The third Balkan war of the 1990s is now raging in Kosovo, the largely ethnic Albanian province of Serbia in what remains of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As with the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO has been taken by surprise – despite years of warnings – and is now scrambling to find a suitable reaction. The increasingly well financed, armed and organised Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) is fighting Serbian forces, including paramilitary police and the Yugoslav Army. The conflict is currently low-intensity, but it is rapidly escalating. The UCK, which is gaining popular support, has adopted a classic insurgency strategy to undermine Belgrade's control. This includes:
• attacks on Serbian forces;
• intermittent pressure on Serbian civilians to leave their homes; and
• assassinations of local Albanian 'collaborators'.
Support for the peaceful and gradualist approach of Kosovo's main ethnic-Albanian political party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), is waning because of its failure to win effective Western support.
Serbian forces have responded to UCK attacks by using greater force against the activists, those suspected of helping them and, increasingly, the general ethnic Albanian population. The Serbian command is using tanks and artillery in a bid to seal the porous and mountainous border with Albania through which the UCK is being supplied with weapons. Serb forces are bombarding villages with artillery and from the air. These attacks have caused thousands of refugees to flee across the border into Albania, necessitating international humanitarian aid and forcing the West to respond.
NATO's reaction
As the violence has escalated, the West has sought to encourage both sides to enter into a dialogue. However, their demands are irreconcilable, and the Western solution – federal status for Kosovo – is rejected by both parties. Until 1989, the Kosovo Albanians were content with their position as an autonomous region within Serbia, and with federal representation in the former Yugoslavia. They now, however, demand independence not only from Serbia, but also from the remnants of Yugoslavia. Belgrade insists that Kosovo remain an integral part of Serbia. The prospects for dialogue are further undermined by the UCK's rejection of the authority of Ibrahim Rugova, the elected President of the self-styled 'Republic of Kosovo'. Even in the unlikely event that Rugova were to negotiate a deal with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, the UCK may continue fighting.
Five days of intense diplomacy from 10 May by Richard Holbrooke, broker of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords), and by the US envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, brought some of the protagonists to the negotiating table. Milosevic and Rugova met on 15 May, resulting in concessions by both sides. By agreeing to negotiate in person, Milosevic compromised on his position that Kosovo's future is an internal Serb (not Yugoslav) matter. By dropping his demand for international mediation, Rugova made a much more substantial compromise, that has weakened his authority over his own people – especially since the Serbian offensive began soon afterwards.
NATO leaders are haunted by humiliations suffered in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991–94, when soldiers from the world's most powerful military grouping did nothing to stop the slaughter of tens of thousands of civilians, and international resolutions were repeatedly defied and mocked. Although in 1995 the Alliance did finally take decisive action against the Serbs, the débâcle of the preceding years risked splitting the organisation and damaged its prestige. Western leaders are determined that this will not happen again over Kosovo. A meeting of NATO Defence Ministers on 11 June accordingly issued a tough statement outlining the Alliance's intentions. The Ministers directed NATO's military authorities to study the situation and to draw up as quickly as possible a 'full range of options'.
These include the possible deployment of large numbers of NATO troops to Kosovo's borders with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania, and possible air strikes within Yugoslav territory if the violence does not cease. To underline the warning, the meeting announced that aerial exercises would be held as quickly as possible over FYROM and Albania 'with the aim of demonstrating NATO's capability to project power rapidly into the region'. A senior NATO Commander, General Klaus Naumann of Germany, has said that he believes air strikes could achieve an end to the fighting.
Possible outcomes
Whether achieved through negotiation or by force, there are at least four possible eventual outcomes to the Kosovo conflict.
Serbianisation. This would involve the expulsion of the ethnic Albanian population, and their replacement by Serbs. This would create 1.5–2 million new refugees in the Balkans, and it seems certain that NATO would take strong action if this happened.
Independence. A large majority of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population supports independence. However, this outcome would destabilise the neighbouring FYROM, a linchpin of Balkan stability. A quarter of all Macedonians are ethnic Albanian, many of whom would see Kosovo's independence as a signal to demand secession. Independence for Kosovo would also cause the Serb population in the province, which numbers about 200,000, to flee.
Partition. Kosovo's partition might be a logical medium-term outcome. However, the two sides are very unlikely to agree on the division of territory. Albanians would demand a split along ethnic lines, giving them 90% of the province; Serbs would insist that they retain the majority of what they regard as the cradle of the Serbian nation. Whatever the details, the consequences of partition are akin to those of Kosovo's full independence.
Federalisation. Greater autonomy for Kosovo is the fourth possible outcome. The province could become the third Yugoslav republic alongside Serbia and Montenegro, or its jurisdiction could be shared between federal, state and local governments. However, it will be difficult – perhaps impossible – to find a formula that grants sufficient autonomy to meet Albanian demands and protect Albanians from Serb forces, while satisfying Serb desires to retain effective sovereignty over Kosovo and protect the Serb minority.
Western military options
The West has insisted that only a federal solution is acceptable, but a key problem for Western powers is that both the Albanians and the Serbs reject federalisation. This double rejection lies at the very heart of the Western dilemma over Kosovo. Despite strong anti-Serbian feeling in the West, NATO countries are hindered from taking a clear pro-Albanian and anti-Serb stance by their adherence to the principle of the inviolability of borders. The statement released following the 11 June meeting said, revealingly, that options should be drawn up 'on the relevant legal basis'.
Although some Western analysts regard this view as anachronistic, it is the tenet on which Western countries opposed secessionist attempts in Crimea, Abkhazia, Turkish Kurdistan and elsewhere. It would be especially difficult for the West to accept Kosovan secession after it ruled out partition as a solution to the Bosnia conflict. Intervening in the face of opposition from Yugoslavia, therefore, raises legal questions of sovereignty. These can only be resolved by the UN, which operates on the principle of non-interference in states' internal affairs, and where Russia – and possibly China – could block any Western action. Germany also insists that any NATO intervention requires a UN mandate.
Deploying forces along Kosovo's borders with Albania and FYROM would be designed to stabilise neighbouring countries, and to deter cross-border attacks by Serbian forces. However, on its own, such a move by NATO would actually help Milosevic by cutting off arms supplies to the UCK and containing its rebellion within Kosovo, where it could be more easily suppressed. Concerning air strikes, critics also point out that these were successful in Bosnia in 1995 because they were accompanied by a Croat–Muslim ground offensive. No such joint strategy is likely in this case. Air strikes also raise the question of what to do if the UCK refused to stop fighting. General Naumann suggested that NATO would then attack them as well, but a strategy of attacking both sides simultaneously hardly looks very feasible.
On 28 May, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to seek a six-month extension of the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in FYROM, and to expand it from 750 to 1,050 troops. NATO Foreign Ministers also asked the NATO military authorities to advise the NAC on possible Alliance preventive deployments in Albania and FYROM – not in Kosovo itself – and to consider the military implications of possible further deterrent missions. In addition, the Foreign Ministers agreed to a series of Partnership for Peace initiatives and exercises designed to bolster Albanian and FYROM confidence and capabilities, although very little has in fact been done so far.
NATO's imperative
As with Bosnia in 1991–94, it is clear that most Western powers are reluctant to use ground forces in the region. A NATO survey of deployment options in Albania concluded that, given the rugged terrain and the absence of local infrastructure and support, over 7,000 troops would be needed simply to monitor the situation; more than 20,000 troops would be required actually to impede cross-border movements. These troops might have to remain indefinitely. In the unlikely event that NATO decided to move into Kosovo itself in the face of the Yugoslav army, far more troops would of course be necessary. NATO countries are unwilling to make this scale of commitment, which would face strong opposition in the US Congress. Yet, as events in Bosnia have demonstrated, US leadership is vital to effective action.
Events on the ground are, however, putting pressure on NATO states to act. If the threat or use of air power can persuade Milosevic to end the Serbian offensive then serious dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the conflict may be possible – assuming that the UCK could also be persuaded to modify its demand for full independence, and to accept a federal solution.
