Central Asia’s fears
Russia’s military intervention in Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia caused anxiety in Central Asia. Regional leaders initially kept silent. Their policy choices were limited by economic links to Russia and the fact that most of their populations read and watch Russian media. They sought to avoid joining Russia in its diplomatic isolation, while at the same time keeping Russia engaged on friendly terms.
Central Asian states waited until the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on 28 August to issue a common statement. They resisted calls by Russia to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia, leaving it to China, which opposes any form of separatism, to deliver the message to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The SCO supported Russia in its criticism of Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia, but called for the implementation of the six-point cease-fire plan and reaffirmed its opposition to separatism.
A second worry was that their foreign-policy options could become more limited. Most Central Asian states have tried to avoid making a choice between Russia and the West.
Uzbekistan was alone in moving away from close ties with the US to allying itself firmly with Russia. This occurred after it came under international scrutiny over the deaths of civilians in a government crackdown – most infamously during a rally in the town of Andijan in 2005. Uzbekistan responded to this scrutiny by closing a US military base in 2005 and pursuing closer ties with Russia. However, Uzbekistan has not received greater economic benefits from Russia and therefore has been trying to mend relations with the West.
A third concern relates to border disputes. When they were part of the Soviet Union, the borders of Central Asian states were arbitrarily drawn by Stalin in a manner that left the potential for ethnic conflict in many areas. For example, the Tajik cities of Bukhara and Samarkand were included in Uzbekistan, while Uzbek communities in the Ferghana valley were brought into Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, many experts predicted that Central Asia, rather than the Caucasus, would be the post-Soviet tinderbox. In the event, disputes were contained, and regional leaders worked to consolidate their states and develop relations with neighbours. However, many disputes remain unresolved. Hence, it is understandable that Central Asian leaders should refuse to recognise the breakaway states Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even though their relations with Russia are at stake.
Central Asian states are confronted by an increasingly aggressive and unilateralist Russia on one hand, and a divided and weakened transatlantic community on the other. Closeness with Russia is unappealing, as is closeness with the West. Therefore, they are increasingly looking to China and Gulf states as key economic partners.
1. Ukraine | 2. Nagarno-Karabakh | 3. Central Asia
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