A troubled inheritance
The death of King Hussein of Jordan on 7 February 1999 occurred at an unsettled time in the Middle East. The Israeli–Palestinian peace process is deadlocked, and the US is unable or unwilling to push it forward. American and British planes are attacking Iraqi anti-aircraft positions on almost a daily basis, to the growing disquiet of even pro-Western Arab regimes. And the whole region is suffering from an economic recession that has been greatly worsened by the fall in oil prices.
Jordanians were not unprepared for the death of their King. They were, however, shocked by his abrupt decision on 25 January to remove his 51-year-old brother, Hassan, as Crown Prince. In his place, Hussein appointed 37-year-old Prince Abdullah, his eldest son by his former wife, Princess Muna. Most Jordanians had long taken it for granted that the highly experienced Hassan – who had served as Crown Prince since 1965 – would succeed Hussein.
King Abdullah is popular with the army. His father ensured Abdullah's closeness to both junior and noncommissioned officers by insisting that he start his career as a subaltern and spend several years in the junior ranks before taking command of the élite Special Forces. The new King also enjoys a great deal of public goodwill. But he is relatively inexperienced politically, and his father's legacy is in many ways a troubled one. In particular, the 'King's Peace' – the long-standing attempt at reconciliation with Israel – has so far almost wholly failed to yield the rewards hoped for by ordinary Jordanians, whether in terms of Palestinian rights or of increased trade and economic growth.
Hussein's legacy
During almost five decades on the throne, Hussein legitimised the state and the rule of his Hashemite dynasty. The Hashemites are an ancient lineage, with roots not in Jordan but in what is now Saudi Arabia. Britain installed them as rulers of the newly created emirate of Jordan in 1921 as a reward for their help against the Ottoman Turks in the First World War. When Hussein became king in 1952, Arab nationalists derided the Hashemites as British puppets and Jordan as an artificial state. There seemed no good reason why either should survive. In 1958, the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq was overthrown by a military and nationalist revolt, and King Faisal II was murdered.
By contrast, King Abdullah has inherited a state whose existence is no longer contested, and which has a relatively distinct identity and established institutions. He does not have to start from scratch to the extent that his father did. Nevertheless, to ensure stability, Abdullah will need to:
• repair the ruling family's cohesion and, in particular, gain Hassan's support;
• revive an ailing economy, and raise the mass of the population's living standards;
• maintain Jordan's freedom of manoeuvre in regional politics, so as to avoid being seen simply as a tool of the US and Israel; and
• permit more popular participation in government – without allowing his own power to erode.
The single biggest danger to Abdullah and Jordan is, however, largely beyond the King's control. This is the threat of a complete breakdown of the Israeli–Palestinian relationship.
Splits in the royal family
Hussein's public demotion and humiliation of Hassan badly strained family unity. The succession issue was reopened in summer 1998 while Hussein was receiving cancer treatment in the US. The rift between the two brothers was partly fuelled by their respective wives – American-born Queen Noor, Hussein's last wife, and Hassan's Pakistani-born wife, Princess Sarvath. The two women had never been friends, and each wanted her son ultimately to succeed to the throne.
Two factors seem to have finally convinced Hussein to move against his brother. First, he wanted the succession to pass, after Hassan, to Hamzah, his favourite and eldest son by Queen Noor. But Hassan would not agree to this demand. Hussein was therefore led to believe that, after succeeding to the throne, Hassan would appoint his own son, Rashid, as Crown Prince. Second, while undergoing treatment, Hussein received reports that Hassan was behaving as if he had already acceded to the throne. He had put his own people in influential positions and, worst of all, had tried to remove Army Chief-of-Staff Field Marshal Abdelhafez Kaabneh – a key ally of both Hussein and Abdullah.
Hussein returned to Jordan on 19 January, sacked his brother, published a long (and in places barely coherent) letter explaining why he had done so, and then returned to the American clinic. He would have preferred Hamzah to be the new Crown Prince, but felt that, at 18 years of age, he was too young. Hence, as a compromise, he appointed Abdullah as Crown Prince on the understanding that Hamzah would succeed him in the post. The episode resulted in a storm of rumour and gossip in Amman concerning the royal family.
Hassan quickly pledged his loyalty to the new King, but he and his close allies still feel grieved and humiliated. Whether this leads to future trouble will depend to a large extent on whether, once he has secured his own position, Abdullah offers Hassan a role that he deems commensurate with his seniority. Given Hassan's experience of economic management, it is possible that he will be offered the key job of determining Jordan's economic policy. Abdullah's first moves, however, have been directed towards reducing still further his uncle's influence. While the new King has praised and thanked Hassan in public, he has removed him from the leadership of 11 royal institutions, and has retired four senior generals considered close to the former Crown Prince.
A weak economy
Jordan has no oil reserves, lacks other natural resources and has always been dependent on outside aid. During and after his father's funeral on 8 February, Abdullah received a string of foreign visitors, many of them pledging assistance. President Bill Clinton, for instance, promised to urge Congress to approve $300 million of aid as a reward for helping to achieve the October 1998 Wye River Memorandum between Israel and the PLO. World Bank President James Wolfensohn and emissaries from the Persian Gulf states and the European Union also attended the ceremony.
The Gulf states' swift endorsement of Abdullah signals the end of the long estrangement caused by Hussein's unwillingness to join the US-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War. Abdullah has good relations with the younger Arab princes, and their moral support will help him as he seeks to establish his authority. However, major financial aid from the oil-rich Arab states is unlikely to be forthcoming. The Gulf states have been badly hit by the steep fall in the international oil price, and for the first time are having to make substantial budget cuts.
The Jordanian economy is stagnant. Official figures show a 2.2% gross-domestic-product (GDP) growth rate for 1998, but unofficial estimates are considerably lower. Jordan's foreign debt is close to $8 billion and the budget deficit was 9.7% of GDP in 1998, compared to the government's target of 3.3%. Unemployment is unofficially estimated at around 25%; officially it stands at some 15%. Amman has been appealing privately to the West for debt rescheduling or, better still, forgiveness. In 1994, the US agreed to cancel $700m of Jordan's arrears in return for pledges of continued support for US policies in the Middle East.
A key test facing the King will be whether he is capable of imposing budget cuts – especially in price subsidies for essential goods – and economic liberalisation and privatisation programmes, which are being pushed for by the IMF, the World Bank and Jordanian government economists. Initial moves in this direction in 1989, 1996 and 1998 led to serious public protests. Especially dangerous for the monarchy is the fact that the groups most threatened by cuts are the eastern and southern tribes. These peoples have been the mainstay of Hashemite power, but they are economically more backward than the country's Palestinian majority.
A hostile environment
Jordan can expect problems from at least two of its Arab neighbours, Syria and Iraq. Both countries sent high-level delegations to Hussein's funeral. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad caused surprise with his last-minute arrival, clearly designed to take the measure of Abdullah. The early signs are that the new King may be ready for a rapprochement with Damascus – but on Jordanian terms. In other words, the peace treaty with Israel stands. Iraqi Vice-President Taha Mohieddin Maarouf represented Baghdad at the funeral. Iraq, like Syria, would like to see Jordan loosen its ties with the West – and, in particular, abandon Hussein's open desire for Saddam's replacement. Baghdad has considerable capacity to destabilise Jordan through agents in the country's large Iraqi migrant population.
However, the 'wild card' for Abdullah, as well as for other Arab leaders, is Israel's election in May 1999. The Jordanian monarchy, like other pro-Western Arab regimes, is praying for Netanyahu's defeat, and the emergence of a more moderate Israeli government. A continuation of the current stalemate would weaken all the pro-Western Arab states. Amman is locked into the Palestine problem through geography and history, and because some 60% of its population are of Palestinian origin. The worst scenario for Jordan would be a collapse of Israeli–Palestinian relations, leading to renewed mass violence, a new surge of Palestinian refugees into Jordan, and Arab and Muslim fury directed at Israel, the US and their regional partners. Moreover, the Hashemites do not want to see a return to a united Jordanian–Palestinian state, which has been proposed again recently by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. This would make Palestinians the overwhelming majority, and leave Jordan's monarchy even weaker.
A constitutional monarchy?
Finally, Abdullah will have to re-examine the social contract established by his father with the people. Politically inexperienced, he will have to rely not only on seasoned advisers but also on the representative institutions which – within clearly set limits – Hussein allowed to function.
As a veteran and popular army officer, Abdullah has the loyalty of Jordan's most important institution, the armed forces. But his handling of government, parliament, the political parties and the press will also be crucial. Jordanians welcomed the democratic experiment that Hussein launched in 1989, and many were dismayed by the return to autocratic rule after the unpopular 1994 peace treaty with Israel. This unhappiness contributed to the 1996 riots and to the rise of the radical and powerful Muslim Brotherhood. In return for toleration, this group has publicly declared its loyalty to the monarchy, and has so far strictly avoided violent actions inside Jordan, while continuing to attack targets in Israel. This stance is likely to continue for the moment. All the political parties and the press want more freedom. But if Abdullah agrees to their demand they will use their freer rein to attack the peace process and to draw attention to sensitive domestic issues like corruption and economic mismanagement.
Lacking his father's authority, Abdullah may well choose to move towards a more constitutional style of monarchy. Because the peace agreement with Israel is so unpopular with the electorate, however, greater democracy risks undermining the international – especially US – links that the monarchy also largely relies upon. Abdullah cannot in the end be all things to all men. He cannot simultaneously please the army, tribes, the Palestinians, the Westernised élite and the Muslim Brotherhood. Nor can he satisfy the US, Israel and Syria at the same time. His own inclination will certainly be to follow his father's pro-Western line and seek to maintain the 'King's Peace'. But for this he will expect and need both financial and political rewards which neither Israel nor Washington may be able to provide.
