The concerns of former Soviet states
From Ukraine to Central Asia, the shock waves from Russia’s intervention in the war in Georgia, and its subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are still being felt. Russia’s actions signalled to its neighbours that it was ready to defend its interests – by military means if necessary. Moscow increasingly sees NATO enlargement and Western military presence in the region as ‘red lines’ and is ready to respond assertively.
Regional states, particularly those most vulnerable to Russian pressure, are reviewing the assumptions behind their relations with both Russia and the West. The largely rhetorical Western response to Russia’s use of force has undermined hopes that partnership with the United States, NATO and the European Union could help post-Soviet states to maintain their territorial integrity.
This article discusses the implications for Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Central Asian states.
Prospects for Ukraine
Russia’s recent actions indicated it was no longer prepared to tolerate NATO enlargement to states with which it shared a long history and a long border. Like Georgia, Ukraine was a candidate for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April. This was rejected, but on American insistence Ukraine was told it would become a NATO member. President Victor Yushchenko’s resolve to keep pushing for membership could lead to confrontation with Russia.
As Yushchenko’s popularity waned and Ukraine entered a period of domestic political instability, Moscow tried to influence Ukrainian politics by supporting pro-Russian constituencies in eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, in January 2008 the government submitted a request to NATO to be granted a MAP.
The issue of NATO membership has split Ukrainians. A public opinion poll by the Kiev-based Sofia think-tank in May 2008 showed only 21% were inclined to support NATO membership, and 53% welcomed the April failure to secure a MAP. The principal worry was that membership would damage relations with Russia.
Moscow has warned that steps towards membership will be seen as a threat and will provoke responses ranging from the introduction of visas to targeting of missiles at Ukraine. Both the foreign ministry and the parliament have hinted that Moscow might even lay claim to Crimea, which was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. Under a 1997 treaty, Ukraine leased the Black Sea fleet’s Crimean base to the Russian navy until 2017. So Russia’s concerns about Ukraine joining NATO include the potential loss of the port of Sevastopol for its Black Sea fleet.
Yushchenko had already told Russia he would not extend the Sevastopol lease. When Russia sent troops into Georgia, he expressed strong support for Georgia and vowed to review the rules for Russia’s Black Sea ships – restricting their ability to conduct operations near Georgia without Ukraine’s approval. He appealed to the West to protect Ukraine against possible Russian pressure. But his position failed to win majority support in parliament. Even Orange Coalition members, including the party of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, refused to endorse it. As a result, three days before US Vice President Dick Cheney arrived in Kiev to support Ukraine’s NATO membership, the coalition collapsed, leaving Yushchenko isolated.
Many Europeans believe that Ukraine’s domestic political instability makes it too early to grant it a MAP. A delay would buy time and avoid confrontation with Moscow. The counter-argument is that Moscow should be sent a strong signal that it cannot achieve its goals by interfering in its neighbours’ domestic affairs.
With the Ukrainian economy dependent on imports of Russian gas, Russia has indicated that it is likely to more than double the price, potentially causing an economic crisis. It could also escalate threats to denounce the 1998 bilateral friendship treaty, which recognised Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Before NATO ministers meet to consider the issue in December, Moscow will work to dissuade Ukraine from pushing for a MAP, and thus put off the issue indefinitely.
1 | 2. Nagarno-Karabakh | 3. Central Asia
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