While emphasising that any such transfers would pose a serious threat to the US and be met with a commensurate response, the US also sought to make clear that it could never have normal diplomatic relations without denuclearisation.
The US administration indicated in early June that it would pursue a new and tougher approach, eschewing incentives that would ‘reward provocation’, and considering ways to interdict North Korean shipments without provoking a broader conflict. North Korea has repeatedly threatened that any effort to stop its ships would be an act of war.
Despite the non-mandatory nature of some provisions, the resolution goes considerably beyond the sanctions that were imposed, but never implemented, after North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has discussed overturning last year’s removal of North Korea from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, although the State Department earlier said that North Korea’s recent provocations did not meet the legal requirement for such a move. Pre-emptive military action is unlikely because it would incur thousands of casualties through retaliatory attacks against Seoul. Nevertheless, Gates has made clear that the US would seek to shoot down any North Korean missiles aimed at the US or its allies.
What next?
In response, North Korea threatened to weaponise the plutonium from its remaining spent fuel rods and to start enriching uranium to make more nuclear weapons. Pyongyang also appears to be preparing to test an intercontinental ballistic missile, with a missile moved to a new test site in Dongchang-ri on the west coast. Separately, the country may fire more mid-range No-dong missiles from its east-coast sites. Other potential escalation options include maritime skirmishes with South Korea, holding more South Koreans hostage in Kaesong and offering dual-use nuclear technology to a country such as Myanmar.
Signs have also been detected that North Korea is preparing another nuclear test. It is sometimes jocularly suggested that the more nuclear tests the country conducts, the better, since each reduces its plutonium stockpile. Each test, however, can significantly improve North Korea’s ability to produce a deliverable weapon. At this stage, the quality of the device is more important than the quantity of plutonium.
It is difficult to determine how much plutonium North Korea used in its two nuclear tests, and exactly how much it had before them. However, it could now possess 4–8 weapons' worth of separated plutonium. It will take six months or more to restore the 5MWe Yongbyon nuclear reactor, but North Korea says it has already begun separating more weapons-usable plutonium from the reactor’s 8,000 spent fuel rods. This should produce 8kg by October, which the leadership may decide would give it the margin for at least one more nuclear test this year. An enrichment programme of the size North Korea appeared to have started in the late 1990s could in theory produce another weapon’s worth of fissile material a year, but it is uncertain whether Pyongyang could have procured the necessary equipment for such a programme.
US Special Representative on the DPRK Stephen Bosworth predicts North Korea will come to realise that dialogue is in its best interests and will return to the Six-Party Talks when its leadership succession is resolved. However, chances for this do not look good in the immediate future. Even if talks eventually resume, they will be back at square one on the denuclearisation issue.
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