Ethnic strife in Xianjiang (page 2)
However, since few Han Chinese were prepared to live in a region seen as remote and barbarous, only 7% of the population were ethnic Han, the remainder being predominantly Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighur, as well as Kazakhs and Hui (Chinese-speaking ethnic Han who had converted to Islam).
Though containing large tracts of desert, Xinjiang produces substantial quantities of cotton and other agricultural produce. It has become an increasingly important source of oil, gas and coal, and could be an important transit route for oil and gas pipelines from neighbouring Central Asian republics. China’s nuclear-test facilities are situated in Xinjiang at the Lop Nor test site. Economic considerations apart, Xinjiang must be seen within the context of the Chinese Communist Party’s commitment to achieving national reunification.
supplementing conventional forces if required. The XPCC – known colloquially as bingtuan – employs some 2.5 million people and accounts for nearly 15% of the region’s economic activity.
Communal relations
The Chinese government’s approach towards Xinjiang’s majority Uighur population has oscillated between relative tolerance of their customs, religion and language, and periods of enforced assimilation during which the use of the Uighur language and the practice of Islam have been banned, as happened during China’s decade-long Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Since then conditions have been eased, with the use of the Uighur language allowed in schools – though this is now being phased out in favour of Mandarin – and a degree of religious freedom permitted. This does not, however, extend to national-minority officials and students who are, for example, not permitted to fast during Ramadan.
In common with other national minorities, Uighurs are exempt from the one-child policy and afforded preferential access to tertiary education, which generates resentment among Han Chinese. There has always been an underlying assumption that Uighur culture was inferior and that Uighurs required ‘guidance’ – implicitly towards the higher level of development represented by Han Chinese culture. Although Xinjiang is formally autonomous and Uighur and other minority officials are involved in administering the region, in practice the degree of autonomy is severely limited and the key administrators, including the party secretary, are invariably Han Chinese.
The Han Chinese presence was previously limited largely to military personnel living in camps, and communal tensions were minimised by the fact that the two communities seldom came into contact. But since the early 1990s a key part of China’s policy for dealing with Xinjiang and Tibet has been to alter the demographic balance by encouraging Han Chinese to emigrate from more impoverished areas of China. The population of Xinjiang is now 40% Han and 45% Uighur, and in Urumqi the population is 90% Han and 10% Uighur. The other element in Beijing’s strategy has been a relentless focus on economic growth and infrastructural development. While this has brought undoubted benefits, there is a widespread perception that most new opportunities have gone to the Han immigrants, leaving the Uighurs feeling marginalised. Modernisation has shown little sensitivity towards Uighur culture, a notable example being the current demolition of the traditional Uighur quarter in the border city of Kashgar to make way for modern housing.
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