On the first day of operations, Georgian air-defence systems destroyed four Russian aircraft – a Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bomber and three Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft. This meant that Russian aviation was all but absent from the combat zone on 9 August, although it reappeared on 10 August.
The Russian air force flew around 200 sorties during the five-day conflict. The lack of night-vision equipment meant that it operated mostly during the day, while the Georgian air force was able to operate at night as well. Adding aircraft rumoured to be lost (see table, above right), plus those damaged beyond repair, the Russian air force’s total losses could have exceeded ten aircraft.
Ultimately, the Georgian air-defence systems in South Ossetia were destroyed by Russian infantry detachments, which captured at least six Buk-M1 and five Osa-AK or Osa-AKM self-propelled anti-aircraft systems abandoned by the retreating Georgian army. Russian pilots had never rehearsed the disablement of air-defence systems, largely because this had not been required during the conflicts in Chechnya.
Problems in suppressing enemy air-defence forces meant the Russian air force was unable to provide direct support to its own troops. Even by 11 August, Russia had not completely achieved air dominance, and Georgian aircraft were still attacking Russian troops and Tskhinvali. The urgent need to modernise the air force may thus be one of the main lessons for Russian military command to take away from the recent conflict.
Georgia’s collapse
The main limitation of the Georgian army was psychological. After approximately 72 hours of combat, during which Georgian officers and soldiers displayed a decent level of battle-readiness, there came a sudden and total demoralisation on 11 August.
This was shown not just by the retreat itself, but by the abandonment of operational military equipment and weapons. Georgian troops appear to have lacked combat experience and to have been shocked at Russia’s response. Georgian casualties were officially estimated at 295 killed, including 186 military personnel and 109 civilians, with up to 1,500 wounded.
The heaviest casualties were suffered by the Georgian army’s 4th brigade (the former Interior Ministry troops), which carried out the main mission of capturing Tskhinvali. The 2nd and 3rd brigades, which provided support for the 4th brigade, suffered only minor losses, as did the Special Operations forces. The 1st brigade, which had been deployed in Iraq, did not suffer any losses.
Russia declared casualties of 71 killed and 340 wounded, many of them among the peacekeeping troops stationed in South Ossetia at the time of the initial Georgian attack on Tskhinvali. The Russians seized up to 150 pieces of Georgian heavy weaponry, including 65 T-72 tanks (44 of them operational), 15 infantry fighting vehicles, several dozen APCs and numerous pieces of artillery. Russia captured many motorised transport vehicles and large quantities of small arms, including American M4 carbines.
In the port of Poti, Russian marines also burnt out the largest ships of the Georgian navy – the Dioskuria, Tbilisi and Torelli missile boats. Georgia’s military infrastructure as a whole has been dealt a serious blow: its expensive bases in Gori and Senaki, the latter built to NATO standards, were both destroyed.
Flawed success
Despite Russia’s quick reaction and rapid victory, the campaign also revealed weaknesses. Its forces are equipped with outmoded weapons and did not seem prepared to engage in high-technology warfare. The rapid victory was won as a result of the Georgian army’s collapse as well as Saakashvili’s miscalculation. Had the Russian army faced a more resolute enemy equipped and trained to the level of the Georgian army, it would have suffered heavy losses.
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