India's long-running Maoist insurgency has increased in intensity in recent months. In April, 76 paramilitary police were killed by Naxalite guerrillas in a brutal hit-and-run ambush near Chintalnar in Dantewada district in the central state of Chhattisgarh – the largest Naxalite strike in the group's 43-year history. There were further attacks in May and June, including the ambush of a patrol killing 27 policemen, and suspected involvement in a train crash that killed 147. This followed an outbreak of violence in West Bengal in 2009. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described the rebellion as 'India's gravest security threat’. His government, under strong pressure to act decisively against the Maoists, has pledged that 'the problem of left-wing extremism [will] be overcome in the next three years'. However, this is an ambitious goal.
A peasant insurgency – sort of
The Naxalite movement dates back to a 1967 peasant revolt in Naxalbari, West Bengal. The first wave of violence was brought under control by the Indian government by the start of the 1970s. However, the insurgency flared again after the merger of two left-wing groups – the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre – into the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI–Maoist) in 2004.
The CPI–Maoist is now the driving force behind a movement to topple India's federal parliamentary regime in the name of social justice. According to a field manual seen by the IISS, its objective is 'to liberate India from the clutches of the wealthy capitalists, landlords and brokers'. But while many Naxal fighters come from marginalised tribal communities, many of the group's leaders are educated, middle-class urbanites. Minister of Home Affairs P. Chidambaram has described the Naxalites as 'most crafty capitalists' and is not the only one to accuse them of running extensive extortion networks. Singh's government banned the Maoist party immediately after the 2009 elections, as it no longer needed the support of other left-wing parties in parliament. This had the effect of bolstering the security forces’ efforts, as they could now arrest members without proving that they had been involved in violence.
Official estimates are that the conflict has claimed the lives of more than 10,000 civilians and security-force personnel since 2005. The Maoists' area of operations stretches along a 'red corridor' covering 40,000 square kilometres across central and eastern India, and is concentrated mainly in the states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Orissa and Bihar. Yet despite their geographical spread, the Maoists' tactical successes have been limited. Their attempted boycott failed to disrupt the 2009 general election. And the Maoists have yet to fulfil their July 2009 threat to assassinate top politicians such as the prime minister and Indian National Congress Party Leader Sonia Gandhi.
Beyond the red corridor, the Maoists' influence appears to be limited. Although there has been fresh violence in eastern Maharashtra, to the west of the corridor, diminished levels of violence in Andhra Pradesh indicate that recent efforts by government forces to contain the insurgency have had some success. The Naxalites' urban presence is small, despite the arrest in Delhi of Kobad Ghandy, a senior member of the CPI–Maoist politburo in 2009.
Dual-track approach
The Indian authorities have sought to counter the insurgency through a combination of force and economic development measures. This two-pronged approach was initiated by the government in a 2006 'Status Paper on the Naxal Problem'. As part of this, Singh announced a 'surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy' in September 2009, proposing that Naxalites be offered financial incentives to give up their weapons. The policy is intended to bring 10,000 of the most hardcore fighters back into the political mainstream. Aimed at the Maoists' armed wing, the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), the scheme involves sweeteners such as vocational training, employment, monthly stipends, fixed-rate deposits and a money-for-weapons exchange. It sets out a fixed-rate deposit of 150,000 rupees ($3,250), maturing after three years for Naxals who give up arms, plus a stipends of 2,000 rupees ($45) per month for three years. However, Maoist rebels have largely shunned similar proposals on a state level, including in Orissa in 2006, Bihar in 2002–2008 and later in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Andra Pradesh.
The Naxalite issue has stirred up passionate debates among Indian policymakers as to where the responsibility for tackling domestic insurgents should lie, and whether development measures should be prioritised over the use of force. Because individual states have ultimate control over law and order within their territories under the Indian constitution, Delhi-based policymakers must be careful not to be seen to making decisions for states' chief ministers. Fortunately, chief ministers of individual states have generally been supportive of New Delhi's policy. A series of conferences on internal security for chief ministers, spearheaded by Chidambaram, has been well attended. These conferences have also fostered opportunities for bilateral collaboration between states.
On the security side, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the country's largest paramilitary force with an estimated strength of 280,000, has been deployed in front-line roles since 2003. Since November 2009, this force has been working more closely with state police forces, who are spearheading operations to push the Maoists back towards their strongholds. This strategy is commonly referred to as Operation Green Hunt, although the government insists no such formal operation exists. It involves some 40,000–70,000 CRPF and state police as well as around 7,000 jungle-warfare commandos and police officers. The CRPF's Special Action Force (SAF) is also dedicated to anti-Maoist operations and supplements at least five state-level units dedicated to counter-insurgency operations.
Delhi's central role in addressing the insurgency is underlined by the fact the states' security measures are underpinned by financial assistance from the central government. Deployments are paid for through the national-security budget, especially under a 'security-related expenditure' scheme. States receive substantial amounts of federal money for modernisation and training of their police forces, and the Home Affairs Ministry contributes to state-level rehabilitation packages for demobilised Maoists.
In June 2010, the Cabinet Committee on Security decided that India's army and air force would not be used on the front line against the Maoists, but would retain advisory/training and evacuation/transport roles. The ruling, which followed a three-month debate, barred the army from participating in activities such as demining. Use of the armed forces against a domestic threat would have been unpopular in military circles and among the wider Indian public. There was little desire to make an open-ended commitment to a protracted conflict, to risk harming Indian civilians, or to commit intelligence resources. Indian governments hesitate to use the military at home except as a last resort, though it can be deployed – as in Kashmir – under the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act.
Development versus policing
Many of the states in the red corridor are among India's poorest. The committee's June decision reopened a long-standing schism within the government over whether the use of force should precede the supply of development aid. Though government efforts to win hearts and minds have been denounced by critics as an afterthought, the Indian National Congress Party has since 2004 had an anti-poverty agenda of 'inclusive growth', which aims to fairly distribute the fruits of the country's high GDP growth through targeted entitlements, better governance and infrastructure.
This has had mixed results. Sonia Gandhi, the party's leader, recently declared that 'the rise of Naxalism is a reflection of the need for our development initiatives to reach the grassroots'. Prime Minister Singh, referring to the indigenous tribal and other groups who make up most of the Maoists' rank and file, spoke in July of the need to plug the 'development deficit'. Such groups form local majorities in the most incident-prone areas, which are also among India's most marginalised, forested and under-developed. For example, members of 'scheduled tribes' constitute at least 32.5% of the population of Chhattisgarh, and 'scheduled castes' at least 12.2%. But any development initiatives will likely take longer than Chidambaram's three-year timeline to bear fruit.
Dantewada failures
Having endured 140 of more than 500 violent incidents so far this year, Chhattisgarh epitomises some of the key challenges and opportunities ahead. Vehicles travelling along its few roads make easy prey for bomb attacks, and 24 civilians were killed when a bus exploded in May. Government forces are hampered in their efforts to improve security by poor infrastructure and by a lack of trust among civilians. In addition, police forces under state authority cannot go beyond their state's boundaries. As a result, borders with neighbouring states are always sensitive areas. This problem is even more acute in cases where the borders of three states come together in one point. Chhattisgarh has six 'tri-junctions', the most of any state. These allow the Maoists to strike and then cross state boundaries to safe havens. (Neighbouring Andhra Pradesh is exploring the possibility of cross-border search patrols.)
The Dantewada massacre in April exposed the vulnerability of government troops, and has been blamed on poor training, insufficient equipment and lackadaisical planning. An enquiry into the incident headed by former border security chief E.N. Rammohan found that the soldiers had committed multiple breaches of standard operating procedures, including returning to base by the same route they had left it and remaining in one large configuration, rather than splitting into smaller groups. The battalion's commander is alleged to have lied about his unit's whereabouts, and is thought to have had little field experience.
Though Chidambaram has acknowledged these deficiencies, it is unclear whether these lessons will translate into policy changes. However, three more counter-terrorism and jungle-warfare schools are to be established in Chhattisgarh, in addition to the existing one which has so far trained 7,000 policemen from across India. The air force is reportedly acquiring a civilian airport, its first military transport base in the state, while some of the helicopters recalled from UN peacekeeping deployments could be based in the state capital. The Ministry of Home Affairs is reported to be testing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) over the jungles of Dantewada. Meanwhile, the government is introducing 'integrated action plans' to assist Naxalite-affected areas in building infrastructure and health services. Chhattisgarh is included in a $200 million plan, yet to be approved, to build inter-state roads, while the Asian Development Bank has committed a $220m loan for transport infrastructure.
According to Chidambaram, the Dantewada massacre was a 'wake-up call' that emphasised the urgency of addressing the Maoist insurgency. However, few measures have been put in place that will enable the government to fulfil its pledge to overcome the problem of left-wing extremism within three years. In the longer term, India's growing prosperity offers a window to tackle the structural roots of the conflict – but there must be doubt about whether the government has either the will or the political capital to use this opportunity.
