Russia's failing North Caucasus strategy
Ingushetia, a small Russian republic bordering Chechnya in the North Caucasus, has been plagued during the past year by a wave of violence, with frequent shootings, bombings and kidnappings. During the first five months of 2008, there were 53 attacks, killing 12 police officers and four service personnel and injuring 57 others. This represented a fourfold increase on last year, raising concern that this primarily Muslim republic could be on the brink of a major conflict.
For several years, a low-level insurgency has been under way, aimed at unseating the government of President Murat Zyazikov and expelling Russian troops from the region. But in summer 2007 there was a substantial upswing in activity by militant groups, including murders, hostage-taking and terrorist attacks on officials and civilians.
In response, parts of Ingushetia were declared zones of anti-terrorist operations in January 2008, and more troops were deployed into the region. However, operations by Russian forces have heightened discontent, as dozens of innocent civilians have been killed in raids supposedly designed to capture insurgents and terrorists. Meanwhile, Russian soldiers and the Ingush OMON riot police have clashed with demonstrators in the largest Ingushetian town of Nazran, during protests about rigged elections and extrajudicial killings by security forces.
In June 2008, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Human Rights Watch accused Russian federal forces of 'dirty war' tactics and 'Chechnya-style' operations in Ingushetia, including the torture of suspects, kidnapping of journalists and suppression of political opposition. In July, groups unhappy with the Kremlin-appointed Zyazikov collected 80,000 signatures calling for the reinstatement of his charismatic and populist predecessor, Ruslan Aushev, and presented their petition to the Russian federal authorities.
Roots of the problem
Ingushetia's location and history are central to its current problems. Along with other North Caucasus mountain tribes, the Ingush were incorporated into the Russian empire after the nineteenth-century Caucasian War. Under Stalin, they were subjected to collective repression, accused of Nazi collaboration and, like several Soviet peoples, deported to Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Ingush were recognised as a 'repressed people' and given the right to resettle in their original homes. However, the sizeable Prigorodnyi District of Ingushetia had been transferred in 1944 by the central Soviet authorities to the neighbouring republic of North Ossetia.
When Ingushetia tried to reassert its territorial claim in 1992, much of the district had been settled by ethnic Ossetians, and these competing claims to the land sparked the first violent inter-ethnic conflict in the North Caucasus. During five days of intense fighting, 478 people were killed and 840 injured. More than 40,000 became internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a simmering dispute that continues to colour Ingushetia's relationship with both North Ossetia and the central Russian authorities.
At the same time, war was looming on Ingushetia's eastern border. In the Soviet era, there was one Chechen–Ingush Republic. However, Ingushetia has never sought to separate itself from Moscow, and the two North Caucasus regions officially split in June 1992 after Chechnya decided to pursue independence. During the first (1994–1996) and second (1999–2000) Chechen wars, the Ingush largely supported the federal Russian centre. The unsuccessful struggle for Chechen independence resulted in between
30,000 and 100,000 deaths, while many others were forced to flee. During the second Chechen war, some 240,000 refugees – half as many people as the entire Ingush population – fled to Ingushetia. Militants from Chechnya made raids across the border, kidnapping Chechen refugees and targeting Ingush victims as well.
The last refugee camp closed only in 2004, which was a particularly violent year in the region. In June, an ambush led by Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev killed dozens of policemen in Nazran. Basayev also claimed responsibility for the September attack on a school in Beslan in North Ossetia, during which 330 people, many of them women and children, were killed. (Basayev was killed in Ingushetia in 2006, when a lorry carrying explosives blew up – which Russian forces claimed as one of their 'special operations'.)
Discontent with regional leaders
Instability in Ingushetia is one manifestation of the failure of the centralisation of power by the former president, Vladimir Putin, who is now Russia's prime minister. After Beslan, which exposed the severe shortcomings of regional governments in maintaining security, he abolished the election of regional governors and replaced them with a system of appointed heads of republics, who were naturally loyal to the Kremlin.
In search of a strong leader, Putin re-appointed ex-Federal Security Service (FSB) General Zyazikov as regional president in 2005; Zyazikov had initially been elected president in 2002 with the backing of the federal authorities and security community. While Zyazikov's predecessor, Ruslan Aushev had governed Ingushetia from 1993 to 2002 with a high degree of regional independence. Under President Zyazikov, however, the regional authorities have relied on loyalty to the Kremlin as their main source of power and legitimacy. Zyazikov was expected to bring order, stability and security, but his appointment has increasingly become a source of discontent. He has rejected dialogue with local clans and activists, and is seen as having failed to deliver on corruption, the economy and disputes with North Ossetia over the Prigorodnyi District.
Although the main objective of the opposition is to replace Zyazikov's government, there are two separate opposition movements. The first, now loosely united behind Aushev, includes civic activists: human-rights advocates, local NGOs and civic leaders. Initially disillusioned by the authorities' inability to resolve the 1990s Ingush–North Ossetian conflict, and later alienated by corrupt leaders and clan politics, this group has been particularly concerned about excessive force employed by Russian interior forces and military, as well as concerned by vote-rigging.
This group was outraged when the results of the December 2007 Duma election results showed 99% of Ingushetia's population voting for United Russia (a party now headed by Putin and which supported the candidacy of the new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev). This, they alleged, showed clear manipulation.
The second opposition stream includes a radical Islamist insurgency. An estimated 100 active Islamic radicals plus numerous sympathisers comprise the Ingush Jamaat, which fought on the side of the rebels in Chechnya and eight of whom were among the Beslan hostage-takers.
Many of the attacks and murders of 2007 were attributed to Islamist groups, which have targeted both Ingush and non-Ingush populations in an attempt to provoke inter-ethnic tensions, as well as police, security forces and regional administrators. Victims have included Russian teachers, Armenian railway workers, Dagestani herdsmen, Koreans and Roma families. A senior official of Ingushetia's Ministry for Intranational Relations and Social Links, Vakha Vedzizhev, was assassinated by extremists in June 2007, while Nazran's mayor, Magomed Tschoev, was shot at in December.
Zyazikov and those close to him have also been targeted; a grenade launcher was fired in June 2007 at his head of security (and distant cousin) Ruslanbek Zyazikov, who has been accused by one leading opposition activist of funnelling $30,000–$60,000 a month in kickbacks to the president, as well as ordering armed attacks on the Zyazikov government's opponents.
While the Islamists share civic activists' discontent with ineffective and corrupt leaders, they have additional and diverse motivations. They were dismayed by the failure of separatism in Chechnya. While religion may be one inspiration for their actions, their agenda sometimes appears essentially criminal. They have also reacted to the murder of civilians by Russian forces.
Counter-productive response
The republic's pro-Moscow authorities have refused to hold a dialogue with either the moderate or the extremist opposition, and have also failed to challenge the actions of the Kremlin and federal forces. For its part, the Kremlin has failed to understand the complex set of grievances behind the growing discontent and violence in Ingushetia. It sees the current situation purely as a threat to the Russian Federation's security, and in its blind support for Zyazikov has been unable to distinguish between popular discontent and radical Islamist opposition.
Moscow's plan has simply involved strengthening military forces stationed in Ingushetia. Under its counter-insurgent 'Programme for Ingushetia' some 2,500 additional troops from the Russian Ministry of Internal Forces were deployed in the republic in August 2007. The strongest regiment of the North Caucasus' military district – the 503rd motorised regiment of the 58th army – is now permanently deployed in the Sunzhensky District of Ingushetia on the border with Chechnya, while forces from the FSB have also been sent in.
However, these actions have not produced any lasting stabilisation and have not addressed problems such as loss of faith in the local authorities. They seek to address insurgent violence through military operations rather than through the legal system.
Moderate opposition groups continue to protest; besides demonstrations in November 2007 and January 2008 there was the collection of signatures under an 'I didn't vote!' campaign to expose election manipulation in December and the recent pro-Aushev petition.
Violence has also continued, with an arson attack on the deputy prime minister's home and at least four other incidents in the first two weeks of July 2008 resulting in the death and injury of policemen, militants and villagers. In March, Zyazikov had sacked his cabinet in an attempt to deflect criticism for the crisis away from himself, although the tactic seems not to have been especially successful.
New strategy needed
The instability in Ingushetia highlights the need for a new strategy and a change of governance models in the entire North Caucasus. The current Kremlin paradigm does not focus on integrating the region with the rest of Russia, but is based on formal control through leaders appointed by and accountable to Moscow. Yet despite Zyazikov's assertion in December 2007 that political turbulence in Ingushetia was a result of interference by the United States, the Kremlin-backed local authorities are rapidly losing legitimacy and support among increasingly disenfranchised and radicalised populations.
An alternative approach by Moscow would promote the rule of law, empower moderate civic activists and hold the regional authorities accountable for the growing discontent. This could only be done if local leaders enjoyed the support and trust of the local population.
Such a strategy would be at odds with the general trend within Russia, but elsewhere in the federation the lack of real choice in elections and of genuine opposition seems a less urgent problem amid the oil-infused economic boom and the growing power of bureaucracy.
In the Caucasus, however, the lack of institutions has produced instability even in a republic such as Ingushetia, which has shown no appetite for secession. Further delay to political reforms could lead to a rise in support for radical Islamic groups, potentially causing a region-wide struggle that could hasten the realisation of Moscow's fear of losing the Caucasus.