China's military might on display (page 2)
Underlining the drive towards creating a ‘small but elite’ army, special forces made their first appearance in a public parade. The PLA has special-forces detachments deployed in every military region, available to be deployed rapidly to any potential hotspot. In addition, a naval infantry formation in the parade was drawn from the Submarine College in Qingdao, highlighting the increasing prominence of China’s submarine force in its strategic thinking.
The one significant addition was a land version of the DH-10 Long Sword land-attack cruise missile, which made its first public appearance. Believed to have a range of around 4,000km, the DH-10 has advanced guidance technology, including inertial-navigational, global-positioning and terrain-comparison systems. It can search independently for targets while maintaining a low-level ‘sea-skimming’ flight path. The DH-10 is part of the PLA’s area-denial/precision-strike package, and currently arms a missile brigade based in Yunnan province.
The combination of ship- and ground-launched missiles of various payloads and ranges offers real strategic depth to the PLA for the first time. While the absence of both the DF-41 ICBM and the latest JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile suggested that this was not a point that China wished to emphasise, it was clear from the parade that China could use missile forces to compensate, at least temporarily, for a lack of power-projection capabilities. The missile forces fill the gap by providing area-denial and precision-strike capabilities over both the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
Confidence in the air
Instead of the traditional long-range bombers, the aerial flypast accompanying this year’s parade was led by the air force’s new generation of airborne warning-and-control system (AWACS) aircraft. The KJ-2000 and KJ-200 AWACS aircraft have been in service for several years, but were only publicly acknowledged shortly before the 2009 parade. PLA commentators have declared that a single KJ-2000 is equivalent to 7–8 ground-based radar stations in terms of combat and operational effectiveness. The aircraft allow the air force to operate with increasing confidence and to move away from a reactive, static defensive posture and towards one of more active defence. This means that the PLA air force possesses more flexibility to choose the airspace in which to operate, instead of merely reacting to airborne incursions.
The combat aircraft that flew over the parade contained no surprises: J-8, J-10 and J-11 multi-role fighters. However, the presence of H-6U tankers, taken together with recent air force/navy mid-air refuelling exercises conducted over the South China Sea, gave a clear signal to China’s neighbours of its increasing aerial power-projection capabilities. The PLA’s improving air-defence capacity was illustrated not only by its aircraft, but also by numerous surface-to-air (SAM) and ship-to-air missiles on display in the mechanised formations. The SAM and radar formations demonstrated the improvement in China’s air-defence network. The newest of these weapons, such as the HQ-16 SAM, have been designed to be modular and possess all-weather, all-direction and multi-directional interception capabilities, as well as being able to resist electronic counter-measures (ECM). Taiwanese experts commenting on the parade expressed doubts as to whether the Taiwanese Air Force could operate at all against such an extensive array of air-defence assets.
The message to be taken from the parade was that the air force is increasingly confident both in its aircraft and in its air-defence network. As it focuses on achieving air superiority, the latest fighters such as the J-10 and J-11 are being integrated into a command-and-control network, which will be directed from AWACS aircraft rather than from the ground. However, the lack of a capable helicopter arm was evident, and this will restrict battlefield air support for ground forces. Naval-aviation assets are meanwhile aimed at assault capabilities, with the JH-7A able to perform low-level anti-shipping attacks as well as ECM ‘growler’ missions. These factors, combined with mid-air refuelling, demonstrate China’s strategic shift from a defensive posture to active defence – with the potential, for example, to mount long-range fighter patrols and to develop anti-shipping strike capabilities as a means of protecting what China sees as its territorial concerns in the South China Sea.
Transparency
Washington has repeatedly criticised China for a lack of transparency in its military establishment. In this context, the 2009 parade was truly surprising. Model numbers of the paraded equipment were shown, even including those of missiles in the previously mysterious Second Artillery force. This too was a sign of the PLA’s growing confidence, along with a wish not to be seen as opaque or threatening by its neighbours. The emphasis of China’s military modernisation has clearly switched away from the domestic issue of reforming ground forces, and is now looking outwards. As it pursues projects such as its aircraft-carrier building programme, as well as continued developments in space technology, China’s next step is likely to be to seek to provide the PLA with battlefield dominance and the country with regional power-projection capabilities.
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