Slaughter at 16,000 feet
On 10 July, after seven weeks of fighting on icy mountain ridges that killed at least 1,000 people on both sides, Pakistani forces began to retreat from the positions they had occupied on India's side of the Line of Control in Kashmir. The withdrawal, negotiated after direct intervention by US President Bill Clinton, brought an end to the most serious confrontation between the two countries since the 1971 Bangladesh War. International concern was intensified by the fact that last year India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests and became, in effect, the world's newest nuclear powers.
Fear of nuclear escalation did not prevent Pakistan's incursion, but it may well have played a part in preventing the conflict from spreading. The risk of renewed conflict in future is, however, very great. Although the US administration, in particular, has pledged a new effort to defuse tension in Kashmir, India rejects on principle any outside mediation in the dispute.
The Pakistani challenge
Every year, the summer in Kashmir sees artillery fire exchanges and the infiltration of small groups of armed insurgents from Pakistan. These join the decade-long rebellion against Indian rule among the Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley. This year's confrontation, however, was a much more serious affair, involving Pakistani regular troops together with Kashmiri insurgents and Islamist militants.
Pakistan denied any involvement in the incursion, and insisted that this year's campaign (near the Indian-controlled town of Kargil) was conducted solely by Kashmiri insurgents. However, these insurgents occupied fixed positions rather than moving on to merge into the population of the Kashmir valley. They were also well-equipped with high altitude clothing, well-stocked with ammunition and food, and supported by Pakistani artillery; on 27 May Pakistani anti-aircraft fire shot down two Indian fighters shortly after India began using its airforce.
Official Indian figures admitted 330 Indian dead and 450 wounded during the fighting, and India claimed to have killed twice as many Pakistanis. Privately, however, Indian army officers say their dead could number 1,200. Islamabad claimed the Kashmiri militants had killed 1,700 Indian soldiers, and said its own losses consisted of 187 troops (almost certainly an underestimate), and several dozen Pakistani civilians killed by Indian artillery fire.
Delhi and Islamabad
Both the Indian and Pakistani military establishments claimed their 1998 nuclear tests eliminated the threat of war in South Asia because of the potentially horrific results. In February 1999 the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, visited the Pakistani city of Lahore, in an attempt to defuse tensions. He and the Pakistani premier, Nawaz Sharif, opened the first bus route between the two countries and gained international prestige as 'peacemakers'. Though the leaders did not conduct any serious negotiations over Kashmir, both claimed that a genuine peace process was underway. However, the Kargil conflict has shown that this is far from being the case. Kashmir, over which India and Pakistan went to war in 1947 and 1965, remains one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints.
Kargil may also redraw the political careers of both men. In India, it could become an issue in the campaign for the September general elections. However, the Congress and other opposition parties may be too intimidated by the upsurge of patriotic sentiment to make India's military failings into an election issue. Such criticisms could also backfire because the Congress initiated the 1980s curbs on defence spending that are now blamed for the military's poor performance.
In Pakistan, Sharif has gained the support of the powerful army chief of staff, General Pervez Musharraf, for the withdrawal. However, he will be hard-pressed to sell this climbdown – presented publicly as an appeal to the Islamic militants to withdraw – as a victory. The withdrawal will be seen by most Pakistanis as a betrayal of the anti-Indian rebels in Kashmir, who enjoy great public support in Pakistan. Several retired Pakistani generals have denounced the move as an unnecessary capitulation which came at a time when Pakistan had the upper hand militarily.
A daring move
In purely military terms, the Kargil affair was indeed a brilliant stroke by Pakistan. A well-executed operation – initially involving around 800 men – captured key ridges some eight kilometres within Indian-controlled territory along a front of almost 110 km. The use of Kashmiri separatist militants meant that Pakistan could claim to the international community not to be directly at war with India. The move caught India's poorly coordinated intelligence agencies and under-funded army so completely by surprise that it was not even detected until months later.
The Pakistani force first took control of the ridges as early as October 1998, shortly before winter closed in and convinced the Indians that there would be no threat until the following Spring. Fortnightly Indian patrols to check for mountain infiltrators did not occur, even after shepherds reported armed men in the area.
Moreover, when the first Indian patrol happened upon the intruders on 9 May, India was in a state of political confusion. Vajpayee's Hindu nationalist-led coalition had fallen from power after losing a confidence motion on 17 April, and was facing general elections in September. It took several days before Delhi understood the scale of the incursion.
The Pakistani position threatened India's sole road route through the region, the Srinagar–Leh highway which supplies the Indian forces on the Siachen Glacier and the disputed frontier with China. This compelled the Indians to counter-attack, though their troops were at a severe disadvantage, attacking up steep, bare mountainsides under heavy fire. Though they appear to have fought bravely, the fighting exposed very serious deficiencies in the Indian army, exacerbated by budget cuts.
Low pay has lowered the calibre of new recruits, particularly to the officer corps, which is also severely understaffed. Most of the weaponry is Soviet-made and ageing. To save money, more modern Western equipment is often bought without service contracts, which means that it deteriorates rapidly and cannot be put to full use. For example, Indian troops can only fire Bofors guns on manual, not automatic, greatly reducing their rate of fire. The army's strength is also drained by its continual use against rebellions in Kashmir and North-east India.
The international reaction
By the end of June, however, Islamabad was facing strong international pressure, including from former allies. The international community tended to side with India's version of events – that Pakistani regular forces were indeed involved in the operation. Delhi's arguments about the 'sanctity' of the Line of Control also gained widespread support. China and Pakistan for many years formed a bloc against India, but on this occasion Beijing – anxious to gain allies against US 'hegemony' – took a cool stance towards Pakistan.
Most important was the US position. The Clinton administration signalled that the next instalment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to Pakistan, amounting to $100m, might be delayed; this loan is critical to Pakistan's faltering economy. Western pressure on Islamabad increased after the Indian government privately warned G-8 leaders before their summit on June 18 that unless Pakistan withdrew soon, demands from the Indian military to cross the Line of Control would become irresistible.
On 4 July Sharif and Clinton met in Washington. Sharif agreed to ask the 'militants' to withdraw from Kargil if President Clinton pledged to take a 'personal interest' in the Kashmir dispute. Soon afterwards, the Pakistani-backed force began to leave, and the conflict to wind down. However, India refused to admit that it had agreed to a ceasefire. Instead Delhi presented the early stages of the agreed withdrawal – for example from the peak named Tiger Hill – as Indian victories.
In fact, restraint was exercised by both sides despite their initial warnings of full-scale war. The conflict was confined to a narrow strip of mountains along the Line of Control. Even while the conflict was at its height, Pakistan sent its foreign minister, Sartaj Aziz, to Delhi on 12 June for peace talks, and the two prime ministers spoke on the telephone three times during the conflict. Vajpayee resisted calls for Delhi to launch its own attack on Pakistan, or simply to cross the Line of Control in order to cut the supply lines of the intruders. After the early loss of two aircraft and a helicopter, Delhi ordered its pilots not to cross the Line.
Back to square one?
Though the immediate conflict is over, starting any new dialogue will be extremely difficult. Despite Sharif's 12 July offer of peace talks, he is likely to remain pre-occupied for some time with neutralising a domestic backlash against his perceived climbdown. On the other hand, the armed militant groups operating in Kashmir are highly dependent on Pakistani intelligence for their finances, and on the military for access to the Indian portion of Kashmir. So militant leaders may exercise restraint in attacking Sharif's government.
However, Sharif will still face a challenge from the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which has been searching for a way to recapture ground from more militant Islamic groups. The former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, could also return from self-imposed exile in the West and try to use the Kashmir issue to effect a political comeback – although she is probably too discredited by corruption and incompetence when in office to succeed.
On the Indian side, Vajpayee feels personally betrayed by Pakistan's Kargil move, given the political risk he took in visiting Pakistan in February. To appease public opinion, he will also have to allow a cooling-off period before engaging in any new dialogue.
By putting Kashmir back on the international agenda, Pakistan has achieved a long-standing goal and probably, on balance, emerged from this confrontation the winner. India, by contrast, is anxious to keep the dispute purely bilateral. Delhi wants to freeze the division of Kashmir along the existing Line of Control, leaving India in control of its richest and most populous part.
Pakistan has also cruelly exposed the weakness of the Indian armed forces and intelligence services. On the other hand, it took considerable self-restraint in Delhi, as well as the new nuclear threat, to prevent the Indian armed forces from escalating the war. Since, overall, the Indians greatly outnumber their Pakistani enemies, such restraint may not always be forthcoming in future.
