alliance security at the summit that might well serve as the tasking document for the strategic concept. However, the secretary-general insists the declaration should be a simple, short one that signals a new concept but mostly serves to reconfirm NATO’s core purpose. Member governments insist the declaration should not pre-empt the strategic concept.
While there is a consensus that a new concept is necessary to reflect the changing international environment and NATO’s activities, there is no agreement on how fundamental the rethink should be. The UK is willing to take the existing strategic concept apart completely, before deciding what is salvageable. Judging by a speech given at Munich in early February 2009 by Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung, Germany sees a new strategic concept as more evolutionary than revolutionary.
Germany’s accent on renewal, rather than a more radical approach, reflects the view that the most important function of the strategic concept is to forge a new consensus among NATO allies about the alliance’s fundamental role and mission. This is particularly so because this will be the first strategic concept written after NATO enlargement to central and eastern Europe.
France and the UK are increasingly aligned in a push for a NATO that is ‘fit for purpose’ by improving European allies’ capabilities. The reintegration of France would create a further opportunity to push the transformation agenda.
Since the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the issue of capabilities has been complicated by the need to find the appropriate balance between NATO’s collective defence tasks under Article 5 and its out-of-area operations. The argument that both types of mission would today require essentially the same capabilities and that NATO allies therefore need to maintain an expeditionary mindset was voiced by the British defence minister, John Hutton, recently when he said: ‘The notion that providing security outside NATO’s boundaries somehow competes with or detracts from our responsibilities in this respect is misguided.’
However, this view does not go unchallenged by those arguing for a refocus on territorial defence. Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich has said that after the Russia–Georgia war ‘the likelihood of a local conflict in which Poland could be embroiled has increased’.
This means the April summit will see a particular effort to reassure Eastern European allies that NATO’s
Article 5 obligations remain valid. A recent British initiative to set up a standing rapid-reaction force of some 3,000 troops for territorial-defence purposes would fall into this category. There is no consensus among NATO for such a move, but the initiative did gain some traction at the Krakow meeting.
Relations with Russia
Another important matter for debate at the April summit is the future of NATO–Russia relations. There was a breakdown of trust after the Georgian war in summer 2008, when meetings of the NATO–Russia Council were suspended. Eastern European allies in particular were quick to point to the council’s failure during the crisis. By contrast, France, Germany and the US apparently believe that Russia and NATO need each other. They argue that trust can be rebuilt through pragmatic cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan, counter-narcotics policy, counter-terrorism, arms control and Iran’s nuclear programme.
The broad offer by US Vice President Biden in February to reset the relationship was widely welcomed. At the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels on 5 March, a decision was reached to resume formal NATO–Russia Council meetings as soon as possible after the April summit. The success of this move will depend on defining a pragmatic agenda focused on problem-solving rather than high-flying rhetoric.
Although NATO will confirm its open-door policy with regards to further enlargement, membership for Georgia and Ukraine is now on the back burner. There is no appetite among allies for a detailed discussion on enlargement beyond the Balkan countries that have already been invited to join. NATO will insist on its decision-making autonomy when it comes to enlargement. However, the view that enlargement is not an end in itself and that any expansion of the alliance has to be in NATO’s strategic interest is now more pronounced.
The task for NATO heads of state and government as they gather in France and Germany is not easy. The summit’s hosts seem determined to use the symbolism of the alliance’s 60th anniversary to foster unity and a new consensus on major strategic questions.
Nonetheless, divisions seem sure to emerge once the conversation moves to substantive issues. The argument over Afghanistan crystallises many underlying differences – from burden sharing, the importance of a comprehensive approach and the balance between collective defence and international crisis management to NATO–Russia relations. Therefore, there is more likely to be moderate progress at the summit than any major breakthrough.
This article was updated on 12 March 2009 to include French President Nicolas Sarkozy's announcement on 11 March that France would return to NATO's integrated military structure. The first published version is found in the PDF to the right.
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