Last hope of the state?
The military takeover in Pakistan on 12 October 1999 stemmed from the corruption, autocracy and mismanagement of overthrown civilian prime minister Nawaz Sharif. However, it also reflects an underlying feature of Pakistan: that the armed forces are the country's only effective modern institution. All others have failed, not least in the eyes of ordinary Pakistanis. The police force and the judicial system are brutal and inequitable; the civil service and public utilities are corrupt and incompetent, and the taxation system has been completely subverted by the élites. Neither private business nor state planning has generated stable economic growth, and parliamentary democracy has given rise to a succession of kleptocratic, irresponsible governments.
Pakistani social values remain those of authoritarianism, 'neo-feudalism' and family, clan and religious allegiance. Despite a relatively free press, the bases of modern civil society are rudimentary. It is not surprising, therefore, that almost half of Pakistan's 52-year existence has been spent under military rule. However, the decay of Pakistan's other institutions means that, during this fourth period of military government, the stakes are higher than ever before – perhaps even involving the survival of Pakistan as a united and organised state.
A popular coup
The immediate trigger of the October coup d'état was Sharif's sudden dismissal of the army Chief of Staff, General Pervaiz Musharraf. This move came just a year after Sharif dismissed the previous army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, for publicly criticising his government and calling for an independent National Security Council to supervise the administration. Encouraged by his ally, intelligence chief Lieutenant-General Khwaja Ziauddin, Sharif acted while General Musharraf was away in Sri Lanka.
This was an utter miscalculation. Even before receiving word from Musharraf, the rest of the high command – evidently following a carefully prepared plan – seized official buildings and placed Sharif in 'protective custody'. So great was public disgust with Sharif and disillusion with democracy that (in sharp contrast to previous military coups) there was virtually no protest. Nor has there so far been any significant domestic pressure for early elections. In fact, participation in elections has fallen steadily since the restoration of democracy in 1988.
Public disenchantment stems from not only Sharif's failings, but also those of his predecessor and rival, Benazir Bhutto. During her two periods in government (1988–90 and 1993–96) her administration set a record for corruption and misgovernment surpassed only by Sharif's. In April 1999, she was convicted of corruption in absentia, and she is now in London. Given her record, it seems unlikely that the military will permit her return.
A key factor in the armed forces' final breach with Sharif was his mishandling of the Kargil conflict with India in the summer of 1999. Having apparently sanctioned the successful Pakistani military incursion into Indian-controlled Kashmir, Sharif buckled under US pressure and ordered a withdrawal that the high command found humiliating. They were also infuriated by Sharif's subsequent attempts to blame them for the whole affair.
However, the army's anger also originated in Sharif's mixture of increasing authoritarianism, corruption and incompetence, as well as his failure to stabilise the economic situation. An obsession with concentrating power drove Sharif to undermine all the checks and balances embodied in the constitution. After forcing the resignation of President Farooq Leghari in December 1997, he effectively emasculated the presidency. Despite possessing – on paper at least – a huge parliamentary majority, Sharif also ignored and bypassed the legislature. According to one estimate, during two and a half years in power, he spoke in parliament for less than ten minutes. In recent months, he arrested journalists and tried to impose his will on the courts.
Only a prime minister certain of military support could have risked such moves. His government might also have survived had it achieved stable economic growth. But this hope proved vain, in part because of the blow to foreign confidence caused by the 1998 nuclear tests and the Kashmir adventure. The internal security situation has deteriorated. To the long-standing ethnic violence in Karachi and Sindh has been added a sharp escalation in terrorist attacks by Sunni extremists – apparently with help from Taleban-ruled Afghanistan – on the 20% Shi'i minority. Shi'i élites have always been at the core of the Pakistani establishment.
Over the past year, Sharif publicly acknowledged the decay of Pakistan's non-military institutions. First he asked the army to take charge of reducing corruption in the education system, by identifying 'ghost' schools – where bureaucrats were drawing the pay and expenses for non-existent institutions. Then, in December 1998, he ordered the generals to take over the state-owned Water and Power Development Agency in order to force consumers to pay their bills, and officials to deliver the proceeds to the state treasury.
Military government
In part because of the need for Western economic aid, but in part due to the absence of significant opposition, General Musharraf has so far sought to present a moderate and humane face to the world. By not declaring martial law, and only invoking more limited emergency powers, the generals signalled that they did not intend to return to the repressive practices of past military rulers. Although the constitution was put in 'abeyance', and national and provincial assemblies suspended, political parties and activities were not banned. Troops were quickly withdrawn from public buildings. Past military rulers declared their determination to suppress provincial and ethnic dissidence and bolster 'national unity'. Musharraf, by contrast, condemned Sharif's over-centralisation of power, and pledged devolution to the provincial authorities.
Musharraf has attempted to reassure the outside world about his government's intentions. In his first policy speech, broadcast on 17 October, he announced a unilateral withdrawal of all forces moved to the border with India during the Kargil conflict. He also pledged that his administration would exercise 'nuclear and missile restraint'. In the longer term, however, restoration of international support and investor confidence may require a more fundamental détente with India. The dispute over Kashmir, Pakistani support for Kashmiri insurgents, Musharraf's own experience of three wars with India, and Pakistani state and army traditions will all conspire to make this difficult.
The new administration is also anxious to emphasise its distance from radical Islam, which is of critical importance in seeking help from Washington. US concern over the links of the Pakistani army to the Taleban regime, and Taleban-backed extremist groups, has been deepened by the presence in Afghanistan of Osama bin Laden. Since the bombings of US embassies in Africa in August 1998, Washington has viewed him as the USA's most dangerous terrorist enemy.
The vital role of Pakistan, and especially the military, in the Taleban victory has aroused US suspicions. Musharraf has, therefore, emphasised that his role models are the secular founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and that of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk. Musharraf himself is a liberal Muslim who was trained in the UK. Significantly, the rise of Sunni extremist groups in Pakistan and among junior officers and NCOs has alarmed the Pakistani high command. So too has the way in which armed violence and criminality stemming from the Afghan wars have helped to undermine Pakistani internal security.
Musharraf's assurances on Islamism, therefore, seem sincere. He has given them credence by the composition of his new National Security Council which, apart from the armed-forces chiefs, comprises four civilian technocrats, including a woman demographer with a UNESCO background, Attiya Enayatullah. He firmly rejected the demand of Pakistan's most well-organised religious party, Jamaat-e-Islami, to include an Islamic scholar on the council.
Economic crisis
In the end, the success or failure of the military administration will depend on the fate of the faltering economy. Musharraf's choice of economic officials has been praised in international financial circles. Shaukat Aziz, a top Citibank executive working in New York, was made Finance Minister, and a respected former International Monetary Fund (IMF) official, Mohammed Yaqub, was appointed to the Security Council. A National Accountability Bureau will probe administrative corruption and seek to increase real revenue from taxes.
With assistance from international lending agencies suspended following the coup, the new finance minister will have to move fast to restart the crucial $1.56 billion IMF programme. If restored, this would also release ongoing funding from the World Bank and other lenders. But even if this funding is available, with only $1.2bn in current foreign exchange reserves Pakistan will find it hard to meet its debt-service obligations. These will amount to an estimated $5.7bn for the period between October 1999 and June 2000 alone.
A Paris Club agreement last year rescheduled a $1.5bn debt due to be paid in 1999–2000. However, if the IMF programme is not put back on track the agreement could be terminated. This would almost certainly lead to a debt default and a collapse in foreign investment. To revive the fund programme, the new administration will have to implement a painful set of reform measures, including new taxes and fewer subsidies.
There have been no international calls for the reinstatement of Sharif, but the US, EU and the Commonwealth countries have insisted on the setting of a timetable for a return to democratic rule. Musharraf has so far said only that he cannot do this until economic and political reforms have been achieved. Fact-finding missions by the Commonwealth and the EU have returned partially satisfied with the general's promise to restore elected rule once certain 'benchmarks of progress' have been attained.
Western support is likely, in fact, to be forthcoming. The US administration's position has already softened considerably. Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons has increased feeling in Western capitals that the country is simply too important and dangerous to be abandoned. In return for US support, the military government will have to either persuade the Taleban to expel Bin Laden from Afghanistan, or openly distance Pakistan from the Afghan regime. But bowing to US pressure will infuriate not only Islamist radical groups, but also many in the Pakistani military. Musharraf's administration risks getting the worst of both worlds – being increasingly denounced as a US puppet and traitor to Islam, while failing to achieve the economic recovery necessary for domestic political stability.
The greatest danger of all is that if this military administration fails, the army itself may split. Including the October coup, every Pakistani military takeover to date has been carried out by a united army led by its high command. This has sharply distinguished Pakistan from certain West African states, where junior officers and NCOs have carried out coups not only against civilian governments, but also against their own generals. The result has been anarchy, state collapse, and endless civil wars. In Pakistan, the rise of Islamic radicalism in the junior army ranks could in future make this a real danger. In the absence of other effective institutions, the Pakistani army is the backbone of the state. If it were to split, Pakistan would fall into a whirlpool of chaos.
