Washington sets priorities for 2010
Despite the passage of Iraq’s election law on 6 December 2009, and signs of improvement in security and oil policy, Iraq remains a fragile state that could yet slip backwards. The United States still has a key role to play in the ‘transition to full Iraqi sovereignty’. But as American troops withdraw, Washington will have to rely on diplomacy rather than military power in Iraq.
The difficulty of the Council of Representatives in reaching agreement on the election law, which is intended to grant equitable representation to Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish parties in a newly enlarged parliament, has shown that deep political tensions persist among the country’s principal groups. The threat of terrorism remains high, including from al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, former Iraqi Ba’athists and other groups, as evidenced by the terrorist bombings on 19 August 2009, 25 October 2009 and 8 December 2009, which combined killed more than 370 and wounded over 1,000 Iraqis.
Iraq will elect a new Council of Representatives in national elections to be held on 7 March 2010. Most critical for Iraqi sovereignty is the effective participation of both Sunni and Kurdish parties in the post-election Iraqi government. Also vital is agreement on a hydrocarbons law in order to increase oil production, boost economic development and expand energy ties with Turkey. Meanwhile, the convening of a regional security conference involving Iraq’s neighbours would help to secure their constructive engagement in Iraq’s transition.
The SOFA and Strategic Framework
The US–Iraq postwar relationship rests upon two bilateral agreements signed on 17 November 2008. The first, known as the ‘Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq’ or the US–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), committed US combat forces to leave Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009, which was done, and for all US forces to withdraw from Iraq by 31 December 2011. As of December 2009, there were approximately 115,000 US troops in Iraq. It remains to be seen how the drawdown will affect national security: it will either be proof of the self-sufficiency of the Iraqi security forces (now numbering approximately 645,000 and consisting of armed forces, police, national guard and border patrol), or a catalyst for more violence if they are not up to the task.
The second is the ‘Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq’, which aspires to lay the foundations for a long-term relationship between Washington and Baghdad across many sectors. It outlines a wide-ranging agenda for political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, energy, health, environment, information-technology, communications, law-enforcement and judicial cooperation. While the SOFA is taken as as the basis for defence and security cooperation, the Strategic Framework prevents the US from using ‘Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries’. It also states that the US must not ‘seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq’
Obama strategy
Following on from these agreements, on 27 February 2009 US President Barack Obama announced that in response to an improved security situation he would launch a new three-part strategy ‘to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi sovereignty’.
Firstly, as a complement to the withdrawal of US forces, the US will retain a ‘transitional force’ of 35–50,000 troops to train, equip and advise Iraqi security forces (‘as long as they remain non-sectarian’); to conduct targeted counter-terrorism operations; and to protect US civilian and military personnel. In addition to the SOFA deadlines, Obama promised to end the US combat mission in Iraq by 31 August 2010.
Secondly, the US will pursue ‘sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq’ including providing support for national elections; more effective local government; improved Iraqi institutions with regard to the rule of law, delivery of services and combating corruption; and assistance for displaced citizens.
Thirdly, the US will undertake a regional strategy under which Iraq is a ‘full partner in a regional dialogue’ that includes US engagement with Iran and Syria. There is a great deal of room for development on this front. Iraq’s neighbours could do more to support Iraq’s transition. The US has encouraged Arab countries to send ambassadors to Baghdad and to renegotiate Iraq’s debt obligations. But strained US relations with Syria and Iran have hindered efforts to persuade them to play more constructive roles in Iraq, including ceasing their support for terrorist groups operating there.
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