Signs of Myanmar's emergence from diplomatic isolation (page 2)
Elections loom
The imminence of national parliamentary elections planned for 2010 has provided the regime with a political incentive to open up to the West. These will be held on the basis of a new constitution, controversially approved in a referendum held in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which devastated the southwest of the country in May 2008. No elections have been held since 1990, when the National League for Democracy under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi swept to victory – a result subsequently annulled by the regime.
The new constitution enshrines a permanent role for the armed forces, ensuring that regardless of the election outcome, ultimate control will continue to rest with the military leadership. Carrying out an election within a controlled framework will allow the regime to place itself closer to the mainstream of regional electoral practice without risking a loss of power. From the opposition’s perspective, should it be allowed to contest the election – it is debating whether it should do so – it may gain an opportunity to exercise political influence, however limited and contingent. In any case, the elections offer Myanmar the best prospect in decades of opening up to the outside world and a chance to reconstitute its society and economy.
The plan to hold elections in 2010 reflects a guarded confidence on the part of the regime that the legacies of conflict and isolation may now be more manageable. Notwithstanding recent fighting on the Chinese border, a broader accommodation has been reached with most of the ethnic groups hitherto committed to armed struggle. And though Western sanctions have had a significant impact on Burmese society, international isolation has increasingly been undermined by the active involvement of Myanmar’s neighbours in all facets of its economy, and by ASEAN’s willingness to countenance the regime’s membership in the organisation.
Ineffective sanctions
A combination of global, regional and internal factors is thus prompting Western governments to reconsider the efficacy of their sanctions, which bar most Burmese exports and seek to place travel and financial restrictions on leading members of the military, as well as their business associates. To any visitor to Myanmar, the country appears to be an object lesson in the unintended consequences of sanctions. The measures are neither comprehensive nor universally upheld. Since neighbouring countries have not added to them, the regime does not lack for alternatives. Sanctions have therefore not damaged the security or economic interests of Myanmar’s decision-making class, which can pursue economic interests and educate their children in regional hubs such as Singapore, Bangkok, Beijing and Hong Kong. The attempt to choke off legitimate trade and commercial ties with the West has helped to create a highly profitable, illegitimate trade in Myanmar’s key natural resources, enabling a ‘crony class’ relying on ties to the generals to secure assets – such as teak, natural gas, precious stones and drugs – and trade them with neighbouring countries. Thus, an important lesson is that Western sanctions on a resource-rich country will place no pressure on it to alter its behaviour if neighbours actively seek to trade with it.
Sanctions have been effective in reinforcing the regime’s isolationist tendencies, in reducing Western influence and in undermining the commercial middle class. A visitor can only conclude that they have enabled the least accountable, most corrupt elements of the business community to thrive, while holding back the professional, managerial and entrepreneurial classes. Sanctions on the manufacturing, textile and rice sectors have cost tens of thousands of jobs and undermined legitimate businessmen. A further risk of sanctions is that, by adding to poverty and reducing capacity-building opportunities, they increase dependency on foreign aid, leaving Western powers attempting to ameliorate conditions created by their own measures.
Immediate prospects
To achieve progress during this next important period, each of the three parties – the Myanmar regime, Western governments and the opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi – will need more patience, flexibility and pragmatism than they have shown so far. Under the best scenario, there would be a step-by-step process of reciprocal actions leading to a virtuous cycle: the regime continuing to relax the conditions under which Aung San Suu Kyi engages in dialogue and releasing more political prisoners, with the opposition in turn agreeing to take part in next year’s elections. This would be followed by the progressive lifting of Western sanctions, beginning with those sectors most critical to the development of the private-sector economy.
None of the parties is likely to achieve all of its goals. But if the regime can be provided with incentives to allow a relatively free election under its own constitution, if the opposition can see a path to greater participation – less than demanded but more than is achievable through continuing conflict – and if the US and EU adopt realistic expectations of the regime’s interpretation of democratic rule and begin lifting sanctions, the Burmese people’s prospects could improve significantly.
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