Ethnic strife in Xianjiang (page 3)
While many Uighurs have accepted a degree of assimilation, or reacted with indifference to China’s presence, some have adopted a more forceful response. In 1990, a group of Uighurs overran the city of Barin and declared self-rule. The response was a full-scale military assault that left hundreds dead and thousands injured. In 1995, 1996 and 1997 riots broke out in the cities of Hetian, Aksu and Yining and in 1997 bus bombs exploded in Urumqi, causing several deaths.
The likely culprit for the bomb attack was the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an organisation that has subsequently been linked to al-Qaeda and some of whose cadres have been based in al-Qaeda camps
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan.
Implications
International reactions to the security crackdown in Urumqi were muted, due in part to the willingness of Chinese authorities to allow foreign journalists rapid and relatively unrestricted access to the areas affected. There was little criticism from Islamic countries, many of whose governments have lucrative commercial relationships with China. Only Iran and Turkey publicly criticised the Chinese response; Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan likened China’s behaviour to genocide and suggested that the issue be referred to the United Nations Security Council. The reaction on Islamist websites, especially those closely aligned with al-Qaeda’s jihadist ideology, was more vociferous. There were reports that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, an Algerian-based terrorist group affiliated to al-Qaeda, had declared its intention to target Chinese nationals working in Algeria, a threat Beijing appeared to take seriously.
The events cast an interesting light on China’s power dynamic and decision-making processes. Although significant numbers of PLA and PAP troops are deployed in Xinjiang, their role is primarily border defence and they are neither trained nor equipped for riot control. The police were the first line of defence, and their ineffectual response to the riots suggested a lack of leadership, morale and training. Only after Hu returned from Italy were substantial contingents of riot-trained PAP flown in from other parts of the country to restore public order. There was speculation that in Hu’s absence, some hardline leaders were advocating the use of the PLA to suppress the riots, which would have resulted in a far larger number of casualties. It was also suggested that Premier Wen Jiabao lacked the personal authority to deploy the PAP.
Hu has had to walk a fine line between providing the strong and effective response demanded by an indignant Han Chinese population, who have shown no readiness to acknowledge Uighur grievances, and sustaining China’s carefully crafted policies for dealing with national minorities. The issue is personally sensitive for Hu since the current policy towards Tibet and Xinjiang of a firm approach to security with a focus on economic development is one with which he has been closely associated; Wang Lequan owes his position to Hu’s patronage; and Hu’s key ideological contribution to Marxist–Leninist thought has been the concept of the harmonious society (hexie shehui). This concept was more concerned with ensuring that growing disparities in wealth did not give rise to social disorder, about which China’s leadership has always been worried and which has been on the rise in recent years. The incident was an uncomfortable reminder to Beijing that there are numerous factors impinging on social stability.
While it is unlikely that any of China’s minorities is ever going to be in a position to threaten the stability of the Chinese state, current minority policies have clearly not succeeded as its leadership would have hoped. However, a change of tack is not on the cards, at least while the current generation of leaders remains in office.
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