However, during the Manchester trial it was revealed that Habib Ahmed had several address books with the telephone numbers of prominent al-Qaeda members in invisible ink, given to him for safe-keeping by Rangzieb Ahmed. These demonstrated Rangzieb's role as a key interlocutor between the al-Qaeda core in Pakistan and UK extremists.
The Praline case
While formed in the UK and involving British citizens, these groups might not have achieved the same impact without external direction from Pakistan and a network to get them there. In terms of Islamist terrorism in the UK, they can be seen as 'first-generation' groups.
By contrast, a group whose trial ended in August 2008 arguably represented a more autonomous model, echoing the 'system, not organisation' (nizam, la tanzim) methodology advocated by jihadist ideologue Abu Musab al-Suri in his 2006 online publication 'Global Islamic Resistance Call'. The highly dispersed nature of this group, for which the police code name was Praline, appears to fit the al-Suri model for 'global jihad'.
weapons, suicide vests and 'martyrdom' videos. Examination of their mobile-phone memories led British police to arrest men in London, including Moroccan diplomat's son Younis Tsouli.
Police only later realised that Tsouli was the notorious online jihadist known as Irhabi007 (terrorist007). Much lauded by online extremists for his abilities as a hacker and disseminator of extremist material, he funded his activities using stolen credit-card numbers. Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (Iraq) had asked him to organise translation of magazines and websites, as well as to release videos. Examination of Tsouli's computer alerted police to a broader network of aspiring and actual online jihadist extremists.
As they investigated, arrested and charged mostly young, second-generation South Asian men in several countries in the months after Tsouli's arrest, they were eventually led to Aabid Khan.
His arrest came after two men were detained in March 2006 in the US state of Georgia and charged with planning attacks in the US, seeking training at madrassas in South Asia and meeting conspirators in Canada. Seventeen people were then arrested in Canada on suspicion of establishing a training camp in Toronto, planning explosions and plotting to kill the prime minister.
Meanwhile in England, police arrested Yassin Nassari for possessing terrorist training manuals and rocket-making instructions. In Scotland, Mohammed Atif Siddique was arrested as he was about to board a flight to Pakistan for jihadi training. Nassari was on Tsouli's online 'buddy' list, and transcripts of online discussions indicated Khan had recruited and dispatched Siddique to Pakistan. Khan was arrested in June 2006, on his arrival from Pakistan at Manchester Airport, and later convicted of possessing terror-related documents.
During his trial it emerged that Khan acted as a global 'emir' for this group, trawling chat rooms for prospective recruits. Little face-to-face contact took place, although Khan visited Pakistan and Canada to meet members. His initial plan was to bring together six to 12 'brothers' in Toronto, who would then undertake jihadi training in Pakistan. Their targets in the West were unclear, though many plots were discussed online. Khan claimed to have established links in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province with the militant groups Jaysh-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Tayiba.
The youth and technical sophistication of the 'Praline' plotters was notable. Khan was 22 when arrested; the group's youngest member was 16. Unlike the 'first-generation' groups, the 'Praline' members were geographically dispersed and from different backgrounds.
While mostly recruited online, many had probably started down the path of radicalisation before coming into contact with Khan. Some were tasked to undertake jihadi training in Pakistan; others were directed to conduct covert surveillance on possible US targets. Khan himself sought ingredients for explosives and was observed conducting surveillance on security vans.
More worrying developments
A potentially more disturbing case was that of Bilal Abdullah, the British-born Iraqi doctor who was convicted in 2008 of trying to car-bomb central London and Glasgow International Airport, with now-deceased co-conspirator Kafeel Ahmed. The trial evidence suggested that Abdullah and Ahmed had developed a plot and attempted to carry it out with no external direction – a worrying development for the security services as such autonomous groups are almost impossible to penetrate or track before they emerge to carry out an attack.
The emergence of these new-style groups may indicate that al-Qaeda is reappraising a strategy which has delivered no tangible results in Western countries for three years. Even if these changes in approach are not part of a conscious effort by al-Qaeda, the new structures seem to provide a more secure format from which to attempt attacks.
Whether or not the 'Praline' network and Abdullah case indicate an evolution to a new kind of terrorist plot, they serve as a reminder of the continuing appeal of al-Qaeda's jihadist ideology, the adaptability of terrorist groups and the skill with which they have exploited globalisation and the Internet.
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