Tentative engagement with US sparks hopes of new era in relations
New signs have appeared in recent months that Myanmar could be attempting to shed its pariah status and to engage with the United States and Europe in a broad, though tentative, dialogue. There is growing recognition in the West that 12 years of American and European sanctions have failed either to alter the domestic behaviour of the regime or to prevent the country from becoming a source of regional concern. A combination of global, regional and internal factors has triggered a series of diplomatic initiatives designed to explore whether there could be a negotiated solution to the long stand-off. With elections due in 2010, the next 18 months will mark a significant chapter in Myanmar’s political evolution.
The outcome of these initiatives will be significant far beyond Myanmar. It will help to provide answers to questions about the efficacy of sanctions. What can they achieve against an entrenched military regime conditioned by six decades of armed internal conflict? How should Western countries balance democracy and human-rights interests against concerns about regional security and non-proliferation? When new economic powers are rising, where is leverage to be found in dealing with recalcitrant regimes whose political and economic alternatives are growing, not shrinking? And when those regimes are faced with the opportunity to reintegrate with the international community, what factors drive their decisions?
Opening up to the West
The opportunity for a new diplomatic dialogue was created by the arrival of US President Barack Obama in Washington: his administration’s commitment to engage with friends and foes alike has unfrozen a number of diplomatic confrontations around the world. More specifically, a thaw in relations was triggered by a visit by US Senator Jim Webb to Myanmar in August. A Vietnam War veteran, Webb is chairman of the Senate sub-committee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and a long-time opponent of sanctions against Myanmar. He met the country’s leader, General Than Shwe, and was also allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader who is under house arrest. Just weeks earlier, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon had not been permitted to meet her.
While Webb (who also secured the release of John Yettaw, the American who swam across a lake to Aung San Suu Kyi’s house) was acting on his own initiative, his visit served as an early test of the administration’s broader desire to explore a new relationship with the Burmese leadership.
At a September meeting of Ban Ki Moon’s ‘Group of Friends’ on Myanmar, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated publicly for the first time that US sanctions had failed to bring about the desired changes in Myanmar – particularly regarding Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. Shortly after, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell declared that Washington, following a seven-month policy review, had concluded that ‘practical engagement with the Burmese authorities holds the best hope for advancing our goals’. However, the US would maintain sanctions until it saw ‘concrete progress’ – defined as the ability of the political opposition to operate freely, and the regime’s willingness to address new concerns about proliferation threats associated with closer ties between North Korea and Myanmar.
Quiet contacts between Burmese and Western officials have been taking place, and on 9 October, Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed to hold her first meeting for several years with a small group of Western diplomats. Significantly, and at her request, the focus of the meeting was on the nature and impact of sanctions.
Regional pressures
In edging towards a new engagement, both the regime and Western governments are acutely conscious of the changing regional environment. For Myanmar’s rapidly growing neighbours, China and India, Western sanctions have provided an opportunity to gain economic and political influence within a country they consider of strategic significance for their economic and political interests. China’s involvement in Myanmar’s economic affairs, particularly in the border areas, is significantly more pronounced than that of India. But New Delhi has also determined that securing supplies of natural gas from Myanmar and using the country as a trade route to other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is of far greater importance than registering protests against the political situation there.
For China, deep and profitable economic and trade relations have recently been balanced by concerns about conflicts between the Burmese army and ethnic groups in the border regions, which want to retain limited autonomy. The fighting, which has triggered refugee flows and instability, has prompted Beijing to declare publicly its desire that Myanmar resolve its disputes without undermining regional stability. China is also concerned about the illegal traffic of drugs, timber and minerals, as well as the spread of HIV/AIDS.
China is likely to have a major role in influencing the regime’s choices. Less significant, but still important, will be the encouragement of Myanmar’s fellow ASEAN members, which are active in Myanmar as investors and traders. The growing influence of Myanmar’s neighbours means that no attempt to pressure or induce the regime to modify its policies is likely to be effective without their involvement.
