Obama's war in Afghanistan (page 2)
Three elements, four pillars
The outcome of Obama’s policy review represented a strong endorsement of the commander’s August assessment. ‘The status quo is not sustainable’, the president said. The Taliban had been able to take ‘swaths’ of Afghan territory, and its momentum needed to be reversed. Obama outlined three ‘core elements’ of his strategy: ‘a military effort to create the conditions for a transition [to Afghan responsibility]; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan’.
McChrystal also called for a change in ISAF’s ‘operational culture’ so that the principal purpose of operations would be to aid stability while protecting Afghans from violence, corruption and coercion – in other words, the goal was stability rather than simply to gain military advantage through ‘kinetic’ action. In addition, McChrystal demanded unity of effort and command.
Progress has already been achieved in some of these areas. Military officers had expressed dismay that in the doom-laden debate surrounding Obama’s review, fuelled partly by rising casualties, gains made on the ground were not being recognised. The arrival of 20,000 American troops earlier dispatched by Obama has made a crucial difference in the south, where the most intense fighting takes place. Several operations have been launched against Taliban-held areas, with much greater focus than previously on achieving stability and reconstruction once territory has been secured. In intense fighting, deaths and injuries caused by Taliban-laid improvised explosive devices have risen, but most such devices are being discovered and disarmed.
At the same time, ISAF’s command structure has been reorganised to become more effective. Day-to-day operations are run from a headquarters under US Lieutenant-General David Rodriguez. Organisational steps have been taken to unify ISAF practices and to provide coordinated advice on civilian issues to regional commanders. Among other advances, ISAF nations operating in the south are sharing intelligence, including biometric data on insurgents. Meanwhile, the Afghan National Army has been increasingly involved in operations, and the training of recruits is being stepped up in smart new facilities.
Further operations are expected to be launched in Taliban strongholds such as the districts of Marjeh, Sangin and Zhari-Panjwai, and there is likely to be a particular effort to improve security in the city of Kandahar. While seeking to improve security in more heavily populated areas, ISAF has meanwhile abandoned many far-flung mountain outposts where its soldiers had little impact and risked simply being targets.
Daunting challenges
However, military operations are only one of the building blocks. Key to Obama’s approach is the transfer of responsibility to Afghans, enabling the withdrawal of foreign combat troops. For this to happen in an orderly manner:
Afghanistan’s security forces need considerable development. While there has been progress in the army, there is a long way to go, including the recruitment and retention of more Pashtuns from the south. The police and border police have large problems that have not yet been addressed.
Civilian reconstruction efforts must improve. This has been problematic because of inadequate security, resources and coordination, and because of the lack of legitimacy and poor governance of the Afghan government. Karzai, inaugurated for a second term in November following the flawed election, has given assurances on reducing corruption, but given his record there is scepticism about his ability to achieve this. Success will also require close coordination between the government, the UN and aid agencies. While Obama spoke of a ‘civilian surge’, those military commanders looking for details of such a plan to back up their efforts will have been disappointed. Hopes will now be pinned on an international meeting due to be held in London on 28 January.
Taliban fighters must be reintegrated. While the ISAF strategy seeks to create the conditions for persuading insurgents to give up the fight, this is viewed as essentially being a matter for Afghans, especially given the complex tribal and multi-ethnic nature of Afghan society. While it is reasonable to hope that some who joined the insurgency for money rather than ideology can be tempted back, it must be recognised that the Taliban’s call to drive foreigners from Afghan soil is very powerful.
Efforts against extremists in Pakistan must be stepped up. Foreign governments are acutely aware of the dangers posed by the rise in extremism in nuclear-armed Pakistan. Yet their scope for action is limited because this is a matter for the Pakistani government. The Pakistani army has launched campaigns against militant groups in Swat and Waziristan, but not against the Afghan Taliban whose leadership continues to operate in Quetta and the surrounding areas. The US has stepped up air strikes from unmanned aircraft. Without further progress there will continue to be a flow of militants into Afghanistan – and the problem that originally brought the West to Afghanistan will still not have been dealt with. It was significant that in early December Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, explicitly called on Islamabad to do more to root out al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, both believed to be in Pakistan.
Obama’s agreement to a temporary troop surge – and the new military strategy which he has backed – provides an opportunity to reverse the tide in Afghanistan, and to create the conditions for these substantial challenges to be met. But the argument about whether his approach is the right one will continue.
1 | 2
<Previous
