China joined the small group of nations with anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capabilities when it conducted a successful missile-interception test on 11 January 2010. Apart from China, only the United States and Russia have systems designed for missile interceptions outside the earth’s atmosphere. The low-key nature of Beijing’s announcement was a sign of both its cautious optimism about further ABM developments, and its understanding that it still has a vast amount of work to do before it can establish even a moderate regional-level ballistic-missile defence (BMD) infrastructure.
The timing of the test prompted Western media speculation that it was a response to Washington’s decision on 6 January to approve $6.4 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan, including the Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missile. But it was in fact the product of a four-decade-long development process and had little to do with the arms deal, which Beijing strongly criticised. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had announced in December 2009 that its strategic missile forces possessed ABM capabilities.
In the 11 January test a target missile, believed to have been fired from Xichang, Sichuan Province, was intercepted and destroyed by a KT-2 variant test missile launched from a mobile launcher near Korla, Xinjiang Province, with the interception taking place somewhere over the Xinjiang–Gansu border. Though it has been suggested that the interceptor could be a derivative of the HQ-9/S-300 or HQ-19/S-400 series of surface-to-air missiles (SAM), the Pentagon detected ‘two geographically separate missile launch events with an exo-atmospheric collision’. This indicated a mid-course interception at an altitude of at least 700km above the earth, well beyond the operating altitudes of SAMs such as the S-300 and S-400.
The road to ABM
The Chinese ABM programme has its origins in the ‘640 Project’ set up by Mao Zedong in 1964 to develop defensive missiles to be used against a nuclear attack. Political turmoil and lack of funding meant the project was terminated shortly after Mao’s death in 1976. However, an anti-satellite (ASAT) programme had already been started in 1969 under the auspices of the Second Academy of the Ministry of Aerospace Engineering – later renamed the Academy of Anti-Ballistic Missile and Anti-Satellite Technology. The academy developed the Fanji-1, -2 and -3 ABMs, but these programmes were all terminated in 1977 owing to political and economic troubles. The personnel and expertise from the Fanji programme proved extremely valuable when Deng Xiaoping called for a Chinese answer to President Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Strategic Defence Initiative in 1986. This was known as the ‘863 Project’.
The new ABM programme, initially termed the ‘863-409 Project Series’, remained in the research phase of the development cycle until the mid-1990s. During this time, many of the necessary technologies were successfully researched by the academy, including digital closed-loop fibre-optic gyroscopes, binary optical/mid-wave infrared seekers, restartable altitude/orbital control systems and thrust controls. The 863 Project was divided into two branches in 2002, known as the 863-801 and the 863-805 programmes, with the latter being the ASAT kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) programme. The chief designer of the 805 programme was the former head of the Second Academy Cheng Dingchang, with the deputy head being Zhang Yiqun. The other deputy programme chief was the head of the Fourth Technical Department of the Fourth Academy, Zheng Shenghuo, who was responsible for the launch vehicle and was situated at Base 66 in Hubei Province.
The 863-805 programme went into the test phase after three years of development, and two unsuccessful tests were conducted in July 2005 and February 2006. A third test on 11 January 2007 resulted in the successful destruction of the obsolete Feng Yun 1C weather satellite orbiting at 853km above the earth. The test caused significant controversy, as the destruction of the satellite resulted in thousands of pieces of space debris, creating a considerable risk to other satellites. The test was initially denied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but was confirmed by the PLA. This confusion, coupled with the lack of prior warning, caused major embarrassment for the Chinese government, resulting in markedly improved transparency for the 2010 test.
According to Chinese sources, the KKV used weighed around 35kg, which is comparable to KKVs used by other countries such as the US and Russia. Shortly after the successful ASAT test, Zhang Yiqun was made the head of a team working on a new exo-atmospheric ABM.
Clues as to the true nature of the test missile used in January 2010 are easily gathered by looking at the January 2007 ASAT test, which used a KT-1 four-stage solid-fuel missile thought to be derived from the DF-21 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The KT-1 was manufactured with US technology in the form of solid rocket-motor insulation sold to the Chinese illegally in 1994 by Martin Marietta Corporation (now part of Lockheed Martin, which was fined $13 million in 2000). In 2002, two new members of the KT family were seen at the annual Zhuhai air show – the KT-2 and the KT-2A – which were apparently derived from the much larger DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). According to industry sources at the time, the two rockets were due to be operational by 2005. In common with the DF-31A ICBM, both can be launched from mobile launchers, but given that the KT-2A is equipped with strap-on boosters, making it more cumbersome, the KT-2 is most likely to have been the test missile in question.
Current programme status
The main launch sites for the ABM and space programmes are at Xichang, and at Taiyuan, Shanxi Province. Known as ‘Xichang Space City’, Xichang Satellite Launch Centre was set up in 1970 and is a sub-division of the PLA General Armaments Department. Beidou navigational satellites are being launched from there: by 2020, China plans to have launched 35 such satellites, with the aim of providing the country with an independent GPS network, as well developing the ABM programme into a BMD network. Meanwhile, Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre, also known as the ‘Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Centre’, has played a key role in the PLA’s missile programmes, being the main facility used for the testing of its newest ICBMs.
Sources vary as to where the latest tests have been taking place, but the general belief is that the successful KT-1 ASAT test in January 2007 was launched from Xichang. It is highly probable that the target missile from the January 2010 ABM test was also launched from this location. At least one Chinese source has placed the launch site of the interceptor missile at Korla, Xinjiang Province, where there is a new phased array radar that could have helped to guide the interceptor. However, China currently lacks the extensive infrastructure required for a BMD system: its space-surveillance and tracking capabilities will not be ready until the full Beidou network is in place. This compounds the difficulties faced by its integrated command-and-control network which still requires considerable development; numerous exercises conducted by the PLA to test these systems in recent years have not produced satisfactory results. Furthermore, China would need a whole network of phased array radars such as the one at Korla.
Beijing’s motivations
The January 2010 test should be seen as a follow-on from the 2007 ASAT test, building on decades of Chinese technological development. The lack of fanfare from the government suggests that it was not meant to be interpreted as a political gesture. However, it is an important step in its development of a multi-tiered air-defence strategy, designed to integrate both offensive and defensive space operations with China’s conventional air-defence network.
Given the ABM programme’s relative immaturity, China is unlikely to use it as a strategic counterbalance against the US and Russia. Beijing will continue to rely on its second-strike capabilities – such as the DF31A mobile ICBM – as its primary means of strategic deterrence. However, the ABM development could have an effect on India, which recently carried out a successful test of the nuclear-capable Agni-III IRBM, which has Beijing and Shanghai within its range. It is in China’s interests to utilise the ABM programme as a strategic tool against its nuclear neighbour. Closer to home, Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng HF-2E cruise-missile project is a genuine cause for concern for the PLA. With its 800–1,000km range, it is capable of striking coastal cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. With China’s main economic hubs located on the eastern coast, this is a risk that the PLA cannot ignore.
The short Xinhua press statement issued an hour after the launch declaring that the missile-interception test had been conducted highlighted the the PLA’s increased openness, and suggested a greater degree of confidence. A former general in the PLA General Staff recently argued that greater transparency would be in the interests of the PLA and China by promoting mutual trust, silencing critics abroad and boosting morale. If his opinions are shared by serving PLA officers, then this shows a substantial shift in approach from the secrecy surrounding Chinese missile tests as recently as the ASAT test in 2007.
