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Strategic Comments  – Volume 15, Issue 2 – March 2009

NATO's 60th birthday

Alliance views its future cautiously

   

© NATO
National flags flutter outside NATO headquarters in Brussels

When NATO allies gather on 3–4 April for their 2009 summit in Strasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany, they will need to strike the right balance between symbolism and substance. The alliance’s 60th birthday is cause for celebration, but NATO faces difficult challenges in charting its future.


The two hosts, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, have argued that the meeting must be more than a birthday party. However, it will be squeezed between the G20 London Summit on stability, growth and jobs on 2 April and a European Union–United States summit, organised by the Czech Republic as the current EU presidency holder, which US President Barack Obama is set to attend on 5 April in Prague.

NATO will only have a working dinner and a morning session to deal with a crowded agenda, compared with two days for the 2008 summit in Bucharest. The logistical challenge of convening on both sides of the Franco-German border, a first for NATO summits, will not make this any easier.

French reintegration

At least one anticipated point on the agenda was previewed earlier, when Sarkozy announced in Paris on 11 March that his country would return to NATO’s integrated military structure, 43 years after Charles de Gaulle withdrew citing concerns over French sovereignty. The French National Assembly is to debate and vote on Sarkozy’s policy before the summit and, if it is agreed as expected, the president will formalise the decision in a letter to NATO.

 

Sarkozy previously made clear that any such move needed to be part of a larger bargain, involving US support
for a stronger security and defence role for the EU, progress towards this within the EU and an adequate representation of France in NATO’s command structure.

 

US Vice President Joseph Biden seemed to have fulfilled the first condition by announcing support for a stronger European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) during a speech in early February, thus echoing statements made by the outgoing US administration in 2008.

 

Progress on the second point is more mixed. Sarkozy can claim that during the French EU presidency in the second half of 2008 ESDP was refocused on the issue of improving capabilities. However, French pet projects, such as an autonomous EU military headquarters, are still out of reach. It seems that the French government has secured US backing for France to take over NATO’s Allied Command Transformation and the NATO Joint Headquarters in Lisbon if France were to reintegrate fully.

 

Thus, on balance, Sarkozy can claim his conditions have been met. Still, his decision represents a sea change in French policy and, despite the backing of Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Defence Minister Hervé Morin, met with some domestic criticism. Opponents both within Sarkozy’s Gaullist Pary and the opposition Socialists have seen NATO reintegration as a chance to portray the president as selling out to the US.

 

The arrival of Barack Obama on the NATO circuit will heighten the perception of a new beginning for transatlantic relations. The idea that the new US administration will pay greater attention to allies’ views has improved the NATO atmosphere.

Given that Obama’s administration has had little time to organise itself before the 2009 summit, there has been relatively little steer from Washington, other than to insist there must be a substantive discussion, in particular about Afghanistan. America’s announcement that it will deploy an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’s appearance at the informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Krakow on 19–20 February have indicated the new priorities of NATO’s dominant member.

The reinforcement of US troops – with the prospect of another 13,000 once the current review of the US Afghanistan strategy is complete – increases pressure on European allies to raise their own commitments. However, it seems unlikely that the Obama team will present a shopping list at the summit. Instead of looking for a specific number of troops from European partners, its view is that Europeans should volunteer to do more rather than wait to be asked.

Contributions across the board, including civilian and financial, are seen as equally important, although there is special emphasis on training Afghan security forces. Thus, while the Obama administration insists Europeans should do more, it is leaving it to Europeans to decide what precisely they can do.

This stance partially reflects the new tone in transatlantic relations, but it is mostly born of the realisation that large numbers of extra European troops will simply not be forthcoming, and that NATO needs to better foster a comprehensive approach.

A priority for 2009 is to provide security during the Afghan elections scheduled for 20 August (a date that Afghan President Hamid Karzai now seems to have accepted). Several allies have begun to clarify their intentions. Germany announced it would send some 600 additional troops, using most of the remaining allotment under the 4,500-troop ceiling set by the existing parliamentary mandate. Italy announced it would send another 500. Poland said it would be unable to send more soldiers but would restructure its contingent to reduce support troops and increase frontline personnel. France, for the time being, has no plans to send additional troops. The UK has insisted that it is up to its partners to come forward and has aggressively pushed the argument that burdens must be shared. However, it too could yet announce an increase in troops for election support.

 

 

 

 

 

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NATO’s 60th birthday
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