serbia's former opposition consolidates power and takes full control of Serbia's institutions. However, this transition promises to be anything but smooth. The 18-party coalition known as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), whose supporters ousted Milosevic in October, risks collapse after the elections and the tasks facing the incoming government are truly monumental.

 

Not only will the new administration have to grapple with the legacies of a decade of war, isolation and economic sanctions, but it will also have to resolve the fundamental question of Serbia's status. Negotiations with Montenegro – expected to take place over the coming months – could result in a new federation, a confederation or a Czechoslovak-style 'velvet divorce'. The outcome of future talks about Kosovo's relationship with Serbia is equally unpredictable.

 

Serbs last went to the polls on 24 September, along with the roughly 20% of the electorate of Montenegro who ignored their government's call for a poll boycott. This election was for the government and presidency of Yugoslavia, which still consists, on paper at least, of Serbia (including Kosovo) and Montenegro. The result was a resounding victory for Vojislav Kostunica, a man who has carefully cultivated his reputation as a democrat and a nationalist and also as a man untainted by either corruption or past collaboration with the Milosevic regime.

 

Although he attempted to resist the inevitable, Milosevic was toppled on 5 October. Kostunica took over as president while DOS forged a coalition with Montenegro's Socialist People's Party (SNP) to form a Yugoslav government. The SNP had been a loyal supporter of Milosevic but expediently switched sides. By contrast, DOS was forced into the coalition by virtue of the fact that it had no other credible partners in the Yugoslav parliament thanks to the Montenegrin poll boycott.

 

DOS exerts control

 

Constitutionally speaking, the Yugoslav presidency, parliament and government are relatively unimportant. In domestic politics, the real power lies with the republican authorities in Serbia and Montenegro. During the past three years, the presidency of Yugoslavia only became crucial because it was the post occupied by Milosevic, and now by Kostunica, who is, according to opinion polls, currently enjoying the support of 75% of the population.

 

Nonetheless, after the 5 October changes, it became a priority for DOS to clear out the remnants of the old regime. Unable or unwilling to put up any significant resistance, Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) agreed to hold elections on 23 December for the Serbian parliament. Until that date, a transitional government is keeping the basic government functions ticking over.

 

After bruising negotiations and much acrimony between the main players, DOS leaders agreed to sustain their otherwise unnatural coalition until the poll. They agreed that the prime minister-designate would be Zoran Djindjic. A veteran opposition leader, Djindjic is the head of the Democratic Party (DS), and the brains behind DOS. The deal he hammered out with Kostunica (whom he dislikes and by whom he is equally disliked) was that the DS and Kostunica's own Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) would each get 28 of the first 125 seats in the 250-seat parliament.

 

With the latest opinion poll showing that DOS is supported by 61% of the population, that Milosevic's SPS can only expect support from some 16% and that 13.5% are undecided, it is quite possible that the DOS parties will end up controlling two-thirds of the seats in parliament.

 

 

Djindjic's DS will probably lead what will become Serbia's social democratic wing of parties while Kostunica's DSS will lead an emerging Christian democraticbloc – the new president is a devout member of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the months and years to come, various combinations are possible, especially if small, new parties led by former SPS officials manage to leap the 5% threshold necessary to be represented in parliament.

 

While the new Yugoslav authorities have already begun to take charge of the economy and have ended the country's international isolation, the task of overhauling the economy can only begin in earnest in the New Year, when the new Serbian government is constituted. The transition will bring hardship to a population already ground down by a decade of economic collapse. Prices of basic goods and services will rise and, in the short to medium term, there will be higher unemployment than already exists.

 

Because of the mutual dislike between the two men, relations between a Serbian government headed by Djindjic and a federal government under Kostunica will be difficult. Djindjic would like to make sure that real power accrues to him, but thanks to Kostunica's enormous popularity, he will find this difficult. The real question is how long Kostunica will hold on to his post. If the forthcoming talks with Montenegro and its president, Milo Djukanovic, fail to forge some form of new Yugoslav state, then Kostunica will not have a country to preside over.

 

 

Both the Montenegrins and Kostunica have begun planning for talks on the future of the two republics. The Montenegrin authorities say they are in a hurry to move to a referendum on their future status and this could well be held before mid-next year. The basic platform of the Montenegrins is that both Serbia and Montenegro should be internationally recognised as independent states, each having its own UN seat, but that a loose 'Union of Serbia and Montenegro' might have one army, one foreign policy and a few other links.

 

During the Milosevic years, the referendum question only applied to the Montenegrins. A major change since 5 October is the assumption that Serbs would also vote. Montenegrins who had believed their future to be in their own hands might find that Serbia votes for its ownindependence, leaving Montenegro to fend for itself.

 

The reason that this might happen is that there are some eight million Serbs and only 650,000 citizens of Montenegro. If a referendum is held, depending on any deal hammered out, many Serbs may conclude that independence is a more appealing option than constantly attempting to satisfy the political leaders of a republic whose population is less than a third of that of Belgrade. Besides, even if Montenegro becomes independent, it is almost guaranteed to remain a friendly neighbour, especially since many Serbs can either trace their roots there or have family in the country. Nevertheless, it is too early to foresee with any certainty what will happen to Montenegro, or even whether the republic's present government will survive, given that one member of the three-party governing coalition is not in favour of independence.

 

 

If talks with the Montenegrins fail, then Kostunica will lose his job in the same way that Mikhail Gorbachev lost his once the Soviet Union passed into history. Kostunica has had, until now, the image of a rather introverted, academic type who does not like to be too pushy. But since his victory, he has revelled in the adulation of the Serbs and of many foreign countries. It has become clear that he has no intention of disappearing along with the Yugoslav federation. Unlike Gorbachev, Kostunica already has his political lifeboat ready and waiting. If he can no longer be president of Yugoslavia, then he can be president of Serbia.

 

The current incumbent is Milan Milutinovic. A former Milosevic loyalist, he is also an indicted war criminal. Since 5 October, Milutinovic has obeyed the will of DOS in order to win himself time. Although his mandate does not expire until summer 2001, he will certainly be dispensed with, either by DOS or Kostunica, the moment that either believes he has served his purpose, or that Kostunica needs his job.

The future relationship of Serbia and Montenegro would be easier to determine were Kosovo not another partner in these discussions, albeit a silent one for the moment. If Montenegro becomes independent, most Serbs understand that, whatever the legal niceties, it is hardly realistic to expect to form an amicable relationship with Kosovo's implacably hostile ethnic-Albanian population once Serbia and Montenegro have parted company on the basis of a right to self-determination.

 

Western diplomats are dusting down old plans for the so-called 'three republic solution' or some form of loose confederation between Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. While this would be a convenient outcome for the diplomats, there is little chance that Montenegro would accept it and no chance whatsoever that the Kosovo Albanians would.

 

 

Next year, Kosovars will vote for their own assembly. After the election, the Albanian-controlled parts of the territory will become independent in all but name. Nonetheless, Kosovo will continue to be plagued by violence against Serbs and among Albanians themselves. Kosovan territorial claims on Kosovo's eastern border, along the Albanian-inhabited Presevo valley in Serbia proper, will also continue to cause problems, both for Serbia and for the NATO-led peace force in Kosovo, KFOR. The cause of the Albanian guerrillas in Presevo, namely that the 80,000 Albanians who live in the valley should be annexed to Kosovo,is far from universally popular in Kosovo. Many Albanians understand that, by opening the question of borders, they risk losing the Serbian-held north of the province.

 

In the long term, it may be the Serbs who campaign for such a partition. Although Kostunica still wants some form of restored Yugoslav or Serbian sovereignty in the province, it is significant that a number of his close political allies believe that, for the greater good of the Serbs, it would be better to face reality and effectively amputate Kosovo, keeping the north if possible. In the short term, there may be violence on or around 23 December, when Kosovar Serbs will vote for local councillors. In all probability, they will also vote in the Serbian elections scheduled for the same day.

 

Although severe difficulties lie ahead, there is little doubt that the changes that began in Serbia on 24 September are amounting to a slow revolution. Serbia, with or without Montenegro and, in the long run, almost certainly without Kosovo, has begun its inexorable transition towards becoming a normal country in south-eastern Europe.

 

 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), comprising the republics of Serbia (including Kosovo) and Montenegro

 

Based on the constitution of April 1992

 

Assembly (Skupstina), including the Chamber of Citizens (138 seats) and the Chamber of Republics (40 seats –20 from each republic)

 

24 September 2000 (presidential and parliamentary); next election due in 2004

 

The election of Vojislav Kostunica as president on 24 September 2000 for a four-year term was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on 6 October

 

Coalition of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and the Socialist People's Party (SNP) of Montenegro

 

Zoran Zizic

 

 

Republic of Serbia

 

Based on the Serbian constitution of 1989

 

Assembly (Skupstina) 250 seats

 

21 September 1997; next election due 23 December 2000

 

President Milan Milutinovic

 

After the 5 October 2000 changes, a transitional government was agreed, comprising a coalition between the DOS, the Socialist People's Party (SPS) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO).

 

Milomir Minic (transitional)

 

 

Republic of Montenegro

 

Based on the Montenegrin constitution of 1992

 

Assembly (Skupstina), 71 seats

 

31 May 1998; next election due 2001

 

President Milo Djukanovic, sworn in on 15 January 1998

 

The 'For a Better Life' coalition, consisting of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) the People's Party (NS) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP)

 

Filip Vujanovic