No solutions in sight to Somalia's insecurity (page 2)
Piracy
Compounding Somalia’s transnational menace, over the last two years Somali pirates, enabled by the absence of the rule of law on the ground, have staged increasingly frequent and bold attacks on commercial vessels in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Although their main aim is to extract ransom payments from commercial companies, they pose a nuisance that foreign governments cannot ignore. Ships of many countries are involved in anti-piracy patrols. US Navy maritime surface and air assets, constituting the main elements of Combined Task Force 151, conduct anti-piracy operations in coordination with NATO’s Operation Open Shield, the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, and navies of other nations including India, Japan, China, Malaysia, Russia and Australia. Despite several dramatic and successful interdictions – in spring 2009, for instance, the US Navy rescued the captain of the US-flagged Maersk Alabama, killing three of the pirates holding him hostage – even modern navies cannot identify and target all small pirate vessels operating in vast expanses of water. Most captures of vessels end in the payment of money rather than by means of military action. Thus, the deterrent effect of the international naval presence remains unclear, although attempted acts of piracy have been thwarted by prompt action and some pirates have been detained.
urgent needs within Africa in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, will divert the major powers’ attention from Somalia and will in effect prohibit a major UN or AU peacekeeping effort. Nevertheless, bringing greater order and control to the Somali polity is a high regional priority.
Political and military futility
After 18 years without an established government, Somalia epitomises the failed state. The TFG has not collected taxes or provided effective social services, established a sound civilian law-enforcement organisation, or gained anything like a monopoly on the use of force. Regions in the north and the centre of the country have formed themselves into the self-declared (though unrecognised) entities of Somaliland and Puntland. Without substantial political advances, even at its full strength of 8,000 troops, AMISOM would have no realistic chance of controlling a factionalised, heavily armed Somali population. The current AU mission of about 5,000 Ugandan and Burundian soldiers has improved its efforts to protect the TFG and in September 2009 was given a more muscular mandate for peace enforcement, but remains too small and under equipped to be truly effective.
The UN, the US, the EU, the International Contact Group on Somalia and Djibouti worked hard – though inconspicuously – to facilitate two changes in the TFG that could lead to a measure of political progress. In January 2009, the TFG parliament was expanded from 275 to 550 members so that clans would be represented more equitably and moderate Islamist parties could be accommodated. Secondly, less than a week after the parliamentary reform was approved, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate Islamist, won the January 2009 presidential election. As a member of one of the two critical Hawiye sub-clans, he stands a chance of resolving conflicts with the other. Sharif is also a former head of the ICU and has substantial credibility with the Islamic community. However, the path to political rehabilitation remains unclear. It seems unlikely that governable regions could coalesce politically in the south as they have in the self-declared entities of Somaliland in the north and Puntland in the central region.
External actors appear to be adopting a realistic approach. Sharif is being given time to consolidate his presidential authority, if necessary by using force against rival militias in the south. If he is able to marginalise them, and bring relative order to southern Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland may warm to the idea of reconstituting a unitary state. Under this approach, limited operational and tactical engagement with Somaliland and Puntland by US and coalition partners – for instance, on counter-piracy matters – would tacitly acknowledge their status as functionally discrete political entities (while stopping short of full recognition of them as states) and perhaps encourage Somali leaders to compromise and reconcile.
Outlook
Policymakers in Washington and Europe appear increasingly sceptical of state-building efforts. The fluid and fragile nature of Somali alliances, and the tenuousness of public support for Islamist and secular groups alike, indicate that inflexibly backing one faction could ultimately prove fruitless. The expanded Somali parliament, while structurally more equitable, may prove too unwieldy to make a substantive difference. Nevertheless, the US, UN, EU, regional multilateral organisations and regional powers will probably continue to support the reconstituted TFG diplomatically, as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged during her August meeting with Sharif in Kenya, and especially to endorse any of its efforts to defeat or co-opt al-Shabaab.
To encourage non-violent political participation, the US may consider removing groups like Hizbul Islam and eventually the more intransigent al-Shabaab, or certain individual members, from its official lists of terrorist organisations and suspects. To avoid broader Somali hostility, counter-terrorism tactics could be altered to minimise civilian casualties, as when US special-operations forces on 14 September 2009 killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a leader of al-Qaeda’s East Africa cell, in a helicopter assault that allowed for more selective targeting. However, if al-Shabaab does manage to increase pressure on the TFG, it could be necessary to secure international reinforcements for the Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM troops.
Piracy and rising Islamist militancy have intensified US and European diplomatic interest in Somalia. In addition, a deteriorating humanitarian situation as a result of drought – especially after the October 2009 US suspension of food aid over fears that aid workers were diverting it to terrorists – has increased pressure on Washington to revise its policy, given the prospect of unmanageable numbers of Somali refugees fleeing over the border to comparatively stable Kenya. These factors could lead to a new approach involving the application of soft power, such as development aid, with less scrutiny over governance. Robust, high-profile international diplomatic or military initiatives in Somalia are unlikely.
1 | 2
<Previous
