Thinking the unthinkable
On the evening of 24 March 1999, NATO launched its air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in a bid to force compliance with the Rambouillet peace plan for Kosovo. In the week preceding the start of Operation Allied Force, Serbian troops had greatly intensified their assault on ethnic-Albanian civilians in retaliation for their support for the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). These attacks developed into a systematic campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' against the province's Albanian majority; by 8 April, more than 315,000 people had fled to Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro, and hundreds of thousands more were displaced within Kosovo.
After ten days of sustained bombing of air-defence installations and military headquarters and communication centres, there were no signs that these attacks had limited Serbia's campaign. A widespread Western belief that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic would capitulate as soon as air strikes began had proved baseless. Instead, the bombing unleashed a wave of Serbian nationalism and support for the authorities in their struggle against NATO. The misery of the refugees, NATO's unpreparedness to deal with the crisis and the apparent ineffectiveness of its air operation amounted to a serious embarrassment for Alliance leaders.
At the start of April, NATO thus decided to shift to a new phase in its air campaign. This involved targeting economic and communications points in Serbia, including bridges, oil refineries and power stations. Attacks on civilian infrastructure were intended to cripple the Yugoslav army's fuel supplies. They also signalled to the Serbian authorities and the population that, if they refused to surrender, NATO would do great damage in the long run to Yugoslavia's economy and to any prospects of national growth and prosperity. These assaults had an early effect, severely limiting fuel stocks, closing down factories and producing long queues for petrol.
More important in the short term, however, was the second aspect of NATO's new strategy: the move to hit Yugoslav forces in Kosovo with ground-attack aircraft and helicopters. The aim was both to restrict the ability of these forces to attack the ethnic-Albanian population, and to underline to Belgrade that NATO was determined to carry on its air campaign over a long period and even at the cost of casualties.
NATO thus deployed new aircraft, including, most importantly, some 24 US air force A-10 Warthog ground-attack aircraft, and a similar number of US army AH-64 Apache helicopters. The Albanian government gave permission for the Apaches to be stationed near its border with Kosovo, together with 18 multi-launch ground-attack rocket systems and 2,600 American ground troops. The declared purpose of these forces was to provide security for the Apaches and their crews and support staff against Yugoslav forces infiltrating across the border. It was widely felt, though, that these soldiers might prove in time to be the advance guard of a NATO ground operation.
As of 8 April, NATO leaders continued to rule out any such offensive, which is opposed by many military experts and by large sections of Western public opinion and the media. However, by the first week of April, Serbian atrocities were beginning to produce an apparent shift in sentiment, especially in the US. A feeling was also growing among observers and policy-makers that, if in the course of the coming weeks or months, the resolve and unity of the Yugoslav forces and government did not crumble under the new pressure of NATO attacks on troops and infrastructure, some form of ground operation might become politically inescapable.
Otherwise, there appeared to be a real possibility that Serbia would in effect win the war on the ground by forcing the great majority of Albanians to leave Kosovo and by demonstrating NATO's impotence to prevent this outcome. The fear was growing in the Alliance that a failure to send in ground troops would be seen as a dangerous sign of disunity, moral weakness and lack of determination.
The stakes are high. A perceived defeat for the Alliance would not only strengthen the resolve of enemies of the US and NATO, but would so damage the organisation's prestige and morale that its survival could be in jeopardy. NATO's collapse or incapacitation would, in turn, greatly increase the chances of a de facto US withdrawal from European security issues – an alarming prospect for most European states. Such a débâcle could also lead to the fall of several Western governments and the effective paralysis of President Bill Clinton's administration.
Geopolitical constraints
The obstacles to a NATO ground offensive are immense, not only in terms of Western public opinion but, even more importantly, because of the diplomatic, geographical and logistical constraints in the Balkans. In the event of a decision to launch a ground attack, the most fundamental strategic question is whether NATO would restrict the offensive to Kosovo, or whether it would be willing to launch a ground operation through Serbia and/or Montenegro.
The latter strategy would simplify the Alliance's logistical problems, because it would allow huge quantities of heavy equipment to be moved by land to Yugoslavia's borders. This hardware could come from NATO bases in Western Europe and could be moved by sea from the US to ports in France, Germany and the Low Countries. These ports, as well as Western Europe's motorways and railways, are more than capable of handling the quantity of equipment concerned. NATO forces could then move through Alliance countries, like Italy, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and the territory of aspirant members such as Slovakia, Slovenia and, possibly, Austria. Most importantly, they could enjoy the enthusiastic support of Croatia and the Muslim–Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
However, extending the war in this way would have major political repercussions. There would be furious protests in the UN, and Russia would be infuriated to the point where an abrogation of the UN blockade and a resumption of arms supplies to Yugoslavia would be a possibility. The administration of President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov is anxious not to take such a radical step, but domestic political pressure might make it unavoidable. This would set the scene for greater confrontation between NATO and Moscow, with Alliance planes blockading Yugoslavia against Russian and other cargo flights.
Even the acquiescence of NATO members like Italy and Hungary may not be automatic – especially in the case of Hungary, whose population fears Serbian retaliation. The heavy military use of West European infrastructure necessary to move troops into position would be unprecedented since the Second World War. Finally, European casualties in an operation led by (and widely seen to be imposed by) the US could lead to the re-emergence of strong anti-American feeling in Western Europe, undermining NATO from within.
More importantly, an invasion of Serbia and Montenegro might leave the Alliance with responsibility for the subsequent political order, in circumstances where virtually no Serb of any influence would agree to work with NATO. The situation would be somewhat altered if Milosevic attempted to overthrow his rival, Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, who is trying to remain aloof from the NATO–Serb–KLA war. After the start of the air campaign, Milosevic moved to replace the Yugoslav army commander in Montenegro with a more loyal general.
A coup by Milosevic could give NATO an excuse to intervene militarily in Montenegro, and to go through the republic on its way to Kosovo. But it would almost certainly mean deploying NATO forces into the middle of a Montenegrin civil war, since a large part of the population identifies strongly with Serbia and is bitterly hostile to Djukanovic and to NATO. They could be expected to launch attacks and protests against any Alliance forces in their region.
Logistical difficulties
If NATO feels compelled to restrict any ground campaign to Kosovo, the obstacles to deploying a massive force are immense and would take weeks or possibly months to overcome. Alliance planners are also aware that, while these troops were being built up, NATO's 12,000-strong, lightly equipped force in Macedonia would be vulnerable to attack by Yugoslav forces – a threat highlighted by the capture on 31 March of three US soldiers on the Macedonian border.
The Yugoslav army numbers some 90,000 men, with 400,000 reservists. There are also approximately 18,000 paramilitary police. Some 15,000 troops and 9,000 paramilitary police are now operating in Kosovo, with another 20,000 stationed nearby. NATO estimates that between 100,000–200,000 troops would be needed to ensure a relatively easy victory over Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.
The critical obstacle to a rapid deployment into the province is the lack of ports and roads for heavy equipment. The US has 70 air-transport squadrons with more than 800 planes, but only the US C-5 Galaxy and the new C-17 transport aircraft are capable of carrying main battle tanks, and there are too few of them to assemble a large contingent. It requires around 500 flights to put in place one lightly armed infantry division, without armour. Furthermore, the US could not commit all of its aircraft to establishing a Kosovo force, in case other states, such as Iraq or North Korea, decided to take advantage of the war to launch an attack of their own.
Moreover, Albania's only large airport is in Tirana. It has only one suitable runway and virtually non-existent facilities for unloading heavy freight. NATO has few engineering troops capable of building new airports. The UK's Royal Engineers are equipped only to repair existing airports, while the US has contracted out this kind of work to civilian companies whose capabilities in places like Albania are unproven.
By far the greater part of NATO's heavy equipment would therefore have to be moved by sea. During the 1990–91 Gulf War, 80 large ships were needed to transport one British division to Jubail in Saudi Arabia. The division consisted of 13,000 men, 5,000 vehicles, 14,000 tons of ammunition and 2,000 tons of matériel and stores – enough to supply the division for only about 30 days – and took almost three months to be fully moved into place.
The only Balkan port suitable for the disembarkation of a major NATO force is at Saloníki in Greece. This also has the advantage of being at the end of the main road and rail link through Macedonia to Kosovo and Serbia. Saloníki can handle vessels of over 500 feet in length, but its cargo pier is only 31–35ft long and its oil terminal 41–45ft. This compares unfavourably with Jubail, which has a cargo pier of 71–75ft and an oil terminal of over 76ft.
The problem with Saloníki is that a large part of the Greek population is traditionally hostile to the Albanians – with whom Greece had a longstanding territorial dispute – and is friendly to Serbia, which has been a close ally of Athens in six wars. Many Greeks also deeply distrust the US. Public opinion, which is also bitterly anti-Turkish, was inflamed recently by the Greek government's failure to protect Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Öcalan. This led to the forced resignation of three ministers and almost brought down Prime Minister Costas Simitis' government. NATO's air campaign has been publicly opposed by almost every section of Greek society, including the main political parties, the media, trade unions and the Orthodox Church.
There is every chance, therefore, that, if NATO requested the use of Saloníki, the Greek government would either have to refuse or would be forced to resign, amidst extreme political confusion and the complete alienation of Greece from the Alliance. Macedonia – with an ethnic-Albanian minority that may comprise as much as 35% of its population – has also refused to permit a build-up of NATO forces on its territory. Skopje fears an attack by Serbia, ethnic revolt by its own Serb minority and war on its territory between ethnic Albanians, Serbs and NATO.
No such political barriers prevail in Albania, which strongly supports the Albanian struggle in Kosovo and would welcome NATO forces. However, Albania's ports are all inadequate. Shengjin is the nearest port to Kosovo, but it has a cargo pier of 26–30ft and its cranes can only lift loads of less than 24 tons. Durrës is of medium size: it has a cargo pier of 26–30ft, an oil terminal of 21–25ft and its cranes can lift more than 100 tons.
The other main obstacle is the mountainous terrain and the lack of roads and bridges suitable for heavy vehicles. Only one metalled road leads into Kosovo from Albania – along the valley from Kukës to Prizren – and it would rapidly disintegrate under heavy traffic. Weeks of work by field engineers would therefore be necessary to prepare for a ground offensive.
Yugoslav defences
The mountainous and forested terrain along the borders of Kosovo and Serbia is ideally suited to defence by the Yugoslav army. This obstacle has been exaggerated by some military analysts – if it were the case that tiny numbers of troops could stop large armies in this area then none of the many victories of the past would have occurred. Even relatively small numbers of highly trained and motivated NATO troops, with massive air support, could in principle fight their way through Yugoslav forces – as long as they and their governments were prepared to accept heavy casualties.
In the event of an offensive restricted to southern and central Kosovo, NATO forces would not need to fear partisan activity, since they would enjoy the support of the ethnic-Albanian population. Moreover, the allied air campaign is chipping away at the Yugoslav army's logistics and supply lines, which run into Kosovo along three valleys. While this does not limit the Serbs' ability to drive out ethnic Albanians, it would put them at a severe disadvantage in a stand-up fight with a NATO ground force.
However, the terrain does give Yugoslav troops the opportunity to inflict heavy casualties on the attacking force – assuming that the defenders are skilled, brave and prepared to accept much heavier losses. Yugoslavia has 239 modern M-84 tanks (an upgrade of the Soviet T-72) and no less than 785 T-55s, although the arms embargo means that many of these are believed to be in poor condition, and they will also be highly vulnerable to air attack.
Yugoslavia's Soviet-made anti-tank missiles are unlikely to defeat NATO tanks, but they could destroy more lightly armoured infantry carriers. A serious threat, however, may be posed by Yugoslavia's 750 or so 80mm and 100mm anti-tank guns.
NATO options
Given these dangers, NATO leaders are hoping that no ground war will be necessary. In the first instance, they are placing their faith in the ability of the ground-attack aircraft and helicopters to inflict so much damage on Yugoslav forces that Milosevic formally agrees to capitulate and to withdraw his troops from all, or at least part, of Kosovo. A relatively lightly armed NATO force – deployed and supplied mainly by air – could then establish a 'safe haven' for the Albanians, similar to the one guaranteed to the Iraqi Kurds in 1991. This might point the way towards an eventual partition of Kosovo. If Milosevic refused to agree to NATO's terms for an overall settlement, however, this NATO force could be gradually built up to the point where it could drive the Serbs out of Kosovo altogether.
Alliance units for a limited protection force could come from the rapid-reaction groups being assembled by various European countries. There would be a relatively small US contingent, possibly drawn largely from the 2,200 marines in the Adriatic and the US Southern European taskforce, a 1,200-strong infantry battalion group based at Vicenza in Italy. Russia might be able to broker a deal for safe havens involving NATO troops under a UN flag. This would give the appearance at least of a compromise rather than an outright Yugoslav surrender, which would probably be fatal for Milosevic's political survival.
Such an outcome would also save NATO's face and allow at least some refugees to return home, while suspending the difficult question of Kosovo's final political status. It would, however, put Alliance troops in a precarious situation in the event that hostilities resumed before NATO was in a position to reinforce them with heavy armour. They would be at the end of long and difficult supply lines and facing larger Yugoslav forces.
Both in the air attacks against Yugoslav units and in any ground war, key weapons will be the A-10 Warthog and the Apache helicopter. Their great advantages are a mixture of fire-power and slow speed. Some of NATO's other aircraft, like the US F-16 and UK Harriers, are supposedly configured for a ground-attack role, but they fly too fast to be very accurate against moving ground targets. One problem for NATO in developing the right kind of forces has been a lack of sufficient cooperation between air forces and armies. While the latter needs slow speed and heavy fire-power, the air force tends to despise such planes and values high speed and manoeuvrability.
If the US mobilised all of its ground-attack aircraft from the Reserve and the National Guard as well as the regular air force, it would have over 60 squadrons and more than 1,000 planes, as well as 753 Apaches (although only 43 of these are equipped with the latest radar equipment). European armies have hundreds more attack helicopters like the British Lynx. So far, the US has announced the deployment of only two battalions of Apaches. Far more will be necessary – and these relatively slow, low-flying aircraft will undoubtedly suffer casualties from anti-aircraft guns and missiles. This makes it questionable whether the US would call up the National Guard, a move which would require a very high level of consensus in American society.
Moreover, NATO ground-attack aircraft and helicopters were designed to hit massed Soviet armoured formations on the north German plain. No aircraft is truly appropriate for hunting dispersed infantry and individual tanks and guns in good cover – as are most of Yugoslavia's forces in Kosovo. Over a number of weeks, Yugoslav logistics can be devastated and tanks and artillery pieces destroyed or driven into concealed immobility. But if the morale, courage and determination of the Yugoslav infantry fails to crack under the bombardment and no diplomatic compromise is achieved, NATO, however unwillingly, is likely to be inexorably drawn towards a ground offensive. If Yugoslav morale does prove to be high, a ground operation will be all the more frightening for NATO.
