A struggle for power
Since NATO's bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began on 24 March 1999, the struggle for power among the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians has intensified. While most Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) soldiers still in the province are fighting for their lives, and hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians have been brutally driven from their homes, many Kosovar politicians have been staking out their claims to rule any future independent state of Kosovo.
From the end of communist one-party rule in Serbia in 1989 until early 1999, Kosovo Albanian politics were dominated by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by the writer and French-educated academic, Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova believed that mounting an insurrection against the Serbs would be suicidal since they would use their vastly superior forces to respond with 'ethnic cleansing' and a campaign of massacres. Instead, he promoted a strategy of passive resistance and created 'parallel' state structures.
In the course of 1998, Rugova's authority and credibility were greatly diminished by the KLA's armed rebellion and the Serbian response. Rugova was detained by the Yugoslav authorities when their campaign of ethnic-cleansing began. On 5 May, he was allowed to go to the West, where he has been trying to reassert his leadership, and has declared support for NATO action. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic no doubt hoped that Rugova's release would increase splits between the KLA and the other Kosovar groups, and further discredit the KLA in the eyes of NATO – and in this, at least, Milosevic may well succeed. These divisions could seriously complicate the creation of a stable Kosovo Albanian state, even under NATO protection.
Deep divisions
Over the past few years, disunity among the Kosovars has been chronic. In the months leading up to the abortive Rambouillet conference of February 1999, NATO diplomats and Albanian President Pandeli Majko's government worked hard to unify them. They finally succeeded – at least on the surface – just days before the start of the talks. A delegation consisting of nearly all of the most important Kosovar factions agreed to form a provisional government, which was to be appointed by 'Prime Minister' Hashim Thaci. The 30-year-old KLA leader is a member of the Popular Movement for Kosovo (LPK), a tiny radical party which had always called for an uprising against the Serbs and which formed part of the basis for the KLA.
Thaci, however, did not even pretend to establish a balance between the different groups in his 'government'. All of the important jobs went to LPK/KLA members, including Azem Syla (defence), Rexhep Selimi (interior) and Kadri Veseli (head of the intelligence service). Other positions were given to the United Democratic Movement of Rexhep Qosja, a well-known nationalist politician who has close political and family links to the KLA.
Horrified by these developments, Rugova's LDK – many of whose leaders have escaped from Kosovo and are now in Tetovo, western Macedonia – decided to reject the provisional government. Bujar Bukoshi, whom Rugova appointed in 1992 as his 'prime-minister-in-exile', has emerged as the group's new leader and has taken an increasingly aggressive stance against the KLA. It is unclear what form Bukoshi's relations with Rugova will take following the LDK leader's release. The two men quarrelled bitterly in 1995 and Bukoshi cut off most funds for Rugova's 'parallel state' institutions. On the other hand, they both deeply fear the KLA, and may well, therefore, form at least a tactical alliance.
Based in Germany, Bukoshi's main role has been to lobby Western governments for the Kosovo cause and to collect a 3% 'income tax' from hundreds of thousands of Kosovars living and working abroad. Until early 1998, most people gave willingly to the appeal. But since the KLA's emergence as a credible force, they have switched their contributions to the LPK's 'Homeland Calling' fund, run from Geneva by Jashar Salihu.
The LPK was formed in the 1980s by Salihu, Bardhyl Mahmuti and other former political prisoners who later went into exile. They remain important figures in the KLA because they control the movement's money supply from Western Europe. However, the KLA's younger generation, many of whom have been fighting in Kosovo, want to play down the LPK connection.
For years, most Kosovars thought that the LPK was an extreme leftist party made up of admirers of Albania's former Stalinist dictator, Enver Hoxha – a view which has also affected Western perceptions. While there may have been an element of truth in this claim in the 1980s, any such leanings have since disappeared. The LPK is now simply a radical nationalist group, although the party (and the KLA) does have close ties to Albania's current (ex-communist) socialist government. By contrast, Bukoshi is linked to former Albanian President Sali Berisha's regime.
Attempts at unity
The perception of LPK 'communism' was one explanation why, contrary to expectations, none of the party's leaders were appointed to the delegation that went to Rambouillet. This fact indicated that, since the rebellion, there had been a balance-of-power shift within the KLA in favour of younger 'fighters'. Instead, previously unheard-of figures, such as Thaci, suddenly appeared on the scene.
Many members of this group had established contact with Salihu and Mahmuti in Switzerland after the abolition of Kosovar autonomy in 1989. After receiving some money from the Homeland Calling fund, they returned to the province to start the 1998 uprising. What they had never anticipated, though, was that the revolt would be initially so successful – or that it would lead to such a crushing Serb response. Now, by virtue of having started the KLA and initiated its armed struggle, they are making their bid for power in a future liberated Kosovo.
One of their many problems, however, is that the KLA remains a highly disorganised force. Its men on the ground form small, largely independent units, and have neither a clear command structure nor adequate weapons and logistical arrangements. Furthermore, if it had not been for NATO's intervention, most KLA fighters would already have been killed or driven out of the province by Yugoslav forces. In a bid to establish more order in its ranks, the KLA appointed, in early May, an ethnic-Albanian general from the Croatian army, Agim Ceku, as their chief of staff.
Another problem is that some commanders in the field – who are in effect independent chieftains – still owe their allegiance not to the KLA, but to Bukoshi and the Rugova group. Alarmed by the KLA's rise and the eclipse of his own power and influence, Bukoshi set up, in spring 1998, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), an armed wing of the government-in-exile. This bid to try to take control of the KLA failed miserably, and FARK has ceased to exist as a separate organisation. All FARK soldiers now refer to themselves as KLA members, but they are by no means necessarily under KLA control. The dislike and fear that Bukoshi and his followers feel towards the KLA was heightened by the movement's efforts in 1998 to quash FARK, including the assassination of Bukoshi's 'Minister of Defence', Ahmed Krasniqi.
Money and guns
In mid-April, Bukoshi visited Tirana to try to reach a deal with the KLA leadership. In essence, he wants an important position in the provisional government, while the KLA desires a significant share of the large funds believed to be under his control. However, Bukoshi's talks with the KLA have so far proved unsuccessful. KLA spokesmen accuse him of being 'worse than a traitor' for refusing to help them buy arms.
The inability of the various Kosovar factions to unite into a coherent whole is worrying NATO policy-makers who are increasingly confused as to whom they should deal with. They fear that some KLA leaders might use any future NATO-sponsored protectorate to establish their own authoritarian rule in Kosovo, which would be extremely embarrassing for Western governments. They are unimpressed by the KLA's chaotic structures and believe that Thaci does not have the necessary leadership qualities to unite squabbling ethnic-Albanian factions. Bukoshi representatives are warning Western governments that a KLA-dominated government would mean the province becoming a 'Cuba in Europe' and a base for organised crime.
The accusation that the KLA consorts closely with drug runners has gained considerable resonance in the West. However, this is true only to a limited extent. Kosovo Albanians run the Zürich heroin trade and various drug-trafficking routes through Italy, and these Mafiosi pay their dues to the KLA just like any other members of the Albanian diaspora. The KLA has also used Mafia links to procure arms. But it is not as an organisation directly involved in crime – although the KLA's lack of organisation limits its ability to control its members in this regard.
Dilemmas for NATO
The differences among Kosovars also extend to NATO strategy. Lacking strong armed forces of their own, Bukoshi and his followers would like Alliance ground troops to liberate the province as soon as possible. NATO protection would then give them a good chance of restoring some of their lost power and influence. By contrast, the KLA has been asking urgently for Alliance weapons and for NATO air strikes to be directed towards helping KLA forces in Kosovo. They hope that the combination of these elements will mean that the KLA will be able to make a credible claim to have freed Kosovo, and thus will have the right to rule the province.
NATO governments are divided over how to deal with the KLA. Some parts of the US administration and Congress would like to arm the movement in order to defeat the Yugoslav army and to remove any need for a NATO ground offensive. European governments are very dubious about this idea. They argue that the KLA's own record of atrocities, and its indiscipline, would make it a very unreliable ally. Moreover, they point out that both the Rambouillet accords and the latest G-7–Russia principles demand the disarming of the KLA – so by arming the movement, NATO could be creating a 'Frankenstein's monster'. Consequently, Alliance cooperation with the KLA so far appears to have been limited to using KLA fighters to help the bombing campaign by identifying both Yugoslav military targets and concentrations of refugees.
The KLA/LPK do not want to be pushed by Rugova's and Bukoshi's friends – and by NATO – into sharing power in a provisional government. They fear that Bukoshi may use his money to fund an election which would bring him to power and sideline the KLA – especially if the movement is partially disarmed as part of a NATO protectorate plan.
The Kosovar leadership question may be solved by a 'dark horse', perhaps installed by NATO. Veton Surroi – the articulate, influential and 'liberal' editor of the daily newspaper, Koha Ditore – seems to have taken a calculated risk to remain in Kosovo while most of the other members of the leadership have fled into exile. In effect, he is now with the KLA, but his political base is independent. Surroi has long been favoured by Western diplomats. He was asked to go to Rambouillet, played an active role at the conference and hopes to lead Kosovo when the moment is right.
