Short war shows lack of modern systems
Georgia launched a massed artillery attack on the evening of 7 August on the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, and began to deploy its troops and tanks into South Ossetia. Its plan appears to have been to capture the city in the shortest possible time and to hand over nominal control of the territory to a pro-Georgian administration.
The attack followed a period of skirmishes between Georgian troops and South Ossetian militias, during which Georgian forces had taken control of the heights around Tskhinvali and had withdrawn peacekeeping troops. The heavy shelling destroyed many buildings and hit the Russian peacekeepers’ base in Tskhinvali, killing and wounding dozens of Russian soldiers. The head-quarters of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) monitoring mission was also hit. Within hours, Georgian forces took control of Tskhinvali and neighbouring villages.
Georgia had amassed ten light infantry battalions of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th infantry brigades, as well as special task forces and an artillery brigade – about 12,000 troops in total. Among these, the 4th brigade had been engaged in the US–Georgian exercise Immediate Response 2008 during the second half of July, alongside 1,000 American troops. This fuelled Russian claims – denied by Washington – that the United States was involved in preparations for the attack.
During the same period in July, some 8,000 Russian troops, including units from Russia’s 58th Army, took part in the exercise Caucasus 2008 across several of the republics of the North Caucasus, including North Ossetia.
On 8 August, units of the 19th Russian motor rifle division (headquartered in Vladikavkaz) of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus military command entered South Ossetia between 8am and noon. Initially, they had little air support, and Georgian aircraft were able to inflict damage on the advance units. Modern Russian forces had never before had to deal with an enemy air force.
By the evening, Russian troops were in the suburbs of Tskhinvali, but no significant fighting took place as the Georgian troops retreated.
While Russian forces were moving slowly through the narrow, four-kilometre-long Roki tunnel that links North and South Ossetia, Georgian forces enjoyed both numerical and fire superiority. By 10 August, however, Russian forces not only included units of the 19th division, but also the 76th airborne division from Pskov, the 42nd motor rifle division from Chechnya and special forces units, including some from the Chechen ‘East’ and ‘West’ battalions.
In total, Russian strength had grown to about 10,000 troops, with 150 pieces of armoured equipment, including T-62 and T-72 tanks and BMP-1 and BMP-2 armoured personnel carriers (APCs). Russia did not deploy any of its modern tanks or APCs.
The Georgian troops were overwhelmed by the Russian forces, which quickly captured the Prisskih heights to the south of Tskhinvali, and most of the Georgian artillery positions on them. Then they took control of Tskhinvali itself.
Meanwhile, the Russians had opened a ‘second front’ in Abkhazia, having redeployed 9,000 troops from the 7th airborne division from Novorossiisk, the 76th airborne division from Pskov, and marine infantry of the Black Sea Fleet. With their support, Abkhaz armed units began to force Georgian troops out of the upper end of the Kodori Gorge (the Kodori Valley) in Abkhazia. The Black Sea Fleet commenced a naval blockade of the Georgian coast.
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