Towards authoritarian reform?
Boris Yeltsin's resignation as Russian president on New Year's Eve 1999 left his designated successor, transitional President Vladimir Putin, as the overwhelming favourite to win presidential elections scheduled for 26 March 2000. In this case, the extensive powers of the Russian presidency, which have largely lain dormant in Yeltsin's feeble grip, will be assumed by a vigorous and ruthless 47-year-old former KGB agent. As prime minister and presumptive successor, Putin already enjoyed popularity because of his launch of the campaign in Chechnya on 23 September 1999, as well as his public image of youth and decisiveness.
To these advantages, Putin has added his grip on the state and the media, thanks to government influence and the support of leading media owners. The power of this combination was demonstrated in the December 1999 parliamentary elections when his government's Unity electoral bloc, only founded in October, came a close second, with 23% of the vote.
Together with its allies in the business-oriented Union of Rightist Forces, which received 8% of the vote, the government bloc has gained a clear parliamentary lead over the communists, who received just 24%. Regarding economic reform, the government should also be able to rely on the support of the liberal Yabloko party, which won 6% of the vote, although Yabloko opposes the government over the Chechen war.
The Fatherland–All Russia bloc of former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov was beaten into third place with 13%. In mid-1999, this party had been tipped to win the race to succeed Yeltsin. This defeat reflected not only the pressure of government propaganda, but also reservations on the part of several regional governors who had previously backed Primakov. The governors now apparently view Putin's victory in the presidential election as virtually inevitable, and wish to be on the winning side. Primakov, at 70 years of age, is older than Yeltsin, and there is ample evidence that most Russians are tired of having an ageing and ineffective leader. The communists, meanwhile, have repeatedly failed to attract support from the majority of Russians, and their shrinking constituency is mostly elderly.
Only a severe Russian defeat in Chechnya could prevent Putin from being confirmed in office. He has publicly taken personal charge of the war, and his first act on becoming president was to visit Russian troops in the republic. He will thus find it difficult to evade responsibility if things go awry.
After weeks during which the campaign went well, Russian troops struggling to capture Grozny have been making slow progress, and in the first half of January the Chechens staged successful local counter-attacks. As a result, on 7 January, Putin replaced two commanders in Chechnya, generals Gennady Troshev and Vladimir Shamanov. According to official figures, 465 soldiers had been killed and 1,583 wounded in the campaign by the first week of January, but the real figure is probably considerably higher.
Due to a mixture of censorship, self-censorship and genuine support on the part of the Russian media, domestic news of these reverses has been muffled. Anger at the Chechens for their attacks on Russia over the past two years has made ordinary Russians more ready to accept heavy military casualties than they were during the war of 1994-96.
Nonetheless, Chechen fighters might be able to stage an attack similar to the raid on the Russian town of Budyonnovsk in June 1995, when hundreds of hostages were taken and the Russian government was humiliated. Such a setback might erode Russian popular respect for Putin, but failing this, he appears unstoppable. Yeltsin undoubtedly stepped down before his term expired in mid-2000 in order to reduce the time in which such a defeat could occur.
Putin's background
Putin's first act on becoming president was to declare Yeltsin immune from prosecution for acts committed while in office. This was undoubtedly an absolute condition set by Yeltsin and his family. The Yeltsin family as such, however, is no longer of great political importance, as Putin demonstrated when he removed Yeltsin's daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko, from her position on the presidential staff.
The important question for the future is the nature of Putin's relationship with the business magnates who acquired their (largely illegal) wealth under Yeltsin's presidency. There is no doubt that Putin needed the approval of the magnates to gain power, but this does not necessarily mean that he is their puppet. Strong rivalries between the magnates will also give Putin opportunities to play them off against each other.
By far the most significant formative influence on Putin has been his work for the Soviet KGB and its Russian successors. In the 1970s and early 1980s he was based in the then communist East Germany. Most reports suggest that he was charged with spying on West German technology. As a result, he is the first Russian leader for many years to speak a Western language fluently.
Following the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev, Putin returned to the Soviet Union and was apparently inserted by the KGB into the ranks of the reformist movement in his native Leningrad (now St Petersburg). His considerable abilities and KGB links led him to become deputy mayor in 1994-96.
In this capacity, Putin gained a reputation for efficiency, discretion and ruthlessness. His rise was aided by his cooperation with former Deputy Mayor Anatoly Chubais who, in 1992, became Russian privatisation minister and a key figure in the transfer of state property to the pro-Yeltsin magnates. Chubais has reportedly boasted of having 'privatised' Putin. In 1996, Putin was brought onto Yeltsin's staff as deputy head of the notorious Kremlin Property Department, which has been accused of being at the heart of the Yeltsin family's corruption. In July 1998, Putin was appointed to head the Federal Security Service (FSB), the domestic successor to the KGB. In August 1999, Yeltsin named him prime minister.
Putin's programme
The KGB that Putin entered as a young man was marked by the puritanical communism of its chief, Yuri Andropov, a determined enemy of the growing corruption of the Soviet system during the presidency of Leonid Brezhnev. Since then, the former KGB has itself become corrupt, and many of its officers have moved into the private security business, often working for the magnates or for criminal bosses. Putin himself worked for the exceptionally corrupt St Petersburg city council as well as the Property Department. However, he is trying to project an image of Andropov-like rigour, which is helped by his icy persona.
Putin outlined his overall approach to policy on the Russian government's website in late December 1999. Denouncing the effects of communism, he pledged to uphold democracy and continue economic reforms. He also, however, spoke of the historic role of a strong state in Russia. This, he said, is necessary to crush 'disorder' and to encourage economic and technological development: 'Russians see [a strong state] as a source and guarantor of order, and the initiator and main driving force of any change'.
Putin stressed the need for strong but sober patriotism, without chauvinism or imperialism. He emphasised his desire for good relations with the West, but said that the West must respect Russia's interests and great-power status. Putin clearly wished to give the impression of a dedicated, modernising servant of the state.
Russia's future
These principles form an appealing combination to most Russian voters. Most of the programme – perhaps excepting the commitment to democracy – is probably fairly sincere, since it represents the broad consensus among educated younger Russians. But the statement lacked detail, and many of its aims may be unachievable, given the decline of the Russian state and economy over the past decade.
As to relations with the West, these have also been damaged by the wars in Kosovo and Chechnya. Over the next twelve months, there are likely to be new relationship crises if the US moves to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Moscow in order to create a national missile defence. Even more harmful would be a US move to bring the three Baltic States – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania – into NATO. No Russian government could willingly accept either decision.
How Putin will set about strengthening the state, and whether he will succeed, are the key questions for Russia. The latest election results suggest that he may find it easier than his predecessors to push reforms through parliament. But parliamentary opposition to reform was only ever part of the problem. More important has been the grip of the new oligarchy on the economy, and the corruption and weakness of the Russian state system.
Furthermore, over the past decade the local bosses and groups who govern Russia's regions have gained power at the expense of the centre. Putin's rule could see some redress of the balance in favour of central government, but given Russia's size and complexity, any regime will have to work in collaboration with most of the regions, not against them. Russia may see a more authoritarian regime at the centre sharing power with semi-authoritarian regimes in the provinces. This might be a recipe for political stability, but not for economic reform.
The harmful influence of the business magnates has been demonstrated over the past 18 months by their determined opposition to regulation of the banking system. The majority of Russian banks are bankrupt by Western standards, and have survived only by exploiting the state, evading the law, hiding real assets in a maze of front companies and robbing account-holders.
Experiences in Central Europe and East Asia have shown that banking transparency and regulation are critical to successful market reform. In Russia, such regulation would be a mortal threat to most of the magnates, and one they can be expected to resist to the end. Similarly, the ability of well-connected Russian businessmen to ignore laws on shareholders' rights has allowed them to cheat Western partners, thereby contributing to pitifully low levels of foreign investment in Russia.
Putin is unlikely to take steps against the magnates until after the elections. Thereafter, how far he opposes these immensely powerful figures will depend on his honesty, courage and determination, and on whether he can rely on a corrupted bureaucracy and police. It seems most likely that he will exploit rivalries between the magnates to attack some of them while favouring others.
His policy towards the magnates will also depend on whether he really understands what reforms are needed to bring about international investment, and whether he is prepared to allow foreign businesses to eliminate rotten Russian competitors. In many parts of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a rhetorical government commitment to foreign investment has given way to nationalism and corruption when it comes to giving foreign companies real power in the economy.
Putin's administration will certainly bolster the role of the security services on the pretext of combating terrorism, corruption and organised crime. Indeed, the FSB may need a powerful mandate if Russia is to break with the forces that have so undermined attempts at economic reform. The question is whether Putin will use a stronger FSB in this way, or only to defend his own regime at the expense of democracy.
