A disaster for Indonesia
Mass killings and destruction by Indonesian forces and pro-Indonesian militias in East Timor in September 1999 left thousands of people dead and ruined the territory's infrastructure. However, the most important long-term consequences may affect Indonesia itself. The Indonesian army's motive for the terror campaign against the East Timorese population was not just revenge for the 78.5% vote for independence on 30 August 1999. Commanders also hoped to warn other Indonesian-controlled territories against pressing for independence. But their actions have badly damaged Indonesia's international standing and undermined prospects for economic recovery, and therefore also for long-term political stability and national unity.
The chief political victim of the September violence is probably Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. His consent to the UN-supervised referendum in August angered the military and Indonesian nationalists, despite his argument that Indonesia needed to repair the damage caused by the continuing conflict in East Timor both to its international reputation and to the flow of Western aid. The former Portuguese colony was invaded and occupied by Indonesia in 1975, provoking two and a half decades of conflict. During the occupation, up to a third of the population of around 800,000 was killed or starved to death. The West turned a blind eye as long as Indonesia was a key ally against the Soviet Union, but with the end of the Cold War more critical attitudes emerged.
When the killings began after the referendum, intense Western pressure, particularly from the US and Australia, forced Habibie to consent to an Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor, and the entry of UN peacekeepers as a prelude to independence. The 7,500-strong International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) began to deploy on 20 September. Its largest component (of 4,500 men) is Australian, as is its commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove. It also includes South-east Asian and British troops, and has logistical back-up from the US.
The withdrawal was regarded as a national humiliation by many Indonesians, the army in particular. By allowing UN intervention, Habibie has almost certainly lost any chance of being elected president by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in November 1999. The scandal surrounding the state's $70 million bail-out of the bankrupt Bank Bali has also contributed to the decline in Habibie's popularity. It appears that virtually the entire sum was diverted to members of Habibie's cabinet, either for their own enrichment, or to pay for his election campaign. Coming on top of other scandals and the general lack of economic reform, this led the International Monetary Fund to suspend further disbursement of its desperately needed $43 billion bail-out programme.
A 'Frankenstein's monster'?
Indonesia's isolation and economic crisis could both deepen if fighting breaks out in East Timor between Indonesian-backed forces and INTERFET. Military experts consider the UN force far too small to control the territory effectively. Initial progress in moving outside the capital, Dili, was slow. Even after the peacekeepers arrived, violence by pro-Indonesian militia (or Indonesian troops posing as militias) continued, with the murder of Catholic priests and nuns near Com on the Eastern tip of the island, and of a Western journalist. A senior militia leader, Eurico Guterres, announced on 29 September that his forces were preparing for a guerrilla war against INTERFET. On the same day, Australian peacekeepers arrested ten suspected members of the Kopassus Indonesian military special forces posing as militiamen.
If the militias were to come into large-scale conflict with the peacekeepers, and were seen to be supported by the Indonesian military, the consequences for Indonesia would be dire. The Australian government has warned that it will use all necessary force against anyone who attacks its peacekeepers. Fighting between Indonesian-backed militias – or even Indonesian troops – and INTERFET would probably lead to international sanctions, and deepen Indonesia's economic decline. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, announced in September that her office would investigate the role of Indonesian officials in the violence in East Timor.
A key issue, therefore, is the extent to which the militias, and even Indonesian troops on the ground, are under the control of the army high command in Jakarta. Given the level of US support for INTERFET, the army chief of staff, General Wiranto, will be anxious to avoid a clash. By the end of September, the majority of Indonesian troops in East Timor had, in fact, withdrawn, but Kopassus soldiers may have remained among the militias.
The Indonesian Governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, and militia leaders have suggested that East Timor should be partitioned, and the districts adjacent to Indonesian West Timor reserved for pro-Indonesian forces. These districts will pose the greatest challenge to INTERFET's efforts to gain full control of the territory, particularly if the Indonesian army continues covertly to supply the militias across the border.
During the quarter century of Indonesian occupation, senior commanders have developed close ties with East Timor. In part, this is because thousands of soldiers were killed there fighting FALINTIL – the military wing of FRETILIN, the main pro-independence force. More importantly, key officers and their local clients have acquired significant business interests in the territory, which will make it even harder for them to break their ties with the militia. Nor will it be easy to persuade the militias to surrender to the UN. Many seem to have retreated into West Timor, where they are reportedly continuing their campaign of violence against pro-independence East Timorese. Around 230,ooo refugees are registered in camps in West Timor.
Political strategies
In the past, Wiranto has had difficulties with Kopassus, many of whose commanders have resisted his attempts to replace them. The indications are that he did not endorse the scale of the terror campaign in East Timor. However, his own political ambitions may prevent him from taking a strong line against the special forces, given the virulence of anti-UN and anti-Australian feeling in the army. Wiranto's hope is that he and the high command will play the role of king-makers and, to some extent, de facto rulers of Indonesia, whichever candidate wins the presidential election.
With this in mind, Wiranto appears to be aiming to use his military backing to become vice-president, whichever candidate wins the November elections. Intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations have been reported between the military high command and both Habibie and the leading opposition candidate for president, Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of President Sukarno, Indonesia's first president). Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle (PDI–P) won 33% of the vote in the parliamentary elections of June 1999, beating Habibie's Golkar Party into second place. Her secular nationalism makes her acceptable to Wiranto and the army, as does her opposition to East Timorese independence.
However, neither PDI–P, with 153 seats, nor Golkar, with 120, can dominate the 500-seat parliament or the consultative assembly. The latter comprises the parliament and an additional 200 members appointed from Indonesia's various regions and minority groups. It includes 38 members from the armed forces, who can also expect to hold a large proportion of the regional seats, given their grip on the provincial administrations. The assembly is scheduled to meet at the start of November to choose a new president.
One possibility is that the high command and the military deputies will help Megawati to become president in return for a promise that the military will retain its key role in the administration, and in parliament. The generals, however, fear that Megawati's popularity will make her too powerful for them to control – especially as this support is concentrated in Java, the home of three-fifths of Indonesia's population of just over 200 million, and of the capital, Jakarta.
Some Muslim senior officers might favour moderate Islamist presidential candidates like Amien Rais – the head of the National Mandate Party, which won 7% of the June vote – or Abdurrachman Wahid's National Awakening Party, which won 18%. However, such officers are in a minority in the high command, and Wiranto has thinned their numbers still further.
National unity in danger
Even a united military might not exert a decisive influence on Indonesian politics. The prestige of the army has suffered over the past two years, above all because of its role in corruption and repression under the former Suharto dictatorship (in which Habibie was vice-president and Golkar the ruling party). Hostility to the military surfaced again on 23 September, after the high command pushed a new security law through the outgoing parliament.
The law, which seems to have been a reaction to developments in East Timor, was intended to give the military licence to crush regional secessionist movements. However, students in Jakarta feared that this would pave the way for a new military dictatorship, and large numbers took to the streets in protest. Three people were killed when the police opened fire. Confronted with these popular demonstrations, the high command asked Habibie not to ratify the law.
Popular opposition to the military is fuelled by the deteriorating economic situation. This makes it doubtful that the generals would dare to suspend democracy altogether and carry out a military coup such as that which brought Suharto to power in 1965. The military fears that the relatively young and diverse Indonesian state itself may disintegrate. The East Timor crisis has heightened this fear, as have growing secessionist movements in Irian Jaya on the western half of New Guinea and in the Muslim region of Aceh (northern Sumatra). Increasing conflict between ethnic and religious groups elsewhere in the archipelago, has claimed thousands of lives since the start of 1999, and has added to the military's concern.
In August 1998, Wiranto publicly apologised to the Acehnese people for the excesses committed by Indonesian armed forces during the previous ten years. However, in the face of a growing Acehnese secessionist movement, this spirit of conciliation did not last. In the spring of 1999, a military operation caused numerous deaths and the displacement of some 230,000 civilians (out of a population of three million).
Outright secessionist movements are still limited to Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, and do not pose a threat to the survival of the Indonesian state as a whole. The real threat is that, if economic decline worsens, so will a wide variety of violent social, ethnic and religious conflicts, until large parts of the archipelago become ungovernable. This danger will increase if the Indonesian military allows its militia clients in East Timor to attack not only the local population, but also UN peacekeepers. This would lead to international isolation, an end to foreign aid and enormous damage to the Indonesian state and people.
