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Strategic Comments  – Volume 15, Issue 4 – May 2009

The drones of war (page 2) 

 

When ground forces request a capability such as FMV during an operation, the CAOC decides if that can best be met by Reaper. Forward-deployed Reapers taking off and landing at Kandahar are operated on a ‘pool basis’, that is shared between UK and US aircrews, with weapons provided from USAF stocks.

 

Among the sensors deployed on the MQ-9 Reaper is the Lynx Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). This provides an all-weather, day-or-night capability that is used to cross-cue a sensor ball that houses colour/monochrome day-light TV, low-light, image-intensified TV and infrared cameras with moving-target capability. 
 

 
Crews talk directly to Kandahar and to Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTACs) on the ground in theatre. Meanwhile, the video from each imaging sensor can be viewed as separate video streams or fused with the infrared sensor video into the Rover (Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver) laptop computer. This displays the same video image to the JTAC as the crews see in Creech.

 

A laser range finder/designator provides the capability to precisely designate targets for laser-guided munitions. The aircraft is also equipped with a colour nose camera, generally used by the pilot for flight control.

‘Flying drones from a ground control centre northwest of
Las Vegas has been likened to ‘commuting to combat’. Despite this, the air crews consider themselves to be completely emotionally involved’

 

Reaper crews are becoming very familiar with way Afghans go about their daily business. Because they do not have to rotate in and out of theatre every few months, UCAV crews on three-year tours in Nevada are well placed to tell when something unusual is happening in a village or along a road that they have been monitoring for months.

 

Firing weapons from a Reaper involves the same process as for conventional aircraft. Under standard NATO clearance to fire, ‘cleared hot’ means that the ground commander understands the effects of the weapon to be fired and has the right target coordinates and the full picture on any nearby friendly forces.

 

Reaper aircrew, supported by intelligence analysts sitting behind them, work with both JTAC and the ground commander to ensure that they have positive identification of the target site. If they are not satisfied, the Reaper crew won’t drop – they usually have time to go round again. Although American and British personnel are tasked within the coalition, they work to national rules of engagement.

 

As an indication of UAVs’ increasing military use, 42 AS amassed 4,722 flying hours during the year to 1 October 2008. During that time, they assisted in 113 instances of ‘Troops in Contact’ – double the number of combat operations they were involved in the previous year. Over 18 months, the RAF’s 39 Squadron flew 3,800 hours and 391 missions.

 

Both units have thwarted IED (improvised explosive device) ambushes. They have also made a significant difference to offensive operations. Over-all, US Air Force UCAVs have made about 365 strikes in the last two years, which averages one every two days. This means that only around 2.5% of US Reaper sorties fired weapons; the remaining 97.5% of missions involved looking at the ground, watching over convoys and acting as eyes and ears over settlements, looking for the abnormal.

 

Commuting to combat

Both 42AS and 39 Squadron are 8,000 miles from the theatre of operations, and not in any physical danger. For this reason, UCAV flying has been likened to ‘commuting to combat from northwest Las Vegas’. Despite this, the crews consider themselves completely involved. Each four-aircraft CAP system requires 30 personnel to support it around the clock, and operators say they do feel as though they are on the front line. As one weapons-system operator put it: ’In the way we deploy weapons, you actually see the delivery of the bomb to the bitter end ... so we are definitely emotionally involved.’ UCAV operations are dependent on skilled tri-service personnel, some with on-the-ground operational experience, who try to ensure that any strike is accurate, proportionate and avoids civilian casualties.

 

Today’s Predators and Reapers can only operate in a benign environment where the opposition has no air-defence capability. The reported shooting down of seven Georgian drones over Abkhazia in April and May 2008 showed that UAVs are not appropriate in all campaigns.

 

A jet-powered Predator C, designed to operate within contested airspace, made its maiden flight in April 2009. However, such a capability involves substantial extra costs, as would other enhancements like defensive-aids suites. An automatic take-off and land capability, plus a more accurate laser altimeter, might have prevented the USAF’s loss of 12 Predators and Reapers in landing accidents. However, the more sophisticated UAVs become, the smaller their cost advantage over piloted aircraft will become.

 

For the foreseeable future, cruise missiles and piloted aircraft will continue to execute some missions more effectively than UAVs. This indicates that the best military air option will be a mix of all three

 

 

 

  

  

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Wider ethical debate

Sending robots into war conjures up futuristic images; it has also raised some ethical concerns, particularly from human-rights groups. Remotely piloted aircraft are a cost-effective alternative for militaries to target enemies without risking their own pilots’ lives. With precision targetting and increased ’hover’ time – a Predator/Reaper crew can watch a potential target for hours to check that civilians are not present, in a way that pilots in an aircraft’s cockpit cannot – UAVs are designed to reduce civilian casualties in heavily populated areas.

 

However, civilian casualties do occur. Thus the United States’ use of drones over Pakistan (see box, page 1) and Afghanistan has proved controversial, as has Israel’s operation of UAVs over Lebanon and Gaza.

 

Furthermore, while UAVs provide their operators with greater protection, they embark on otherwise risky missions. This has caused some fears that the use of drone weapons could eventually lead the military to become more ‘cavalier’.

 

Analyst P. W. Singer has described the drones as having ’an incredible effect’, but in his book on future conflict, Wired for War, he also notes that some Pakistani and Afghani militants see the use of drones as a sign of US unwillingness to lose more troops in combat.